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ABSTRACT
The Political Elite in Kazakhstan Since Independence (199 1-1998):
Origins, Structure and Policies
This is an analysis of the post-independence Ka.zakhstani elite between 1991 and 1998.
Exploratory in nature, the thesis seeks to demonstrate four main points. First, historical
antecedents and concurrent socioeconomic and political forces partly explain the
composition, recruitment and nature of Kazakhstan's post-independent political elite.
Second, while the political elite displays a certain consensus in its cognitive
orientations, its social origins have become less homogeneous and its interests
increasingly fragmented as a result of socioeconomic change. Third, the structure of the
elite has narrowed between 1991 and 1998; this closed elite, through careful recruitment
policies, is ensuring its self-replication. Fourth, if some links can be made between elite
origins, attitudes and behaviour, these are only of a tentative nature.
These lines of enquiry are demonstrated in three sections: the historical antecedents and
institutional sources of Kazakhstan's political elite (Section I); the degree of elite
integration, in terms primarily of social homogeneity and recruitment (Section II); and
the link, if any, between social structure and policies of the political elite (Section III).
The study is based on Russian and Kazakh primary and secondary sources and on
interviews with the political elite and a "panel of experts".
After establishing the work's aims and limits, the first section defines the terms
"political elite" and establishes the methodology employed to locate and analyse the
political elite. Chapters 1.1 and 1.2 provide the historical and institutional context in
which the post-independence political elite has operated. Chapter 11.1 addresses elite
composition and structure according to dimensions of social background, in particular
those of education, career, ethnicity and sub-ethnicity. Chapter 11.2 assesses the
recruitment process since 1991. Section III assesses two major elite policy spheres of
these last eight years: nation-building and economic reform. The conclusion aims to
establish the degree of linkage between these three sections and briefly discusses the
implications of elite structure and integration for the future stability of the regime.
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INTRODUCTION
People are the basic element of all social structure. Human beings create a society and
its traditions. The assumption of this thesis is that the political elite plays a crucial role
in the shaping of society.' In a society undergoing rapid social change2 with a strong
social hierarchy and where political passivity is considerable, the role of the elite as an
instigator of reform is crucial. 3
 This is a study of the post-independence Kazakhstani
elite between 1991 and 1998. The analysis follows three lines of enquiry: the historical
antecedents and institutional sources of Kazakhstan's political elite (Section I); the
degree of elite integration, in terms of social homogeneity, personal interaction and, to a
degree, value consensus (Section II); and the link, if any, between social structure and
policies of the political elite (Section III). This chapter explains the rationale behind the
enquiry, its theoretical considerations, and its methdology.6
A number of reasons make Kazakhstan an interesting case-study. Kazakhstan is
an "accidental country", a nation that emerged from a Soviet republic which was never
intended to be an independent state. 7 By contrast, the Eastern European upheavals
involved largely sudden mass mobilisations that rendered regimes defunct, thereby
creating power vacuums into which emerging opposition elites quickly stepped. The
speed and ease with which this happened (outside Romania) testified to the always quite
artificial, externally-imposed nature of the communist regimes; they fell like houses of
cards. No humanistic intelligentsia existed in Kazakhstan to lead a comparable
revolution or transition.
The post-independence Kazakhstani elite was not only initially reluctant to
assume power but also highly insecure. At the root of the Republic's problems in 1991
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was the fact that Kazakhstan was the only Soviet republic in which the titular
nationality was a minority population; according to the last Soviet census, taken in
1989, Kazakhs constituted 39.5 percent of the population, while Russians were 37.7
percent. Combined with the Ukrainians (5.4 percent) and the Belorussians (1.1 percent),
the Slays constituted 44.2 percent of the population. When combined with the largely
Russified Germans (5.8 percent), non-Kazakhs formed a bare but absolute majority of
the Republic. Moreover, many of these were, and are, settled in nearly homogenous
communities in the Republic's north, hard against Russia's southern and Siberian cities.
By most predictions the 1999 census will indicate that, largely as a result of substantial
Slav emigration, ethnic Kazakhs for the first time in their history of statehood have
reached a majority. Faced with these cleavages, the Republic's only post-independence
president, Nursultan Abisevich Nazarbaev, has celebrated his country's maintenance of
interethnic peace. However by virtue of this multiethnicity, the elite has been deprived
of an immediate source of legitimacy: monoethnic nationalism.
Despite their new-found status, then, Kazakhs were still faced with a substantial
Russian minority from the era of nineteenth-century Russian colonisation and twentieth-
century Sovietisation, a constant reminder to the political elite of its continued
vulnerability to external political and cultural influence. Indeed, the Kazakh steppe
cannot be considered a part of Central Asia proper; in Donald Carlisle's words, "it
should be viewed as a Eurasian territory with a longtime - and enduring - subjugation
to or dependence on Russia". 8
 Historically, as we shall see, Russia had always been
preferred to China as a partner since Chinese-Central Asian relations were hampered by
the "legacy of mutual suspicion and fear". 9
 China built the Great Wall as protection
against invasion by Mongol and Turkic tribes and China's Han dynasty ruled large
tracts of Central Asia until the second century A.D. The Arab conquest of Persia opened
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up China more to influences from farther west. Furthermore, China's westward
expansion left a large Turkic-Muslim minority in China's Xinjiang province and a
strong, albeit unspoken, belief among many Chinese that large parts of Kazakhstan and
Tajikistan "rightfully belong to them ". '°
In contrast to these multinational and geopolitical constraints, Kazakhstan's
prospects as a viable economic unit were better in 1991 than those of many other
successor states. Only some sixty years prior to independence, as Stalinism's
collectivisation policy had still to be fully launched, the vast majority of ethnic Kazakhs
were still pastoral nomads." Sovietisation thus entailed sedentarisation as well as
collectivisation. Like all successor states, Kazakhstan emerged from the Soviet era
industrialised and urbanised. Kazakhstan inherited a sometimes obsolete but
nevertheless significant manufacturing and processing industrial sector (including
phosphate fertilizers, rolled metal, train bearings, tractors and bulldozers). According to
Martha Brill Olcott, Kazakhstan also supplied about 11 percent of the total military
production of the USSR and housed 1,360 nuclear warheads and one of the world's
largest satellite-launching centre, at Baikonur. Nearly a third of its inherited workforce
of 6.5 million people had enjoyed at least a secondary education in a total population of
virtually universal literacy. The Soviet period also bequeathed a highly developed
technical and physical infrastructure. Concludes Olcott: "Indeed, at independence,
Ka.zakhstan could claim to be one of the world's most technologically advanced
states". 12
Unlike many other successor states, it also emerged with substantial wealth
beneath its soil. According to Nazarbaev, Kazakhstan holds 30 percent of the world's
proven reserves of chromium, 25 percent of manganese, 19 percent of lead, 13 percent
of zinc, 10 percent of copper and 10 percent of iron. The President also claimed,
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although without citing percentages, that Kazakhstan ranked first worldwide with
respect to estimated reserves of uranium, and seventh worldwide for gold.' 3
 Crucially,
Kazakhstan possesses the longest border of the Caspian Sea and thus stands to benefit
exponentially once its oil reserves are tapped.' 4
 In 1992 the Kazakhstani government
signed two flagship deals: with Chevron over the Western Tengiz oil-field and with
British Gas and Agip over the Western Karachaganak gas-field.' 5
 By 1997, Kazakhstan
enjoyed the largest foreign direct investment of all successor states.' 6
 These economic
ventures are linked in another way to geopolitics: as a land-locked country, Kazakhstan
relies on the good-will of its neighbours for the export of its products. As of 1998 all
existing oil and gas pipeline routes continued to run through Russia.
In an echo of communism's top-down structure, the political elite's legitimacy
has depended to a large degree on its ability to redistribute those resources. The political
elite's ability to ensure economic redistribution will be its surest guarantee of keeping
society together. Emile Durkheim argued that what provides a society's solidarity and
its sense of identity is a form of a collective conscience or set of values and ideas
created in the process of living together and carried around in the minds of the members
of the group.' 7
 He called these ideas - embodying both values and instrumental
knowledge - "collective representations". People behave in accordance with these
collective representations or, what he sometimes called, "currents of opinion". Changes
in population densities, Durkheim contended, led to social change. Social change,
economic reform and geopolitical constraints create considerable challenges for the
cohesion, autonomy and effectiveness of Kazakhstan's contemporary elite.
Studies of political elites have drawn on social-background information both to
illustrate theoretical concepts and to establish relationships among social, economic and
political variables. This thesis aims to identify such empirical connections in the
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Kazakhstani context. Terms such as an "homogeneous-ruling elite", "the elite-mass
gap" and "the integration of a political system" will be illustrated and clarified by a
quantitative study of the characteristics of the political elite. Similarly, in the search for
theoretically interesting statistical relationships, information concerning political elites
may be seen as a dependent variable affected by social and economic changes, or as an
independent variable producing results of political and social significance. Such a study
of the Kazakhstani political elite both as a dependent (i.e. where its formation is related
to other factors) and as an independent variable (i.e. where the political elite itself
affects other variables) is arranged in the following three sections.
The first section provides the historical and institutional context of the
contemporary political elite. One of the first tasks is to discover how the political elite
emerged in Kazakhstani society. Here it is well to follow Durkheim who distinguished
three separate elements: the antecedent cause, the concomitant cause, and the current
function. Section 1.1 looks at the antecedent cause, at the political tradition of the
steppe, Russian colonisation and Sovietisation. But the Kazakhstani elite cannot be
reduced to these historically antecedent groups, and 1.2 considers the concomitant
causes, or the concurrent social forces that underlie the emergence of the contemporary
elite. 1.2 considers whether, institutionally, the elite in Kazakhstan is a pluralist or
power elite.'8
John Higley et a!. pay particular aftention to the possible emergence of national
elites that share a consensus on rules of the game and that are unified in defence of
democratic institutions. 19 With such elite consensus and unity, stable democracies are
feasible, though perhaps not inevitable. 20
 The thesis will also ask whether the failure of
such unity has been one of the key reasons why Kazakhstan has failed to democratise.
Higley el a! argue that if elites become deeply disunited, unstable regions that oscillate
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between pseudo-democratic and authoritarian forms, probably accompanied by much
violence, are a virtual certainty. 2 ' In this section we also analyse the linkage of social
status and political power. As we shall see, classical elite theory states that in modern
societies wealth and social status and political power reinforce each other. The elite may
be a "balance of the dominant social forces" in society. Pluralists argue that there is
diversity in social class origins.
This institutional context established, Section II will assess the degree of elite
integration by assessing several prominent "dimensions of integration", along the three
parameters of social homogeneity, recruitment patterns (which also helps us to look at
the permeability or ease of entrance into the elite), and - where possible - value
consensus.22
 The concept of an integrated political system implies that political leaders
and activists throughout a country and at each level of authority hold relatively similar
ideas as to how government should be managed. In terms of social homogeneity,
different stages of economic and political development seem to be associated with the
dominance of distinctive types of political elite. With the large amount of evidence that
exists suggesting that socioeconomic status and political power are closely linked, it
should be possible to establish whether this is an unstable political system in elite terms,
such as those in which the secondary elite is more highly educated and enjoys more
prestige than the top elite. 23
 After the degree of their social homogeneity has been
established in 11.1, recruitment patterns are analysed. Where possible, some indication
of the values of the political elite will be made; it is important to state at the outset that
elite cognitive orientations, although crucial, are extremely nebulous and subjective at
the best of times. 24
The third section analyses the output of the elite in two crucial policy areas:
nation-building (ifi. 1) and the post-Soviet reform of the economy (111.2). Here we
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assess the outward expression of elite values, the degree of intra-elite conflict that has
arisen in the formulation of these policies, and the degree to which such policies have
been reshaping the nature of the elite. We can go some way toward assessing how
predictable this output is in the light of the structure and composition of the elite.
Theories linking social background characteristics to political behaviour grow out of the
work of Lasswell and Lerner. 25 Discussions of these linkages are found in Eulau and
Sprague who focused on the legal profession; Janowitz who studied the American
military establishment and the origins of the officer class;27 and, Frey who investigated
the relationships between education, occupation, age and place of birth and the
behaviour of Turkish parliamentarians.28
The conclusion will attempt a broader theoretical discussion in the light of this
empirical evidence. For example, are there any linkages between our sections? Searing
posited the weak links between social background and attitudes. Is the structure of
society unalterable? What links are there between the composition and output of the
elite? From the point of view of stable, effective democracy, is elite integration
desirable? By extension, can we divide society in Kazakhstan quite clearly into those
who have "significant" political power and those who have none? Do the powerful try
to claim legitimacy for their power, so it is acknowledged and accepted in the eyes of
their subordinates and institutionalised in social arrangements? We will also look here
at the relationship between elites and non-elites.
In seeking statistical relationships between socioeconomic variables and the
social backgrounds of political leaders, the researcher is entering a field where data,
while assembled with much effort and perseverance, will remain somewhat incomplete
and where crude empiricism and abstract theonsing are both occupational hazards.
There are literally hundreds of quantitative studies on the background of political elites.
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The attention paid to political elites and to their social backgrounds has frequently been
justified by injunctions such as those of Reinhard Bendix who has written that:
a study of politics should be concerned with the social composition of the
members and leaders of different political organisations; this kind of knowledge
will provide a clue to the political goals which their leaders are likely to
pursue.3°
Expanding on the rationale for these studies, Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing have
written that:
The stated or implied underlying assumption [in social-background research] is
that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns will facilitate
understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good
deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite
relationships and about elite-mass relationships.3'
This thesis hopes to draw some wider implications from the social data. There will be
limits to the types of conclusions that can be drawn. This is because the use of one case
study - which does not compare systematically across time or space - can really only be
considered in isolation. The thesis thus falls into the most common type of study of
political elites to date conducted by social scientists - the analysis of a single political
unit at a single point in time. The use of one case-study can be justified for a number of
positive reasons, however.
First, at a minimum, this represents the first detailed analysis of the political elite
in Kazakhstan, and in Central Asia in general. Second, meaningful comparisons are
strengthened by an intimate knowledge of one country. Often one country is a
microcosm of trends witnessed elsewhere, and by understanding intimately the
interrelationships of one country, more confident comparisons can then be made. Third,
data gathering on one country is time-consuming. The data on this elite was collected in
two periods, one nine-month period from October 1995 to June 1996 and October to
December 1997. As explained in the Appendix, obtaining access to the elite was
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difficult and time-consuming. Fourth, in the absence of strong institutions and legal
norms, individuals oflen count more than institutions. Finally, comparisons of the same
political unit at different moments is of particular interest in the study of periods of
rapid change, which 1991-1998 has been for Kazakhstan.32
For data to be useful it must be as complete as possible, compiled through sound
methodology and analysed by adequate theory. The methodology for elite studies has
been somewhat neglected. 33
 The Appendix describes the methodology and variables
used. That study of methodology principally argues that the definition of a political elite
must be empirically grounded.
While a major concern has been the search for political elites, disagreements
over whether one has been located frequently derive from the use of incommensurate
definitions. Harold Lasswell defined the political elite as "the power holders of a body
politic ... the political elite is the top power class". C. Wright Mills defined it as
"men. . . in positions to make decisions having major consequences ... [T]hey are in
command of the major hierarchies and organisations of modern society". 35
 Robert Dahl
referred to it as "a minority of individuals whose preference regularly prevails in cases
of differences in preferences on key political issues". 36
 James Meisel, however, framed
it as "the collective manipulation of the masses by a small leadership group or by
several such groups... To put it into a facile formula, all elites shall be credited here
with what we should like to call the three C's: group consciousness, coherence and
conspiracy".37
 Finally, it has simply been termed "an elite which exercises preponderant
political influence". 38
 Taken together, the definitions contain two crucial problems:
different labels are used to refer to the same concept and different concepts are covered
by the same label. These problems are discussed by Alan Zuckerman and the following
represents a summary of the points he raises.39
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Not only is there no general consensus as to how and where to use the concept
"political elite", 40
 but also each of the suggested definitions also contains difficulties:
(1)To define the political elite as those who control "real, effective power" raises the
question of how to determine who in practice comprises the political elite. To cite
Fleron's critique of Bottomore, "First, we are still left to grapple with the elusive
concept of 'power'. Secondly, before using the concept 'elite', thus defined, in the study
of any particular political systems [sic] we still have to solve the empirical problems of
identifying those individuals who in fact exercise political power in that political
system" 41
(2) To define the political elite by the control of political institutional positions omits
those individuals who exert influence outside institutions. Although it is not possible to
identify all individuals with informal power, attempts can be made to identify some of
these individuals. This need is all the more the case in Kazakhstan, where, as we shall
see, individuals without institutional power can be just as effective as those with
institutional status. As Fleron maintained, there is still no certainty that those indicated
are the actual controllers of power. 42
 Lasswell argued for the utility of initially denoting
the political elite by the following positions and then seeking to determine whether the
occupants are the power-holders: (a) high government officials; (b) those who have
recently occupied office and are in harmony with those in power; (c) those perceived as
highly influential; (d) those of a counter-ideology who are perceived as highly
influential; and (e) close family members.43
(3) Finally for our purposes as Zuckerman highlights, "in some cases, the definitions
chosen make it impossible not to find a political elite. In others, the criteria used make it
impossible to find one ' As will be shown, Pareto's conceptualisation is an example
of the first point.45
 Dahi's definition exemplifies the second problem. Both Dahi and
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his critics agree that political elites are incompatible with democracy. They differ on
whether a political elite is to be found in the United State and, therefore, over the
normative appraisal of the American polity. Dahi includes cohesion and finds a divided
leadership group in New Haven and, therefore, by his definition, no political elite.
This thesis follows Bottomore by identifying both a political class and a political
elite:
I shall use here Mosca's term, the "political class", to refer to all those groups
which exercise political power or influence, and are directly engaged in
struggles for political leadership; and I shall distinguish within the political class
a smaller group, the political elite, which comprises those individuals who
actually exercise political power in a given society at a given time.47
I shall refer to the broader political class as the political elite and to Bottomore's
political elite as the core elite. This enables me to identify a broader political elite in
1995 and to follow the paths of a core elite - the political elite who actually exercise
political power - over three time periods, 1992, 1995 and 1998. The political class
enables me to conduct a wider statistical analysis of the political elite; the core elite
identifies individuals with key influence.
Nevertheless, although sight must not be lost of members of the political elite as
individuals, the elite is considered as a social group. It is in their roles rather than as
individual personalities that we usually encounter them. It is a record not primarily of
the people, but the parts they played. The destiny of a class is not identical with that of
the individuals within it. The relative breadth of Bottomore's definition is particularly
relevant to Kazakhstan where power remains informal. Power is understood here as "a
process involving the exercise of control, constraint and coercion in society". There is
no commonly accepted definition of social power, but the essential idea is that power is
the ability to affect the actions or ideas of others, despite resistance. It is thus a dynamic
process. When studying political elites, it is most useful to consider power as the ability
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to influence outcomes, or, more precisely, the policies and activities of the state, or (in
the language of systems theory) the probability of influencing the authoritative
allocation of values.
The full significance of this definition, I hope, will become apparent by the
close of the thesis but it is a definition, working backwards, that is grounded in
empirical evidence and theoretical considerations. This is because, as noted by
Zuckerman, the problem with the definition of political elites is that the concept has led
to a morass of conflicting definitions, the fI.ill ambiguities of which have not been
solved.49
Concepts must be both empirically precise and theoretically useful. In the
conclusion we shall return to whether the definition was empirically precise. For the
moment we shall introduce the key elite theorists, whose relevance for Kazakhstan will
be discussed in the conclusion once the empirical evidence has been gathered.
Elite theorists fall into two main groups: those selecting a single elite - usually
the "political" - a single, socially decisive unit, and here Aristotle, Pareto, and Mosca
bear relevance; those who insist that a number of elites coexist, sharing power,
responsibilities, and rewards and here belong such writers as Saint-Simon, Karl
Mannheim, Raymond Aron, H.D Lasswell, Floyd Hunter, C. Wright Mills and Robert
Dahl.5°
Aristotle focused on the social function of elites. He argued that elites are linked
to the moral and material needs of the community. Like Plato, he saw the state as an
instrument designed to fulfil collective ends and to serve communal needs. Irrespective
of the form of government that develops, an elite must emerge to carry on the affairs of
the state. French nobleman Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon, also saw
elites linked to the social needs of the community but argued that those needs, writing
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as he did during the industrial revolution, were above all dictated by the emerging
industrial society. Hence the importance of industrial producers. These producers - later
to be replaced by high priests preaching the gospel of industrialism, he argued, would
manage equilibrium. By rejecting the model of a single dominant political elite and by
substituting for it the industrial elite, Saint-Simon anticipated a number of modern
tendencies.
Mosca and Pareto were concerned with the conflict between two minorities.
Pareto saw this conflict as a struggle between representatives of two types of social
character, the lions and the foxes; Mosca assigned key significance to the skilful
utilisation of political formulas by those in power. But both writers, in Machiavellian
fashion, emphasised the importance of correct strategy for the maintenance of power,
and both underscored the importance of traditional and nonrational forces in communal
life. Perhaps their chief distinction is the insistence that a ruling class or elite is an
inevitable feature of complex societies. But they put it all at the doorstep of personality
and failed to account for the historical variety of elite types. Michels studied power in
specific organisations rather than in society as a whole. He formulated the famous "iron
law of oligarchy". This states, "Who says organisation, says oligarchy".5'
Mannheim wrote on the problem of defining political generations, a topic which
has still not been adequately treated. Man and Sociely in an Age of Reconstruction
developed Saint-Simon's ideas on elites as a response of the functional needs of society.
Rather than explaining the rise of elites in terms of power-hungry individuals,
Mannheim saw elites as part of a system of collective relationships and necessities.
Elites, in Mannheim's view, exercise functional and institutional power. Contrary to the
Marxists and the "Machiavellians" referred to earlier, Mannheim held that the
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replacement of personal and arbitrary power by functional and institutional power to be
a major social trend in modern times. Hence power is more legitimate and limited.
Mannheim was a member of a transitional generation of scholars whose works
form a bridge between an older (and largely European) generation of philosophical
students of social structure and social change and a younger generation (largely
American) whose theoretical efforts are grounded in empirical studies. In this respect,
and with particular reference to the analysis of patterns of power, Mannheim may be
grouped with such scholars as Harold D. Lasswell.
Lasswell and some of his younger colleagues made the first systematic attempt
to date to conduct comprehensive empirical studies of political elites on a world scale.52
Lasswell followed in the footsteps of Pareto by analysing socio-psychological traits of
elites - various skills, personality attributes, attitudes and symbols in the struggle for
attaining and maintaining elite status. But Lasswell is clearly more interested in
ascertaining what channels are open for those aspiring to elite positions and what
rewards await those who succeed than in the social and cultural circumstances
underlying the existence of these positions.
A third group, finally, may also be mentioned. This group concentrates on the
distribution of power in sub-national communities - for example, cities in the American
state of Georgia, by Floyd Hunter. These investigations generally concluded that a small
number of people, mainly from the upper or upper middle class backgrounds, and/or
representing business interests, were predominant in the community. Wright Mills
applied these findings to the national level in the United States. In his influential study
of The Power Elite, Mills argued that three interlocking groups dominated the
"command posts" of American society: political leaders, corporate leaders; and military
leaders. DahI challenged these interpretations, arguing that the image of a closed power
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elite should be replaced by that of a relatively competitive environment in which there
are dispersed inequalities of power. 53
 Suzanne Keller argued instead that society is
governed by strategic elites which "consist of the minority of individuals responsible for
keeping the organized system, society, in working order, functioning so as to meet and
surpass the perennial collective crises that occur". 54
 These various theories of elites will
be borne in mind as the empirical analysis of the Kazakhstani elite now begins.
Endnotes to Introduction
'Key works on the Soviet political elite include: T.H. Rigby, Political Elites in the
USSR: Central Leaders and Local Cadres form Lenin to Gorbachev (Aid ershot and
Vermont, Edward Elgar, 1990); David Lane (ed.), Elites and Political Power in the
USSR (Aldershot: Elgar, 1988); Jeffrey Kiugman, The New Soviet Elite: How They
Think and What They Want (New York: Praeger, 1989); Michael Voslensky,
Nomenklatura: Anatomy of the Soviet ruling class (London: Bodley Head, 1984); Evan
Mawdsley, 'Portrait of a Changing Elite: CPSU Central Committee Full Members,
1939-1990 ", in Stephen White (ed.), New Directions in Soviet History (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 191-206.
2 For an introduction to transition literature, see G. O'Donnell & P.C. Schmitter,
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions (Baltimore and London,
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). In the Soviet context, see Stephen White,
Graeme Gill and Darrell Slider, The Politics of Transition: Shaping a Post-Soviet
Future (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
The focus on national elites in transition is often associated with the work of Dankwart
Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model ", Comparative Politics
(Vol. 2, No. 3, 1970), pp. 337-63. See also his "The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When
and How", World Politics (Vol. 18, No. 3,July 1966), pp. 690-717. On the role of elites
in transition see, John Higley and Michael G. Burton, "The Elite Variable in
Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns", American Sociological Review, (Vol. 54, No.
1, 1989) pp. 17-32; Thomas A. Baylis, 'Plus ça Change? Transformation and
Continuity Amongst East European Elite", Communist and Post-Communist Studies
(Vol. 27, No. 3, September 1994), pp. 315-328; "Circulation vs Reproduction of Elites
during the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe", special issue of Theory
and Society (Vol. 24, No. 5, October 1995); "Regime Transitions, Elites, and
Bureaucracies in Eastern Europe", special issue of Governance: An International
Journal of Policy andAdminisiralion (Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1993); John Higley, Judith
Kullbert & Jan Pakulski, "The Persistence of Postcommunist Elites ", Journal of
Democracy (Vol. 7, No. 2, April 1996), pp. 133-147; John Higley and Jan Pakulski,
21
"Revolution and Elite Transformation in Eastern Europe ", Australian Journal of
Political Science (Vol. 27, 1992), pp. 104-119; and Heinrich Best and Ulrike Becker(eds.), Elites in Transition: Elite Research in Central and Eastern Europe (Opladen:
Leske + Budrich, 1997).
Interesting studies of other post-communist elites include: Anton Steen, Between Past
and Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-Communist Countries: A
Comparison of Estonig Latvia andLithuania (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997); Timothy J.
Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995); Olga Kryshtanovskaya & Stephen White, "From Soviet
Nomenklatura to Russian Elite", Europe-Asia Studies (Vol. 48, No. 5, July 1996), pp.
711-734; David Lane and Cameron Ross, "The Changing Composition of the Political
Elites", in David Lane (ed.), Russia in Transition (London: Longman, 1995), pp. 52-75.
Rarer studies are of the regional elites: James Hughes, "Sub-national Elites and Post-
communist Transformation in Russia: A Reply to Kryshtanovskaya & White", Europe-
Asia Studies (Vol. 49, No. 6, 1997), pp. 10 17-1036; and Hellmut Woliman, "Change
and Continuity of Political and Administrative Elites in Post-Communist Russia",
Governance (Vol. 6, No. 3, July 1993), pp. 325-340.
David Lane has written extensively on the post-communist Russian elite,
including 'Political Elites Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin in the Early Period of
Transition: A Reputational and Analytical Study" in Timothy J. Colton and Robert C.
Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp.
29-48; "The Gorbachev Revolution The Role of the Political Elite in Regime
Disintegration ", Political Studies, (Vol. 44, No. 1, March 1996), pp. 4-23; "The
Transformation of Russia: The Role of the Political Elite ", Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.
48, No. 4, June 1996, pp. 535-550; and "The Role of Elite and Class in the Transition in
Russia ", paper presented to the Political Studies Association Communist and Post-
Communist Studies Conference, South Bank University, London, 6 Februaryl999.
For notions of elite cohesion see John Higley and Jan Pakulski, "Revolution and Elite
Transformation in Eastern Europe", Australian Journal of Political Science, (Vol. 27,
No.!, March 1992), pp. 104-119.
6 See the Annex for a full explanation of the methodology employed.
7 Martha Brill Olcott, "Democratization and the Growth of Political Participation in
Kazakstan", in Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (eds.), Conflict, Cleavage and Change
in CentralAsia and the Caucasus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.
201.
8 Donald Carlisle, "Islam Karimov and Uzbekistan: Back to the Future?", in Timothy J.
Colton and Robert C. Tucker (eds.), Patterns in Post-Soviet Leadership (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1995), p. 211.
Shireen Hunter, CentralAsia Since Independence, (Washington, DC: The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, published by Praeger Press, 1996), pp. 124-5.10 See Keith Martin, "China and Central Asia: Between Seduction and Suspicion ",
RFE/RL Research Report (Vol. 3, No.25, 24 June 1994).
Some sedentarisat ion had already occurred under the Russian period
12 Martha Bnll Olcott provides a neat summary of the industrial legacy. See her The
Kazakhs, 2"°' edn (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), p. 272.13 Almaty Investment Summit, Panorama, 4 June 1998; and Interfax-Kazakhstan, 4
June 1998.
14 Oil reserve estimated for the Caucasus and Central Asia as a whole vary greatly and
range from 3Obn to 200bn barrels. These estimates include proven and possible
22
reserves. Industry analysts often use a middle range of figure of 9Obn barrels. See the
excellent analysis of Rosemarie Forsythe in her, The Politics of Oil and The Caucasus
and Central Asia (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adeiphi Paper
300,1996). She cites Robert O.'Connor, Richard Castle and David Nelson, "Future Oil
and Gas Potential in the Southern Caspian Basin", Oil and Gas Journal, 3 May 1993,
pp. 117-26; Michael J. Strauss, "Caspian Sea May Offer Wealth of Oil and Gas,
Geologists Say", Journal of Commerce, 16 September 1991, p. 6B; Khartukov and
Vinogradova, "Former Soviet Union: Another Poor Year", World Oil (Vol. 215, No.8,
August 1994), p. 69. See also John Roberts, Caspian Pipelines, (London: The Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1996). Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan have the largest oil
deposits of the region. Forsythe cites geophysical estimates of lObn barrels; she also
points out that industry analysts cite Kazakhstan as the richest of the former Soviet
republics in oil and gas, with more than 60 billion barrels.
15 Tengizchevroil, a joint venture between the US company Chevron and the
Kazakhstani Tengiz oil-field, went into operation in April 1993. At $2Obn, it is one of
the largest single investments by a US firm in the former Soviet Union. Chevron began
negotiating the deal in 1990 before the fall of the Soviet Union, and continued with
Kazakhstan after its independence. As Forsythe notes, the oil-field "is the largest oil
discovery in the world since the 1970s, with proven high-quality oil reserves of 6-9bn
barrels - to be developed, according to the contract, over a 40-year period".
Kazakhstan's Western Karachaganak field is estimated to be about two-thirds the size of
Tengiz. In June 1992, Kazakhstan concluded an agreement with British Gas and Agip to
restore the field; since then Russia's Gazprom and US Texaco have joined the
oducti0nshar1ng agreement.
6 Statististicheskoe Obozrenie Kazakhslana (Almaty: National Statistics Agency,
1997), p. 21 cites 1997 foreign direct investment as US$1633,2 million. Japan at 28.7
percent tops the list of foreign direct investors, followed by South Korea at 27.6, UK at
15.7, USA at 11.1 and Germany, Italy and Turkey roughly at 4 percent each. The largest
sector of foreign direct investment is the metallurgical sector, followed by the oil and
then energy sectors. See also Interfax-Kazakhstan, 12 January 1998; Panorama, 31 July
1998;
' Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society, trans. G. Simpson (Glencoe, IL:
The Free Press, 1951).
For an excellent analysis of elite integration in the United States, see Gwen Moore,
"The Structure of a National Elite Network" in Marvin E. Olsen and Martin N. Marger
(eds), Power in Modern Societies, (Boulder Westview Press, 1993), pp. 183-95.
19 John Higley, Jan Pakulski and Wlodzimierz Wesolowksi (eds.), Postcommunisl Elites
and Democracy in Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1998). Prospects for
such consensual elites are judged to be best in Poland and Hungary, less good in
Czechoslovakia, poor in Romania, Bulgaria and Albania, and virtually non-existent in
the Yugoslav republics.The most popular account of the role of insurgents is by
Timothy Garton Ash, We the People: The Revolution of 89 (London: Granta, 1990).
This work is concerned with Eastern Europe rather than the USSR.
20 Other conditions, such as economic growth, the absence of deep regionally-based
cultural conflicts, and a relatively benign international environment, may also be
necessary for stable democracy. But without elite consensus and unity these other
conditions do not appear to be reliably related to it.
23
21 See Higley et aL, Posicommunist Elites, Chapter 1. As the authors point out, for
"transitologists" and "consolidologists ", "the achievement of democratic consensus
and power sharing among divided elites through pacts is regarded as decisive".
22 An excellent introduction to the study of comparative elites is Robert Putnam, The
Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976). See
also Gerraint Parry, Political Elites (New York: Praeger, 1969).
23 William B. Quandt, The Comparative Study of Political Elites, (Berkeley, CA: Sage,
1969).
24 Among the most useful introductions to the interplay of personality and politics are
Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1969); Fred I.
Greenstein and Michael Lerner (eds), A Source Bookfor the Study of Peronality and
Politics (Chicago: Markham, 1971); Lewis J. Edinger, 'Political Science and Political
Biography Ii", Journal of Politics (Vol. 26, August 1964), pp. 648-676.
25 Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in
Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, MA M.I.T. Press, 1965). See also
Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and C. Easton Rothwell, The Comparative Study of
Elites: An Introduction andBibliography (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1952).
26 Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1964).
27 M. Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960).
28 F.W. Frey, The Turkish Political Elite (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 1965).
29 See in particular D.D. Searing, "The Comparative Study of Elite Socialization",
Comparative Political Studies (Vol. 1, January 1969), pp. 47 1-500. Other studies that
develop important theoretical perspectives include John C. Wahike et aL, The
Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley,
1967); J.A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); J.D. Barber, The Lawmakers (New Haven: Yale
University Press,1965); Tom Bottomore, Elites and Soci ety (London: C.A.Watts,1964);
Prewitt eta!., 'Political Socialization and Political roles", Public Opinion Quarterly,
(Vol. 30, Winter 1966-1967); and W.H. Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative: Strategies
for Political Survival in Asia and Africa, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969).
° Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and Political Power" American Political
Science Review (Vol .46, June 1953), p. 596.
31 Lewis Edinger and Donald Searing, "Social Background in Elite Analysis: A
Methodological Inquiry", American Political Science Review (Vol. 61, June 1967), p.
430.
32 Donald Matthews, along with many others, has suggested that revolutions are led by
intellectuals, but that usually the bureaucrats win the post-revolutionary struggle for
power. Donald R. Matthews, The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers
(New York: Random House,1962), pp. 58-9.
Among the best contributors are Edinger and Searing, "Social background ";
Searing, "Models and images of man and society in leadership theory ", Journal of
Politics, (Vol. 31, February 1969), pp. 3-30; Wahlke el a!., The Legislative System; C.
Beck and J.M. Malloy, Political Elites: A Mode ofAnalysis (Pittsburgh: University of
Pittsburgh, Archive on Political Elites in Eastern Europe,1966); C. Beck, A Survey of
Elite Studies (Washington, DC: American University, 1965); J. Dennis, "Major
Problems of Political Socialisation Research," Midwest Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 12, February 1968, pp. 85-144; and R.S.Robins, "Elite Career Patterns as a
24
Differential: A Use of Correlation Techniques and the Cconstruction of Uniform Strata"
Behavioral Science (Vol. 14, May 1969), pp. 232-23 8. Briefer methodological
discussions are included in a number of other publications, including S.E. Finer eta!.,
Backbench Opinion in the House of Commons (London: Penguin, 1961); Frey, Turkish
Political Elite; and William B. Quandt, The Comparative Study. See also, Samuel J.
Eldersveld, Political Elites in Modern Societies: Empirical Research and Democratic
Theory (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1989).
Harold Lasswell, "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites" in Dwaine Marvick (ed.),
Political Decision-Makers (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1961), p. 66.
C.Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 3-
4.
36 Robert DahI, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," reprinted in Edward Laumann,
Paul Siegel and Robert Hodge (eds), The Logic of Social Hierarchies (Chicago:
Markham, 1970), p. 269.
' Meisel explains the three C's: all the members of the elite are alert to their group
interests; that this alertness is in turn caused or affected by a sense, implicit or explict,
of group or class solidarity; and last, that this solidarity is expressed in a common will
to action". James Meisel, The Myth of the Ruling Class: Gaetano Mosca and the Elite
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), p. 4.
Geoffrey Roberts, A Dictionary of PoliticalAnalysis (New York: St Martin's Press,
1971), p. 79.
Alan Zuckerman, "The Concept 'Political Elite': Lessons from Mosca and Pareto",
The Journal of Politics (Vol. 39, No. 2, May 1977), pp. 324-44.
° Anthony Giddens, "Eites in the British Class Structure," in Philip Standath and
Anthony Giddens (eds), Elites and Power in British Society (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1974), p. 2.
Frederick Fleron, "Notes on the Explication of the Concept 'Elite' in Soviet Studies,"
Canadian Review of Slavic Studies (Vol. II, No. 1, Spring, 1968), p. 112.42 Fleron, "Notes," p.112.
'° See, Harold Lasswell, "Introduction: The Study of Political Elites," in Harold
Lasswell and Daniel Lerner, World Revolutionary Elites, (Cambridge, MA: MItT Press,
1968), 3-28.
Zuckerman, "Concept Political Elite ", p. 328.
" Vilfredo Pareto, Treatise on General Sociology (New York, Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovitch, 1935); Samuel Finer, Vilfredo Pareto: Sociological Writings (New Yoric
Praeger, 1966).
Robert A. Dahi, "A Critique ", pp. 269-70.
Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex, England: Pelican, 1964), p.1 0.
' Introductory Sociology, p.197. Also "Every social act is an exercise of power, every
social relationship is a power equation, and every social group or system is an
organization of power". (Cited in Olsen and Marger, Power, p. 1). When Amos Hawley
wrote that statement in 1963, very few sociologists were giving serious attention to
social power. During the suceeding thirty years, however, increasing numbers of writers
have argued that power exertion is the central dynamic within the process of social
organization. These include: Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society: Outline of
the Theory of Structuration (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984); Stephen Lukes, Essay in
Social Theory (London: Macmillan, 1977); Michael Mann, The Sources of Social
Power: History of Power from the Beginning to A.D. 1760. Volume 1 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Denis H. Wrong, Power: Its Form, Bases and
25
Uses (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979). Mann, for instance, began his work on the history of
social power by asserting that "societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and
intersecting sociological networks of power". Sources of Social Power, p. 1.
' The argument that for a concept to be theoretically useful it should be used as a
"natural" classifier is set out in its classic form by Carl Hempel, "Fundamentals in
Taxonomy," in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the
Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 137-154. Sartori has
emphasised the importance of unambiguous definitional criteria in concept-formation,
and, hence, concept as data container ' See Giovanni Sartori, "Concept Misformation in
Comparative Politics", American Political Science Review (Vol. LXIV, No. 4,
December, 1970), pp. 103 3-53. The view that concepts must be both empirically
precise and theoretically useful is also clearly developed in Abraham Kaplan, The
Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Chandler, 1964), esp. p. 53.
50 See Aristotle, Politics (trans. by TA Sinclair, London: Penguin, 1962); Vilfredo
Pareto, Treatise; Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, (ed by Arthur Livingston, London:
McGraw-Hill, 1939); Count Henri de Saint-Simon, Oeuvres Choisis, Tome Premier,
1839; Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1946), Part V; Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the
Ruling Class ", The British Journal of Sociology, (Vol. 1, 1950), pp. 1-16; Harold D.
Lasswell, Politics, Who Gets What, When, and How (1936); Floyd Hunter, Community
Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North
Carolina Press, 1953); C. Wright Mills and Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1961).
51 Robert Michels, Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical
Tendencies ofModern Democracy (New York: Dover, 1959).
52 Lasswell, Politics, Who Gets What, passim.
Robert Dahi, Who Governs?, passim.
Keller, Beyond The Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society (New
York: Random House, 1963), p. 23.
26
CHAPTER Li:
KHANS, CONQUERORS AND COMMUMSTS:
KAZAKH TRADITIONAL SOCIETY AND THE IMPACT OF
RUSSIAN AND SOVIET RULE
This chapter aims to trace elite-society relations since the ethnonym "Kazakh" first
emerged in the fifteenth century.' This is not intended as a general history of the rise of
the Arabs, Turks or the Mongols, or the causes of imperial Russia's expansion
southward and subsequent Sovietisation. The focus instead is on the dynamics of power
distribution in the Kazakh steppe, and on its transformation under Russian colonisation
and Sovietisation.2
A word of caution: the impartial student who aims at "getting at the significant
facts" of early, medieval and early modern Kazakh history is confronted with an almost
insurmountable task. History was transmitted orally from one generation to the next.
Russian culture played an important role in conveying the nomadic legacy but fell
hostage, therefore, to misinterpretation.
The chapter is based on a tl.inctional view of culture; cultures do not die but are
reworked and transformed. As Stuart Hall writes, "we should think instead of identity as
"production", which is never complete, always in process". 3
 If we are to appreciate
contemporary elite political culture, we need to understand its origins. To echo Benedict
Anderson's reasoning behind his celebrated definition of the nation as an "imagined
community":
nationality,... nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a
particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how
they have come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed
over time, and why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.4
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In the case of Kazakhstan, as we shall see, the case is interesting for the reverse reason -
the sense of national identity is weak. Second, the contemporary elite are today's
nation-builders and tomorrow's ancestors. Just as the steppe bard would be relied on to
recount and transmit orally from one generation to the next the rich epic history of his
forefathers, so today the contemporary elite will fashion its own view of history. This
also begs the question whether the intellectual and political elites are the same and
whether they define the nation in similar terms, a topic for Section III. As we shall see
in Section II, what the political elite chooses to forget about its history will be as
important as what it remembers. In David McCrone's words: "Getting history wrong'
is the precondition of nationalist history because it requires not only collective
remembering but collective forgetting". 5
 Whether the ruling elite will ever be sharply
reminded of hidden elements of its history by a dissident counter-elite depends on the
nature of the polity, explored in the next chapter. That chapter will also highlight how
the present regime bases itself on "primordial links" with the Kazakh steppe. The fill
significance of this chapter, I hope, will become apparent by the close of the thesis.
The chapter considers four periods: (1) early steppe history, namely, before the fifteenth
century; (2) Kazakh nomadic political structure up to the close of the eighteenth
century; (3) The impact of Russian colonisation on traditional nomadic politics and
society; and, (4) the impact of Sovietisation. As with all historic periods, they are
somewhat arbitrary and inevitably overlap. It is the second period which provides the
focus of this chapter. This is the period in which "traditional Kazakh culture" is formed.
It is this culture that Russian colonisation indirectly transforms and that Sovietisation
directly attempts to destroy. And it is to this period that today's nation-builders turn for
guidance, inspiration, solace - and legitimisation.
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EARLY STEPPE FIISTORY
The investigator of Turkish and Mongol history in this part of the world is like a
man standing on an upper floor, watching the unpredictable and disordered
movement of a crowd gathered on some great occasion. Groups meet and
coalesce, groups melt and dissolve; a sudden interest draws a mass in one
direction, only to split up again; a bidder or leader may for some moments
gather a knot of adherents; political or personal causes lead to rioting;.. .there is
slaughter and destruction, or even for a time a sense of purpose and direction of
effort".6
Early history of the Kazakh steppe may be divided into four main periods: the
emergence of nomadism and the arrival of the Turks, probably in the sixth century AD;
the Arabo-Persian Islamic conquest in the ninth and tenth centuries; the Mongol and
Timurid dynasty (1200-1500 AD); and, the Uzbek (Shaibanid) empire followed by the
emergence of the Kazakhs as a distinct group on the steppe.7
Historical records relating to the period before the Islamic conquest at the
beginning of the eighth century are extremely scanty. As Shirin Akiner writes,
archaeologists have identified the remains of some 200 Neolithic settlements,
distributed all over the territory of present-day Kazakhstan, which suggests habitation
by sedentary farmers and livestock breeders. 8 Nomadic tribes began to emerge in the
first millennium BC. The Saks were the most prominent of these tribes, but the
subsequent tribes of the Usuns, Kangyu and Alans are also thought to be direct
ancestors of the Kazkah people. Some Soviet scholars contended that there was a
Turkic-speaking presence in Central Asia before the end of the first millennium BC.
Most Western Turkologists, however, date the first signs of a Turkic people in this
region to the sixth century AD.9
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The scarcity of historical records - and those that do exist are almost exclusively
in Chinese - which obscures the earlier history of Central Asia ends with the beginning
of the Arab invasion. Nomads, like the peoples of Central Asia proper as a whole, came
into contact with Islam for the first time in the tenth century. But the influence of Islam
on the steppe was far less. Nomads lacked the institutions to absorb the philosophy and
dicta of Islam; the semi-sedentary Kazakhs of the south were the first to be exposed.
The Arabs introduced tax incentives to nomads who adopted the Islamic faith. Overall,
as the distinguished Kazakh ethnographer Chokan Valikhanov reports, Kazakhs
combined a shallow internalisation of Islam with the cosmology of shamanism.'°
It was to be the Mongols who, as we shall see, were to exert the strongest
influence on the political life of the steppe. In the early thirteenth century, Chingiz Khan
and his Mongol hordes captured the oasis cities of Transoxiana, among them Otrar and
Taraz in the territory of present-day southern Kazakhstan. The Mongols destroyed the
social and political organisation of the Turkic-speaking nomads; they reshuffled nomadic
tribes and caused considerable ethnic regrouping in the Eurasian steppes. Chingiz Khan
divided his huge empire between his four sons." His descendants, the Chingizids, were
to become the Kazakh aristocrats. Moreover, the three political formations which
emerged on the Kazakh steppe in the seventeenth century are deemed by many to be the
three sons' legacy. Today, as we shall see in Section II, the process of claiming ancestry
to Chingizid descent amongst the elite is ambiguous.
It is important to stress that there is no consensus over the chronology or precise
circumstances of the ethnogenesis of the Kazakhs; some historians do not trace the
origins in the immigration of tribes who had divorced from the Uzbeks but rather in the
fusion of a number of tribes long resident in the region. The Uzbeks and Kazakhs (who
were even called Uzbek-Kazakhs) considered themselves to be one unified people.' 2 In
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the second half of the fifteenth century the cultural centre of Central Asia shifted; at the
beginning of the sixteenth century the Uzbeks invading from the North-East under
Shaibani Khan conquered the Timurid possesions in Turkestan and Khorezm. Pressured
by encroachments on his land from other leaders and their followers, a Kazakh tribal
leader, Abulkhair, broke away from his Uzbek master with a camp of followers, and
decided to roam northward to the steppe.' 3 There he united a number of tribes and the
resulting group became known as the "Kazakhs". The choice of"Kazakh" is explained
in most writings by its meaning - free wanderer - since Abulkhair had freely wandered
off and formed his own tribe. Thus, the earliest historical records of the Kazakhs appear
in the fifteenth century, prior to which date they are believed to have formed part of the
Uzbek people.'4
 The Kazakhs thus appear as a distinct people a century after the
Uzbeks, an important fact in the current competition for supremacy in Central Asia.
Chingiz Khan's sons did not rule over ethnically defined units. When Abulkhair
was forced to migrate, there was no evidence at this stage of any real sense of ethnic
difference among the Uzbeks and Kazakhs. At this stage, crucial in identity formation
would appear to have been the definition of the self against the outsider. As part of this
self-definition there appears to have been a process of discovery by the Kazakhs of their
descent from a common ancestor.' 5 Already at this stage, the multiplicity of Kazakhness
becomes apparent. The mythical history divides itself into a grand, universal myth and a
second, specific myth, one common to the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz.
The grand myth refers to all Turkic peoples. It professes that all Turkic peoples
are descended from a primal ancestor in the direct male line; this ancestor bears the
eponym of the Turkic peoples generally. The specifically Kazakh myth, which
interestingly is also applied by the Kazakhs to the contemporary Kyrgyz in the claim
that the two peoples have common ancestry, has manipulated this universal myth.
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Nineteenth-century observers generally agree that the primogenitor had three Sons who
branched off to form separate units which many deem were the precursors to the three
"hordes" (on which more will follow).' 6 Thus the Kazakh nation and all its subdivisions
were regarded as ramifications of an extended family group. To this day, however,
ethnographers have failed to pinpoint a common ancestor. Even the name of the
primogenitor is disputed, although it is generally also believed to be Alash. Valikhanov
confirms the name of the ancestor as Alash whom he sees as a real rather than mythical
figure. Even the etymology of the word "Kazakh" remains disputed.' 7 Fortes has
demonstrated the role of a genealogy as a kind of ongin myth in a unilineal descent
group, of which the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are examples.' 8 It would appear, then, that the
common ancestor was male - despite the fact that certain tribes of nomads in the Near
East and Eurasian steppes traced their descent from a female ancestor, or else have
female eponyms.'9
What has this brief overview of early history demonstrated? First, the confusion
surrounding ancestry and the ethnonym of the Kazakhs allows for convenient
contemporary manipulation and wide interpretation. Potentially, this is not a problem:
Gellner, amongst others, has noted that the Estonians at the beginning of the nineteenth
century did not have a name for themselves, but subsequently did create a vibrant
culture and past.2° Second, the early ethnic mix threw up the controversy over whether
Kazakhs are predominantly of Turkic or Mongol (or indeed Arab) origin. The dispute as
to which tribes appeared first on the steppe is not merely a theoretical debate; the
official rewriting of history, as discussed in ffl.1, places much emphasis on analysing
the Kazakhs' ethnic roots and Section II highlights how the confusion over origins is
part of a much larger geopolitical question and of the importance of external influences
in past and contemporary elite formation.
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KAZAKH TRADITIONAL NOMADIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE
The traditional Kazakh steppe tribes were predominantly pastoral nomads. Pockets of
semi-sedentary peoples practising transhumance and crop-growing were found at the
steppe periphery. We are still in the era, of course, where the steppe was bereft of
borders despite the tendency by some indigenous historians to dub this area already
"Kazakhstan".
Livestock was the nomad's principal source of property, ritual and livelihood. As
Bacon writes, sheep were of greatest economic importance, whilst horses incurred
prestige and status. The small, shaggy horses of the steppe, she continues, "did not have
the grace and fire of Arab steeds, but they were fast and had great endurance; they gave
mobility in the wars and blood feuds (ba,ynla) which frequently disrupted the peace of
the steppe; they were the object of cult attention". 21
 Possession of large herds gave
prestige unrelated to their economic value. Two-humped Bactrian camels were also
kept. Until Russian colonisation, cattle were rare. Every camp was guarded by large,
fierce watchdogs, and dogs were used in herding.23
As with other peoples, an understanding of traditional Kazakh society and politics is
best gained by first examining their economic way of life. Kazakh nomads conformed
to Khazanov's useful five-part definition of pastoral nomadism.24
First, pastoralism was the predominant form of economic activity. Second, its
extensive character stemmed from the maintenance of herds all year round on a system
of free-range grazing without stables. Nomads, third, were thus periodically mobile
within specific grazing territories. Finding pasturage for the livestock entailed regular
seasonal migrations by their owners. In winter the portable dwellings were set up in
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sheltered spots in the foothills. In spring the people moved out of their winter quarters,
following the fresh growth of grass northward or, for eastern groups, upward into the
mountains; they followed then to the rich summer pastures and by October the autumn
migration was over. Nomadic groups were thus only really clustered and sedentary in
the winter months. The migration routes were never haphazard. Each tribal group had a
traditional territory within which its member family groups migrated. The nomad
migrated in encampments.
Khazanov's fourth criterion described how the population participated in
nomadism which, fifthly, aimed at subsistence (as opposed to the market ranch or dairy
farming of today). The nomadic economy, in short, aimed at "integration and
accumulation."25
 Nomadic groups cooperated and depended on each other. Rich groups,
who possessed spare and numerous horses, would often help out the poorer groups.
Georgi recorded that a fairly well-off Kazakh family kept 30-50 horses, 100 sheep, 15-25
head of large stock, 20-50 goats and several camels. 26
 Below this minimum even simple
reproduction could not take place. For example, since the nomads stored no fodder, many
animals died of cold and starvation, and if late "frost" (d.zhul) became too hard to be
broken by the horses' hooves, entire herds and flocks sometimes perished. During the
nineteenth century, d.zhul reportedly occurred twenty times in the area of what is now
Kazakhstan - even if not simultaneously across the whole area. 27 If a nomad for any of
these reasons was forced to migrate and eventually settle into agriculture, this was
considered as the greatest defeat for the nomad and echoes Owen Lattimore's aphorism,
"the only pure nomad is a poor nomad."28 To become an agriculturalist was to lose
status.
As Markov and Masanov highlight, livestock breeding and pastoralism shaped
social and political relations, and were in turn shaped by them. This symbiosis is seen
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below in detail; in general, a useful means of conceptualising production is provided by
Wolf's three possible modes of production. 3° Whilst nomadic society is not based
around a tributary mode (where the elite coerces) or a capitalist mode (where labour is
bought and sold), it is based on the kin-ordered mode. Production centred around
kinship is based on an opposition between those who belong to the group, say, a lineage
or a clan, and those who do not.
Traditional Kazakh society oscillated between dependence and independence.
The rigidity of the structural hierarchies - born of a long tradition of warfare - was
offset by the inherent mobility of nomadic life. As Shirin Akiner explains:
Thus, despite the very strong bonds of communal obligations and loyalties,
ultimately the nomads remained free agents and if dissatisfied could, and not
infrequently did, move with their households and flocks to a new location. This
flexibility gave the tribal structure a dynamism that enabled it to accommodate
the constantly changing shape and balance of regional power politics.3'
Traditional Kazakh society, to coin Bacon, was thus conical in shape; or
"pyramidal", to use the typology developed by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard. 32 The
narrow segment at the top was comprised of the Kazakh hereditary estate, the aq su, or
white bone, whilst the wide lower part consisted of the non-hereditary masses, the qara
su, or black bone. As we shall see, "bone" refers to lineage, and the colours white and
black were inherited from Mongol practice. By way of further illustration, Kazakh
traditional society was a textbook example of Khazanov's "differentiated segmentary
society", in which "the ruling segment ceases to be a replica of the other segments, fully
or partially falls away from the genealogical cliché of the given society, acquires
distinct laws of kinship and descent and, most importantly, turns into a distinct estate".33
Russian ethnographers considered that this hierarchy spoke of a far more developed
political society than that found amongst their neighbouring Kyrgyz.
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The primary socio-economic unit in Kazakh nomadic society was the
encampment, or aul. This constituted a "clan", "consisting of an extended patriarchal
family network"; maternal relatives from other clans (the Kazakhs were exogamous
up the preceeding seven generations); 35 freed slaves and other who had become part of
the community. Each encampment consisted of a number of separate households, each
with its own tent (Kazakh ul, Russian kibilka and Western yurl). 36 Several encampments
would come together for the long summer migration; they would also unite in time of
war or other periods of danger. During the winter, however, they would separate into
their original units, to have a better chance of finding good pasture. The encampments
were loosely grouped into tribal units, whose number varied.
Each encampment had its own leaders, of which there were two main principal
categories: the baayr ("hero") and the bii ("interpreter of customary law" or "judge").
Their role and influence depended on situation and their character. They usually
presided over one or two clans, but sometimes over a greater number. Each clan also
had its aqsaqal, or elder. The remainder of the clan consisted of "commoners", who
were also subdivided. As Akiner explains, the largest subdivision was formed was that
of the sharua, clan-tribe members of middling standing, owning around 10 head of cattle
per family. The bai formed the wealthier stratum, some of them owning several hundred
head of cattle and having poorer families as their dependants; it was they who acted as
heads of encampments. The poorest clansmen, those without animals of their own,
would work as shepherds or domestic servants for others. Slaves, telenguts, were
generally acquired as from raids on neighbouring lands, but only very few were kept.37
It is important to note that the aul is not composed of one lineage because of the rule
of lineage exogamy. 38 In practice, two constraints prevented the aul being strictly of
common descent, of men related in the male line - brothers, cousins, uncles, nephews.
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First, family poverty: poor family heads would force their eldest sons to join a different
encampment, take up agriculture or migrate. When a son moved off he renounced all
inheritance rights. A poor family might be conquered or be forced to join a richer tribe,
again of a different primogenitor. Second, the size of the cm! was limited by the number
of animals that could be pastured within range of one camp site. When the number of
conjugal family units and animals became too large, one son might ask for his share of
the family livestock and move off to form a new aul. The son automatically adopted the
kinship of the au! that he joined or formed his own, separate kinship. Thus, the Kazakh
au! was more frequently not a strictly patrilineal family, and implied looser ties than are
normally associated with sedentary tribes.
However fictional the tribal genealogies were, they nonetheless provided the
framework for much of Kazakh life. What mattered was that Kazakhs residing in one
au! believed themselves all descended in the male line from one primogenitor.
Furthermore, the genealogies themselves often recognised the engrafting of unrelated
groups by attributing one subdivision to an adopted son or by the name of the
subdivision, such as Zhetiru, "seven tribes." Followers of a strong leader often took his
name for their group, and this name was in time incorporated into the tribal genealogy
as that of an eponymous ancestor.
Kazakh law - based not on Muslim law but on Kazakh common law, the adat -
embodied these principles of kinship and lineage. Khan Tauke's legal code, Zhety
Zhargy, is the only one of three to have survived to this day. Kazakh customary law had
three sources: custom, practice in the courts of the bus or magistrates, and resolutions
taken at periodical meetings of the bus. In different regions and clans customary laws
would vary superficially, although fundamentally they remained the same everywhere.
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The principles of kinship and hierarchy were expressed in nomadic law. The
principles of Kazakh law corresponded most closely to Grodekov's principles of
restitutive law, rather than repressive law. Most graphically, seizure of property (usually
livestock) without permission was not regarded as theft among the extended family.39
No provision was made for repressive punishment (by loss of life or liberty) - only
restitution - penalty was payment of a kun (similar to the Anglo-Saxon wergild). The
basic kun, mentioned above, was 200 baital (an abstract unit corresponding to the value
of a horse in good condition, or the equivalent). Kinship always had validity - the kin of
a murderer, even if the murderer was rich, would pay the kun. A lineage thus
indemnifies another lineage for the loss of one of its members. Knowing one's lineage
meant knowing one's enemies; a popular saying recounts how an encounter between
two nomads on the steppe would begin with the question: "Which is your clan?" °
Because the average Kazakh could not remember his genealogy for so many
generations, there was an understanding that certain tribal subdivisions were too close
and that others were far enough removed to allow intermarriage. The implications of
such "genealogical amnesia" will be elaborated upon shortly.
The existence and maintenance of extended families depended on inheritance
rules. These rules ensured that sons remained in the one encampment. The family estate,
in line with the practice of nomadic society in general, was not communal family
property but held in trust. Succession was unknown to the ordinary Kazakh: no Ka.zakh
died without society making provision for the appointment of his heirs. Inheritance was
based on the principle of ultimogeniture.4 ' When an older son married, he received a
yurt to be set up in his father's ciii!; he lived in close proximity and herded with his
father. Together with the payment of the kalym on behalf of the son for the purchase of
his bride, this practice of allotment to the eldest sons amounted to the total property
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distribution from one generation to the next. Only the youngest son remained in the
paternal yurt after marriage to care for his parents in their old age and inherit the yurt on
their death. It was the youngest son who, as in both the Turkic and Mongol worlds,
received the special title of "prince of the hearth". If the family head died without direct
male issue, the estate then reverted to his brothers, the closest collateral line. This
occurred even if the brothers had quarrelled or were living apart.
An important exception to the pre-eminence of the patriarchal or male line
existed, the contemporary significance of which becomes apparent again in Section II.
This was the very close relationship existed between the maternal uncle (nagasy) and
his nephew (dzien). Another close relationship existed between the husbands of sisters
(who are badza to each other) and the sons of sisters (who are bule to each other). The
case of the relationship between bule is quite clearly a systematic attack on the agnatic
principle (paternal line) because in addition to the mother's brother relationship, a man
must now be aware of, and respond to the economic and legal implications of, a
relationship through the mother's sister. It is thus also non-unilineal, or cognatic. In the
context of daily life this mattered: a man can call on all his cousins for help, paternal
and maternal alike; he shares a common grandfather with them.
To sum up, then, the lineages operated according to the agnatic principle and
were defined in terms of fixed generations counting from their founding ancestors.
Lineage exercised various functions. Fortes usefully describes lineage as a type of
corporation: it had a personality as a socio-legal unit. The lineage functioned as the unit
of exogamy. 42
 As a socio-legal unit, the lineage, used interchangeably with clan,
addressed the issue of property. The property of an individual who died without any
unilineal or collateral relatives simply passed to the clan; the corporation, to use Henry
Maine's expression, never dies. Genealogies were handed down by oral tradition. It is
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thus unsurprising that two genealogies taken fitly years apart differ radically.
Ultimately, as we saw - accuracy was only of secondary importance. What mattered is
how individuals conceptualised their kinship. Finally, the clan also assumed a military
function, but this was usually as part of a larger unit, the tribe.
When part of a tribe, the clan took on a predominantly military role. Each tribe
possessed its own ziran ("war cry" or word shouted in the heat of battle) and lamga
("seal" of a given group embroidered on tents, incorporated into rugs, filigreed into
jewelry, and used as a cattle brand). 43 The strongest clan gave its name to the tribe.
Because of its size, and because it was itself divided into several clans, the tribe was
relatively far less important. It was a military unit, and a tribe earned a senior status
through military achievements.
In the seventeenth century, records and writings suddenly reported the
appearance of three large units, the zhuz. Zhuz means hundred in Kazakh. Independent
from each other, the zhuz were known as the Senior (Uly) Zhuz, Middle (Orla) Zhuz
and Junior (Kishi) Zhuz. There is also a fourth, the Inner or Bukei Zhuz. Their labels
indicate their chronology of formation, the Senior having been formed first.
Nevertheless, as with Kazakh ethnogenesis, the origins of the zhuz are hazy.
The principal tribes of the Senior horde were, in roughly descending order of
importance, the Zhalair, Oshakty, Dulat, Kangly, Shynyshkly, Alban, Suan, Shaprashty,
Saryuisun, Srgeli, Ysty. In the Senior Horde, the Zhalair was the most important. The Argyn
became legendary in the Middle Zhuz, followed in precedence by the Naiman, Kipchak, Kerei,
Uak, Tarakty and Konrad. The Junior Horde were led by the Alimuly tribe, but also included the
six large clans of Shekty, Shomekei, Tortkora, Kete, Karakesek and Karasakal. 45 Kazakhs were
familiar with the hierarchy of these tribes. But between the seventeenth and mid-nineteenth
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century it appears that the zhuz was primarily a military formation, but did not perform any
useful economic, social or cultural function.
The approximate boundaries of the zhuz have remained more or less unchanged.
According to the first All-Russian Census in 1897, the populations of the Senior, Middle
and Junior Zhuz were roughly 700,000, 1.2 million and 1.1 million people respectively.
Although numerically less, the Senior Horde covered the most extensive territory in the
southeast of the country. In the Russian era, its territory spanned the Semirech'ye and
Syr-Darya oblasts.47 Today, the Senior Zhuz covers Taldy-Kurgan, Almaty, Jambyl and
South-Kazakhstan oblasts. The Middle Zhuz, geographically closer to Russia, covers
northeastern, central and a part of southeastern Kazakhstan. In the Russian colonial
period, it covered the Semipalatinsk and Akmola oblasts and the Kustanai and Turgai
uzeds. The Junior Horde is situated in the west. Today, the areas coincide with Western
Kazakhstan, Aktyubinsk, Atyrau, Mangistau, and part of the Kzyl-Orda oblasts.
Reasons for the emergence of the three zhuz remain shrouded in mystery. The
appellation "zhuz" suggests the importance of units of one hundred in the Altaic steppe
society when they related to a decimal politico-military organisation. 49
 But that still begs
the question as to why these structures loosely remained when nomads were not at war.
The most convincing explanation behind the formation of the zhuz is probably
provided by the famous Kazakh historian S.D. Asfendiarov (and seconded thereafler by
historians of the nomadic era Kh. A. Argynbaev and Nurbulat Masanov). 5° All contended
that the groupings were largely territorial, covering three geographically distinct geographic
areas of the steppe: Semirech'ye, Western and Eastern Kazakhstan. Thus, even though these
units arose primarily from geographic differences, the evidence provided by scholars such as
Bacon and Krader suggests that the three units also differed in some aspects of political and
cultural life. 5 ' Legends hold that each is associated with a different symbol: the Senior with
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sheep (symbolising wealth); the Middle with a pen (signifying knowledge); and, the Junior
with a weapon (symbolising a warrior culture). 52
The formation of the Inner or Bukei Zhuz between the Ural and Volga rivers,
was governed by altogether different forces; at the beginning of the nineteenth century a
part of the Junior Zhuz flowed westward into an area vacated by the Kalmuks.
It was as military leaders that the top of the pyramid - the hereditary state or
white bone - played a role. 53 The sultans, or tore, were "white bone" nobles, directly
descended in the male line from Mongol princes, almost invariably of, or laying claim
to be of, the house of Chingiz Khan. Periods of succession involved bitter power
struggles between the khans. Crucially, they were not part of the clan-tribal system, but
considered themselves a separate estate with their own Chingizid genealogy. Only they
could elect the khan from among their own number, and they ruled by skill and their
ability to balance conflicting tribal interests. This made their position fragile, for
although they were a hereditary estate, they still had to earn their title. 54 They were not
necessarily wealthy either, the bii or bai often surpassing them in wealth. Bii were as, if
not sometimes more, influential than the khan, even conducting their own relations with
rulers of contiguous peoples. The inability of the khans to command specific tribes or
slaves also made them extremely weak and ineffective rulers. They often had to
entertain lavishly to keep their followers who paid them no tribute. What they did enjoy
were privileges in steppe etiquette. Commoners in conversation with tore were not
allowed to call tore by name, and instead had to use the word "taksyr" ("Your Majesty")
When greeting or thanking they had to use "Aldiyar" "God come to help!", while
placing both hands on the chest or the right hand on the right knee. 55 Upon being sworn
into office, the khan was lifted and spun around on a white felt; white was the sacred
colour of the Mongols.
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To summarise, several factors point to a situation of weak central authority.
First, what might appear obvious but again is often denied in writing by both Soviet and
post-Soviet historians, is the absence of a state. The official rewriting of history, as we
shall see in 111.1, refers throughout to a nomadic state. None of the five attributes of a
modern state as outlined by Dunleavy and O'Leary, for example, apply to the Kazakh
steppe. 56 They can, however, be applied in varying degress to the three khanates of their
sedentary southern neighbours, the Uzbeks - Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand.
First, the khan did not rule over a clearly defined territory and could not, in
Dunleavy and O'Leary's terms, therefore claim an exclusive right to that territory. The
boundaries of the Uzbek khanates may not have had internationally recognised,
cartographic borders, but the Kazakh khan did not even possess a clearly defined
territory to rule over. There was no "khanate" as such. The nearest equivalent unit that
springs to mind is the zhuz, but, as Erofeeva points out, at no time in Kazakh steppe
history did a zhuz concord with the territory over which the khan ruled.57
Rule over territory was not spatially but tribally defined: the khan ruled over
tribes and the strength of his rule was as strong as those tribes. Thus, the strength and
influence of khans such as Abulkhair, Kaip and Argynazy was based on nomadic
groupings of the Alimuly, Baraka, and Kanakoji; of Ablai over the Naiman; and, of Nuraly
over the Argyn. Nomadic tribes are thus never a territorial unit. Unlike a canton or a
district with historically and administratively established boundaries, ties to a nomadic
territory were instead shaped by vague references of kinship and descent.
Moreover, khans such as Tauke, Kaip and Abulkhair in the 1830s and 1840s
resided in Turkestan in the south whilst ruling over several clans in the North and West.
Issues of external sovereignty, namely the recognition in international law that a state
has jurisdiction (authority) over a territory, only arose in the era of Russian
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colonisation. 58 There is no passage in the ada! which says that all groups "are legally
subject".59 Or to follow Dahi's definition, no institution existed on the Kazakh steppe
which can be considered as the ultimate regulator of the legitimate use of force within
its territory.60 Indeed, the ada! enshrines a reverse legitimacy - namely that a poor
nomad is able to rob the khan of his property in times of desperation.
Finally, the state was not a "recognisably separate institution or set of
institutions" - public and private spheres in nomadic societies were not clearly
differentiated. There was no separate institution of bureaucracy, tax-collection or
standing armies, which also eliminates the fourth point of Dunleavy and O'Leary's
definition, namely that certain personnel are primarily employed in bureaucracies. The
administrative system of Bukhara - as well as that of Kokand - was to some extent a
legacy of the Perso-Arab administration of Transoxania under the Abbasid caliphate and
the Timurids: most of the terms relating to finance, land-tenure, justice and taxation
were Arabic in origin; those relating to the army were mainly Persian. Unlike the
Kazakh steppe, as many as 40,000 Uzbeks formed the ruling classes and provided the
administration. After all, unlike the Kazakhs, the Uzbeks already possessed a written
language. And unlike the Kazakh steppe, the Khiva khanate had a large slave element,
mainly Persian, which seems to have exerted an important effect on its culture.
The nomadic relationship with territory was the single greatest obstacle to the
establishment of any kind of state. The boundaries of what then effectively amounted to
social units were not stable. 6 ' Even if the khan enjoyed the support of powerful tribes,
nomads were at any time legally free to wander across to another zhuz - even if they
were often financially and socially constrained from doing so. Nomadic respect for
social authority was high (in the form of the bii or aqsaqal) but for political authority
slight. Pressure from the Chinese or from local neighbours, local wars, droughts, frosts,
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floods, epidemics of man and/or beasts, in any combination, could compel a pastoral
group to move to a new locality. Land is not owned in a nomadic society, and, perhaps
as a contemporary legacy, the government has still failed to introduce land privatisation
- as we shall in 111.2. The word "feudal", another term often applied in contemporary
historiography, is an utterly inappropriate description of steppe society. In the place of
fiefs and vassals the stratum of ordinary free tribesmen dominated. Markov neatly
summarises the difference: "History knows no rising of nomadic tribes, comparable to
peasant risings."62 As shown above, grazing and production was based not on dependency
but on cooperation or consent.
All things considered, khans were "chief-fainéants":
Nowhere in the world had the heads of the nation and the aristocracy by birth so
little meaning, so little real strength, as the Kirghiz [Kazakh] Khans and Sultans. If any
one of them aspired to any influence, so as to be able to draw a crowd after him, he
reached this not because of his "white bone," but on account of his personal worth, and
personal qualities which have gained exactly the same influence for simple Kirghiz of
the "black bone.'63
The absence of real power among nomads was underscored by the much greater
influence khans exercised in the southern, partially sedentary areas. It should come as
no surprise, therefore, that the institution of the khanate was the first to disappear under
Russian rule. It also suggests a society that is far more fissured, splintered and cloven
than, say, the tightly integrated society of the Uzbek khanates. It should also come as no
surprise that in their work on "segmentary lineage systems" which described how
descent systems behave politically, Radcliffe-Brown, Fortes, Evans-Pritchard and
Goody all write that these systems usually occur in "stateless" societies.
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Khazanov's Nomads and the Outside World takes these eminent social
anthropologists to task by arguing that it is the nomads' need to interact with and react
to the outside world - either in the form of conflicts with other nomads or the sedentary
world - that is the single most important influence on social and political structure.
Indeed, only the geopolitics of the Kazakh steppe demanded leadership, and one could
speak of unity, rule and some kind of political cohesion under the authority of khans
only when the external world encroached on their territory. We turn to the period now
which takes us out of this era of nomadic traditional culture: the onset of Russian
colonisation.
RUSSIAN COLONISATION
At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Kazakhs were threatened by a
catastrophe which had been steadily gaining momentum since the opening years of the
seventeenth century. The Western Mongol tribes, the Oirots or Zhungars, squeezed out
of their homelands by the eastern Mongol tribes who had reunited and grown powerful
under Altan Khan (1543-83), were beginning to head westwards. Repulsed by the
Manchus in the 1690s, Oirot armies raided the whole region with impunity and almost
without interruption. Particularly catastrophic was the period of 1723-25, when a
counter-attack, reaching southern Kazakhstan and the cities of the Syr-Darya -
Tashkent, yasi, Sairam - was beaten by the Oirot armies. At the same time the Kalmyks
of the Volga began raiding into the Kazakh steppes to link up with their kinsmen from
Zhungaria. This was the age of the aqiaban shubrundy (the Great Disaster) which
imprinted itself in an ineffaceable manner upon the epic literature of the Kazakhs.
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In the face of the mortal danger which threatened them the Kazakh tribes, so
long divided, resolved to unite and form a common front. In 1728, near Shymkent, a
general assembly of the tribes chose the khan of the Middle Horde, Abulkhair, as their
supreme chieftain. In 1732 Abulkhair approached St Petersburg for protection. In 1731
the Junior Zhuz, in 1740, the Middle Zhuz and in 1742 part of the Senior Zhuz had in
fact accepted Russian protection - but so far as the Oirot threat was concerned this
protection remained purely nominal.
The reasons for Abulkhair's approach to Russia have been much debated. The
Anrakai victory had by no means removed the threat of new Zhungar attacks and the
grazing land question was a "matter of life and death". However, Bogder, in a lucidly
argued chapter, demonstrates that dynastic struggles were the single most important
reason behind Abulkhair's plea to Russia to incorporate the Junior Zhuz into its
Empire.65
 Put in the framework of this thesis, then, elite struggles within the Kazakh
steppe had a decisive impact on the nature, speed and consequences of Russian
colonisation (see below). Key to these dynastic struggles were competing genealogies
within the Junior Horde.
The Junior Horde was subdivided into two Chingizid lineages - Zhadig and
Osek. The Jadig lineage had to date monopolised power. However, during the Zhungar
invasions the Kazakh hordes were scattered and mixed, and Chingizids of the Zhadig
line were criticised by various tribes for providing weak leadership. Between 1716 and
1719 sultan Abulkhair of the Osek line came to increasing prominence as a commander
and, in 1726, was elected khan. Bodger, emphasising that no khan had ever been elected
from the Osek line, correctly affirms that Abulkhair's election "constituted a kind of
dynastic revolution."67
 And it was to defend his fragile position that Abulkhair turned to
Russia. There seems little doubt that the Russian government believed that this
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submission of the Khan would be followed by the submission of the people. Khan
Abulkhair, for his part, regarded the fort built by the Russians at the mouth of the River
Or' as somewhere where he could take refuge in the event of trouble among his people,
and he expected that the Russians would support him indefinitely. Eventually the
Russians realised that the Khan's voluntary submission meant nothing. No security was
guaranteed to the Russian caravans crossing to Turkestan and the Khan's descendants,
as well as the khans of other hordes, repeatedly swore equally meaningless oaths of
submission or allegiance not only to the Russians but to China and other Central Asian
states.
Nevertheless, Abulkhair's approach to Russia certainly consolidated and
facilitated the imperial power's southward advance into the Steppe region. The advance
was further eased by the lack of Kazakh cohesion described above; the Tsarist
government was not confronted by the need to compromise with nationalist movements,
to grant real or synthetic self-determination to the non-Russian nationalities, or to justify
the retention of imperial domination in the face of world opinion. Even in the heyday of
the khanates no one thought of himself as Bukharan, Khivan or Kokandi. There were no
tight-knit communities like the Sikhs and Mahrattas in India. As emphasised, the loyalty
that did exist was to tribe and extended family. Nevertheless, as Bodger also pinpoints,
Abulkhair did not seek the permission of a kurullai, a steppe council, when he
approached Russia, and there is little, if any, indication that nomadic tribes desired what
followed.68
The Russian advance was quite different from the raids of the Oirots. It was
slow but inexorable. Two principal methods were used: the construction of military
forts, and the permission, and eventual sponsorship, of Russian settlers by Tsarist
Russia in the region. Peter the Great, seeking to increase commerce with the cities of
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Central Asia and India, came to believe that the Kazakhs were "the key and the gate to
all the Asian countries and lands". He reached this conclusion when two Russian probes
into Central Asia failed. Nevertheless, in his reign several forts were established on the
Upper Irtysh river: Omsk (1716), Semipalatinsk (1718), Ust-Kamenogorsk and
Paviodar (1720). It was, however, the second prong - the movement of Russian settlers
into the steppe - that exerted the most lasting effect on the nomadic way of life.
The settlement of Russian peasants in the Kazakh Steppe did not seem to have
been contemplated by the Russian government before the subjugation of the Steppe had
been completed. Earlier the Cossacks had been used to consolidate the territorial gains,
first along the Ural River, then to the south of Orenburg and finally in Semirech'ye, and
it was in this last comparatively fertile region that peasant colonisation was first started
in 1868, largely on the Chinese border. The oblast of Semirech'ye consisted of what are
now the Alma-Ata oblast (including the former oblast of Taldy-Kurgan, abolished in
1961) and the whole of the eastern half of present Kyrgyzstan, and it was classed as
nomadic, although many of the Kyrgyz in the southern part had begun to adopt a settled
existence and to take up agriculture.
George Demko has provided the most detailed study of the effects of land use
and allotment in the wake of peasant settlement. The greatest single cause for
complaint, and the underlying cause of the 1916 revolt, resulted from the wholesale
settlement of Russians on the so-called unoccupied lands and on lands used by the
nomads for grazing purposes. It is no exaggeration when Andreas Kappeler writes that
the uprising in response to the call for military labour in 1916 was "part of a secular
clash between expansionist agriculture and nomadic cattle-breeders."69 For the first
time, land became an issue for the nomads. The Russian settlers occupied not just any
land, but the best land. Many Kazakhs were reluctant to start a sedentary way of life -
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even if there is some evidence that a few former nomads were willing to learn a new
way of life; some had already been practising agriculture at the periphery with their
sedentary neighbours, the Uzbeks and the Uighurs. But overwhelmingly there was
opposition to the incursion on sacred nomadic migratory routes. And as pastureland
became scarce, so too did the possibilities for nomads to express their disapproval of
tribal chiefs by moving off into new pasturelands.
Land became private property: it could now be taxed. Before the Russian
conquest the nomads had only paid taxes when they came under the influence of one or
other of the khanates. One of the most difficult and pressing problems which confronted
the Tsarist administration was the collection of revenue and its channelling into a
central treasury. Pierce writes that it is "unfortunate that Soviet historical literature has
not yet provided any detailed description of this land reform, one of the most
progressive steps taken by the colonial regime".7° The Russians now instituted the so-
called kiblika or tent tax, which was in reality a tax on each household irrespective of
the number of residents, and exacerbated inequality amongst the nomads.
The reduction in pastureland exerted knock-on effects for income distribution
and, by extension, the relative power of social groups, and the relative power of white
and black bone. Kazakhs increasingly needed strong leadership to protect their ever
scarcer territories; Russian administrative power soon exploited this by sponsoring
richer chiefs who were more concerned with augmenting their own personal power than
with preserving paternalistic practices.
The role of the bii was further transformed with territorial-administrative
reforms, which were consolidated in earnest in 1867-8. In general, the introduction of
administration, borders and bureaucracy forced nomads to reassess their relationship
and attitude to territory.
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Up to the 1867-8 reforms, Russian imperial policy had relied on the support of
the white bone, which was in common with the general tsarist policy of coopting non-
Russian elites. Russian authorities even gave some lore, or sultans, tax-raising powers,
supplementing these with bribes and gifts. Khans were often bought at modest sums:
Batyr was an enemy of Abulkhair and an enemy of Russia, yet he swore an oath of
allegiance in exchange for R100 and a bolt of Damask, plus a further R50 and a bolt of
Damask for his son. 7' Between 1820 and 1840, Russian policy became more discerning
and began to reward only those sultans who had demonstrated their loyalty to the
Russian interests. But eventually Russian authorities recognised that khans appointed by
Russia such as Nuraly and Esim of the Junior Horde in the eighteenth century often had no
real power amongst the population. On the other hand, Khan Kenesary, who was opposed
to Tsarist power under Nicholas I and who was never confirmed by Tsarist authorities,
managed to get himself elected as the representative of all three zhuzes. Russian abolition
of the authority of the khans began with the Middle Horde whose last ruler, Shir-Ghazi,
was summoned to Orenburg in 1822; in 1824 the khanate of the Junior Zhuz was
suppressed, followed in turn by that of the Senior Zhuz in 1848. Its abolition spelt the
end of the divide between the white and black bone, and of endogamy within the white
bone.
By the time the 1867-8 reforms were introduced, Kazakh lands had ceased to be
a border region and the limit of the Russian conquests had reached Tashkent, some
1,400 miles from Orenburg. Hitherto the new territories had been administered by the
Governor-General of Turkestan, which included a large part of what is now southern
Kazakhstan, the northern part remaining under Orenburg and Western Siberia. With the
1867-68 reforms three governor-generalships were formed: Orenburg, West Siberia and
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Turkestan. These incorporated six oblasis: Uraisk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk,
Semirech'ye, and the Syr-Darya.
The administration of the Steppe Region (and Turkestan, for that matter) was,
from the beginning of the advance up to the Revolution of 1917, an essentially military
one. 72 However, the military character of the administration was less marked in the
Steppe region than in the Turkestan Governor-General. Whilst the Turkestan Governor-
General was always a serving army general officer, responsible to the Ministry of War,
all the so-called Steppe oblasts73 came under the Ministry of the Interior. By 1867, there
were already fourteen settlements of Cossacks which in many cases had appropriated
the winter pastures of the nomads and the best lands of the settled Kazakhs and Kyrgyz.
While Tsarist authorities appointed the oblasi and uezd heads, Kazakh nomads
themselves were responsible for electing the volosi head, who was usually a bii. Along
with the abolition of the white bone as a legal category, this represented another
revolution in steppe politics, one which often backfired. The election of the bii did not
conform to the consensus of the steppe, where nomads obeyed the bli simply because he
commanded their respect. Elections introduced open power struggles between bli, and
upset the equilibrium. The only institution to retain its former role was that of the aqsaqal,
recognised by the Russian authorities as a type of popular judge.
It is quite untrue, as has been stated by some Soviet historians and repeated by
some Western writers, that the provincial division of the Governates-General was
carried out with the express purpose of breaking down national formations since these
last did not in point of fact exist. Instead, oblasi and even uyezd boundaries "were to
some extent contrived with the object of breaking up tribal and clan combinations, but
this was not at all the same thing". '
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However, as with the bii, this policy also often had the reverse effect. To recall
1.2, auls were generally formed on the basis of lineage. Now that groups of different
lineage were shifted around, the Kazakhs had to look for a different tribal identity. This
was based now on the clan itself. In effect this amounted to the same thing as before -
even when based on lineage, the aul and clan were the expression of this common
descent. Now the clan, instead of the lineage, became the unit of exogamy, further
strengthening intra-Kazakh cleavages. Sedentary and now administratively defined, the
tribe actually strengthened. Defined by borders, identities lost some of their fluidity.
These units were also often bigger and thus stronger: Russian administrative units, if
concordant with clan size, stretched over a far larger surface area. In short, as lineage
(vertical stratification) decreased and clan allegiance (horizontal stratification)
increased, tribal formations transformed from being three-dimensional (or vertical) to
flat structures.
In any case, the clan system had begun to change by the seventeenth century
with the increase in wealth resulting from the conquest by the Kazakhs of some of the
southern cultivated areas and the partial introduction of agriculture among them; in the
Inner Horde, no Iamga or uran could any longer be seen or heard. Hugh Seton-Watson
writes that in the mid-nineteenth century "some of the tribal chiefs were trying to
convert tribal lands into personal property and to make peasants into their tenants".75
Krader illustrates the process of acculturation with an illuminating story. A son
had two elder brothers who had been allotted their shares of the father's estate during
the lifetime of the father, while he remained by his father's side until the death of the
latter. 76 Through the principle of ultimogeniture, the residual property should have been
transferred to the youngest son upon the father's death, but the two older brothers
threatened to take the herds away from him. The younger brother appealed to the bii of
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his community. The older brothers argued that the Kazakh customs were no longer in
force, and that Russian law required an equitable distribution of the paternal estate. The
bii ruled that the youngest son should give up one of his winter camps. The youngest
son appealed to the Russian courts, who advised all three simply to comply with the
decision of the bii, but also to take one of the older brothers' winter camps instead. The
youngest son agreed with neither suggestion. His appeal to the Russian courts was
strongly resented by the community and he was threatened with arrest, whereupon he
moved to a nearby town. The entire affair was placed in the hands of the local bii, but it
was left unsettled. Finally the courts voted in favour of the youngest son after the
appointment of a new Governor-General in the region. Important to note is that the
appeal to the Russian courts provoked resentment amongst the local Kazakhs.
The tale highlights two final additional important aspects to Russian rule. First,
even though imperial policy did not aim to Russify the steppe, acculturation had
become inevitable. The oldest sons appealed to Russian practice, challenging traditional
culture and the bii supported this challenge. As an extension of this phenomenon of
acculturation, Russian rule made the conditions possible for the education of a
Westernised elite. From 1789, institutions of higher education were established with the
specific aim of providing a Russian education for the children of the Kazakh hereditary
estate. The intention was 'to facilitate the rapprochement of Asiatics to Russians to
inspire in the former love and confidence towards the Russian government and to
provide the region with educated personnel." In addition to these "advanced"
establishments, which played a crucial role in the Russification of the Kazakh elite, the
regional authorities were required to open mixed Russo-Kazakh primary schools in the
all the district (uezd) centres. It was thus the children of the lore and khod.zha who
become the intellectual elite of tomorrow. Russian cultural influence was also seen in
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the adoption by the hereditary estate of European form of dress, furniture and
entertainment.
The degree of acculturation depended on the area of the Kazakh steppe. The
Kazakhs of the Middle Zhuz had been longer under Russian rule than those of the
Senior Zhuz, and their adoption of Russian practice was consequently greater. Writes
Krader "A Middle Horde Kazakh could adopt a "Russian" point of view and have the
public opinion of his community support him in it a full generation anterior to even a
remote envisagement of such a situation in the Great Horde". 78 The Junior and Inner
Hordes, closest to European Russia and the longest of all in close contact with the
Russians witnessed an even more marked degree of acculturation.
The Russian-educated Kazakh elite, numerically very small and still very
shallowly grounded, had close the urban-based immigrant communities. As Akiner
highlights, local newspapers began to appear in Orenburg, Omsk and Ural'sk in the last
quarter of the nineteenth century. Kazakh social elites used the First World War to
encourage the assimilation of nationhood among other Kazakh conscripts. They now
organised an A/ash Orda provisional republican government which, after the Bolshevik
revolution, did manage to unite a good proportion of the Kazakh population against this
threat of Russian domination. It was they who formed the Mash Orda government;
similarities may be gleaned with the "enlightened" political elite in 199 1-94 whose
members also failed to implement their democratic vision of society. This cultural elite
doubled as the political elite in 1917.80
The second and final point, again illustrated by the three brothers' story, is that
the Russian administration ultimately opted for Kazakh and not Russian custom.
Invariably anyone who applied to the uezd commandant or to higher Russian Courts for
the settlement of disputes seldom got any more satisfaction than they got in their own
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courts. Although powerful examples of how Russian influence was disturbing and
disrupting Kazakh rules and practices do exist, these were not all that common. In both
Turkestan and the Steppe Region local government was allowed to continue on more or
less traditional lines, although it was to some extent regularised by the Russians and
locally elected elders were liable to summary removal by the uezd commandants. Much
the same applied to the lower judicial courts.
Ultimately, the evidence on the steppe would bear out Kappeler's assertion that
Russian rule was overwhelmingly indirect, governed by a policy of "pragmatic
flexibility". The imperial regime was not interested in the swift assimilation of non-
Russians. Indeed, the segregated Muslims were officially declared to be second-class
citizens, or inorodisy ("allogenous", i.e., of a separate race),8 ' who enjoyed a peculiar
status with diminished rights, but also with privileges such as exemption from military
service, as well as special rights regarding self-government and religion. Tsarist
administration, itself weak, probably rightly recognised that it stood a better chance of
maintaining control of the steppe region by allowing it to operate more or less as it had
done previously. Nevertheless, Kappeler's statement needs to be qualified. True indirect
rule leaves a native society intact and governs through its elites. In this case,
colonisation by Slays limited indirect rule to non-colonised native areas.
SOVIET RULE
The influx of Slays was to continue in the Soviet period. Born in war and revolution, the
Kazakhstani Soviet elite was consolidated through purges. Of course, this was a Union-
wide phenomenon but the struggle between old and new elites at the birth of the Soviet
era took on added significance in an area still beholden to much of its traditional way of
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life. Unlike the contemporary elite who, as we shall see, grew up predominantly in an
urban environment, the new Soviet bureaucrats who rose to power still had cultural
links with the traditional aui.
Modemisation sought to eradicate these vestiges. Two key Soviet policies need to
be highlighted here: the creation of a Soviet nation; and, sedentarisation and
collectivisation combined with accompanying industrialisation. All would profoundly
influence the nature of the elite and of elite-society relations.
Soviet rule for the first time created a Kazakh nation-state. Marxist-Leninist
theories of nationhood were partly based on common territory. This, as we have seen,
the Kazakhs did not posses at the time of the 1917 revolution. Russian administrative-
territorial reform, as described above, did start to transform the nomads'
conceptualisation of territory, but not in any way on a nation-wide scale. To give at least
a semblance of regional autonomy, Soviet republics were granted, albeit only formally,
regional statehood and the right to secede. Simultaneously, Soviet powers set out to
establish a trans-republican Soviet state identity. This resulted in a dual policy and dual
identity - identification with the Soviet state and encouragment of a national self-
definition. The Kazakhs, only recently sedentarised and still of a predominantly
traditional existence, "were especially vulnerable to Soviet ethnic engineering". 84 In
1924-5 the formal National Delimitation of Central Asia was accomplished, whereby
the borders of the five main administrative-territorial units (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were marked out; it is these borders, as we
shall see, that have now become the international frontiers of the post-Soviet
independent states of Central Asia.
As we shall see in Section III, language and culture were crucial in instilling in
Kazakhs a sense of nationhood. The campaign for mass literacy and education
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established a new basis on which elites and society could be linked. As long as
statements were shrouded in Soviet patriotism, a tempered ideology of nationhood -
that had been lacking for the Chingizids - took on a concrete shape. Cultural borders
were being established, in which the negative definition of the nation was as important
as its positive attributes.
Many prominent members of the Kazakh intelligentsia - the cultural elite that
had in 1917 attempted to double up as the political elite - were shot in the second wave
of repression in 1938.85 Close on the heels of the campaign of terror came the
eradication of pastoral nomadism through collectivisation and sedentarisation. This was
in many respects a continution of the process enacted under Tsarist rule, but it had now
become a deliberate and central plank of regime policy. As Shirin Akiner highlights,
Zhuldyz Abulkhozhin in Tradllsionnaya sirukiura Kazakhstana draws on archival
material and rare publications of the 1920s, was one of the first post-independence
Kazakhstani writers to give a comprehensive account of the sedentarisation period.86
Soviet leaders showed none of the hesitation of their Tsarist predecessors. Once they
were in control, they pressed for rapid change. In 1926-7 there began an intensive
programme of taking arable and meadow lands from the tribal leaders and redistributing
them among poor families. In 1928, the Soviets confiscated 145,000 animals, also for
redistribution. This animal redistribution marked the beginning of a collectivisation
program which was rushed through at breakneck speed, far ahead of plan and much
more rapidly than in Russia itself. In the first year, 50,000 households were "settled" in
collectives, and by the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan, the settlement of the
Kazakh nomads was regarded as basically complete.
Thousands of nomadic families were forced into collective encampments where
their animals often starved to death for lack of adequate grazing. Many fled to the
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Chinese side of the border, some sought refuge in Afghanistan. Those who could not
escape often killed their animals. The collectivisation programme, which emphasized
settlement of the nomads and development of agriculture, was accompanied by the
impoverishment, exile, or liquidation of tribal leaders. The cost of the collectivisation
campaign in terms of human and animal losses was calamitous:
out of a Kazakh population of approximately 4,120,000 in 1930, some 1,750,000
had died from starvation, epidemics and executions by 1939 - over forty percent
of the entire population (this is in addition to deaths from natural causes);
200,000 fled into neighbouring countries and remained there (another 400,000
fled, but later returned), and 453,000 took refuge in neighbouring Soviet
republics, also to remain there permanently.88
At the same time, mining and industry were developed in regions that had been
the pasture lands or winter quarters of the nomads. Before and during World War 1T
many thousands of Koreans, Ukrainians, Volga Germans, Crimean Tatars, and other
nationality groups were transplanted to Kazakhstan, and throughout the Soviet period
there was an influx of Slays in the guise of administrators, agitators, technicians, and
"fraternal helpers". By 1939 Kazakhs had become a minority in name only: whilst in
1926 they had comprised 58.2 percent of the population, by 1939 that percentage had
fallen to 36.4 percent. Only in 1989 did the Kazakhs become a plurality again in the
Republic (39.7 percent as opposed to 37.8 percent Russian), but even then actual
majority remained elusive. Finally came the "Virgin Lands" program, inaugurated in
1953 to convert the remaining grasslands of northern Ka.zakhstan into a Russian
breadbasket. Even in 1959, the Kazakh population in the KASSR still numbered some
one million less than it had in 1926 (2.8 million and 3.7 million respectively).
This is the first era, then, in which we can speak of a nalional elite, albeit
a Soviet republican national elite. Soviet recruitment practice is analysed to
some extent in Section II, including the analysis of the ethnicity of those who
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held the commanding heights of the polity and economy, and the constellation of
power networks of the ruling elite. To continue instead our analysis of the
effects on traditional structures, it is important to understand at this stage that the
Kazakh First Party Secretary in the Brezhnev era enjoyed a fair degree of
autonomy in the appointment of his bureaucrats. The promotion and formation
of an ethnic Kazakh elite can be largely attributed to Dinmukhamed Kunaev
(1912-1993), who became Kazakh First Party Secretary in 1960. A protégé and
close personal associate of Leonid Brezhnev, he became a candidate member of
the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union in 1966, and a full member in 1971, an achievement unique amongst
Central Asian Party leaders, which gave him considerable power and influence.
This, as we shall see in Sections II and HI, benefited Kazakhstan, since he was
able to promote both the Kazakhstani state and Kazakh nationhood.
Freed of the threat of repression, the nomenklatura began to develop on
the lines of a ruling class not dissimilar to the white bone estate described by
Khazanov in his differentiated segmentary society. But this time an elite post
meant entitlement to real material gains, high consumer goods standards and an
elitist standard of life, prestigious education, and undeclared income. Elite
building for the first time was given its own institutional network. This, of
course, was a Union-wide exercise. As in other fields, the dual-level hierarchy of
Soviet and national identity was carefully articulated. 9° Thus, for example, the
Communist Party of Kazakhstan (founded in 1937, on the basis of earlier,
regional organisations) was part of and subordinated to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union. Similarly, as in other republics, the Ka.zakh national flag was a
variant on the Soviet flag.
60
What had happened to the aul, tribe and zhuz, already under assault in
the Russian era? We note an interesting, although not altogether surprising,
development. In terms of recruitment and self-identification, the elite's zhuz
membership was the decisive factor. Zhuz affiliation counted more for
recruitment than that of the aul or the tribe. It is possible that the zhuz assumed
this importance because the zhuz is the only unit which, as we saw, has readily
available symbols and myths associated with the professions to be practised by
members of a zhuz; to recall, a chief in the Senior Zhuz, a writer in the Middle
Zhuz and a warrior in the Junior Zhuz. As we shall in Section II, after the
dismissal of Janin Shayakhmetov from the post of First Secretary, power began
increasingly to be concentrated in the hands of the Senior Zhuz, to which Kunaev
belonged. The Senior Zhuz suffered the least from the sedentarisation campaign
(having traditionally been part-agriculturalists), and was thereby in a better position
to preserve its traditional social relations. This also brought prestige to the Senior
Zhuz.9'
At the societal level, even the Soviet era seemed unable to encroach into the
established tribal affiliation. Tribal identities existed alongside the new nation-building
project. The reasons are convincing in their simplicity. As Bacon notes, "kolkhoz
exogamy has replaced genealogical exogamy". 92 Kol/thoz nomad brigades regularly
consisted of a close family unit. A brigade either tended a flock of sheep or a herd of
horses, of camels, or of cattle, or cared for cultivated fields or cut hay from the
meadows. Even if traditional auls always herded different types of animals separately,
there was always close cooperation between different breeders, such as when horses
were sent "to teben" for sheep, and this practise continued between ko/khozy.
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The kolkhoz itself was made up of closely related families of a tribal kin
segment. When these early kolkhozy were consolidated to form larger kolkhozy, such a
consolidation usually brought together related kin groups by virtue of their traditional
sharing of a common territory. In some cases, where one small kolkohz kin group
happened to be farther afield, it was nevertheless included in the kolkohz of its closest
tribal kin segments rather than in that nearest to it geographically. Thus, the old tribal
kin structure had not been destroyed. As Bacon writes: "Indeed, the formation of
kolkhozes within the traditional territory has perhaps strengthened kinship ties." 93 This
reinforcement of territorial boundaries and its effective strengthening of tribal identity
mirrors our findings in the Russian era. And the bii, chief of the tribal kin groups, often
reappeared as a district administrator. There were frequent newspaper complaints that
administrators gave preference to members of their own tribal kin segment in making
appointments and decisions. And the aqsaqal remained a person of importance -
children within the extended family unit continued to be trained from earliest childhood
to respect their elders.
CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, except during periods of domination by a single great centre, such as
Chingiz Khan's Mongolia or Imperial and Soviet Russia, the peoples of the steppe were
constantly in flux. Horde, clan, and tribal boundaries changed; intermarriage between
Kazakhs and non-Kazakhs increased considerably. Genealogy, kinship and descent
represented the one means for Kazakhs to maintain some semblance of continuity- by
preserving the same clan names. Genealogies were the shell of the nomad: as successive
powers encroached on their territory, groups of nomads were able smoothly to
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incorporate and adopt outside groups into their own ranks, without making any essential
structural changes. "Genealogical amnesia" was not uncommon: "The lineage was,
moreover, a more fluid entity than the family, which also had a biological as well as a
moral basis for stability."94
The relationship established by a common ancestor, or of a previous group of
common descent, was a weak one, but was related to certain rights of admission or
combination with the distant kinsman. For example, the Kereit of the Senior Zhuz could
join an Uzbek group also bearing the name Kereit. A small portion later returned to the
Kazakhs, but this time established itself in the Junior Zhuz. Those who made the move
to join the Junior Zhuz were thereupon given a fictive genealogy tracing descent from
the eponymous founder of the Karakat clan in the Junior Zhuz. Noteworthy is the
assertion of the right to clan membership by genealogical reckoning, real or fictive.
Ultimately, kinship served different functions for the white and black bone. At
the lower level, kinship determined and organised questions of property, inheritance,
guardianship of young children, the levirate, and material help on birth, weddings and
funerals. For the white bone, genealogical links were very important in power relations,
ideology and politics, and in the maintenance of their rule. Chiefs who could afford a
Tatar secretary kept written genealogies.
Finally, what have the periods of Kazakh traditional nomadic culture and
subsequent Russian and Soviet rule demonstrated individually?
Despite their dislike of excessive authority, the nomads did not live in a state of
anarchy. They required leaders to settle disputes among themselves and to represent
them in relations with the outside world. Part of the overall stability stemmed arguably
from a complete separation of the elite and society - each operated according to its own
rules. Ultimately, Kazakhs failed (or did not try) to reconcile the two apparently
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contradictory principles of social structure: the common line of descent of all Kazakhs
from one ancestor, and the division into estates.
Part of the stability stemmed from an innate systemic equilibrium. Where
inequality was too pronounced, the system of cooperation and mutual aid which existed
in the community was put in jeopardy; in such cases impoverished households fell away
from the community and became dependent on new households. Two main mechanisms
prevented inequality: reciprocity and redistribution. Kazakh nomadic society offered a
prime example of reciprocity: satin. Saun in Soviet anthropology designated the various
forms and terms by which rich stock-owners entrusted the pasturing of their animals to
the poorer members of their society. 95 Satin discouraged poor households from falling
away from nomadic societies, thus helping to prevent the disintegration of societies in
question. Inequalities were nevertheless perpetuated: the rich tended to marry the rich,
and the poor married the poor, for the bride-wealth (kalym) necessary for a rich wife
was beyond the means of a poor Kazakh.
Property redistribution was equally common. Bais, bus and sultans (i.e., members
of the ruling and well-to-do strata) often organised lavish feasts, following the saying:
"The dog that is hit with a fatty bone never whines". Livestock raids were an
institutionalised form of property redistribution. It is curious that amongst the Kazakhs in
the nineteenth century livestock redistribution, or bcüymta, was sometimes used by poor
nomads as a way of seizing stock from the Kazakh nobility. Ultimately, poor nomads
could not remain poor for long - either they entered the service of rich stockowners or they
supplemented nomadism by partial sedentarisation. Property differences were only ever
temporary, and rarely tended to turn into stable and hereditary social stratification.
Imperial policy introduced to the steppe a fundamentally different
conceptualisation of power, one defined by territory, regulated by elections and
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supported by a bureaucracy. Key to Tsarist rule was the seizure of Kazakh land. The
policy in the Kazakh steppe was sometimes dominated by the colonialist feeling of
superiority, industrialisation, imperialism, and nationalism. But overwhelmingly,
colonial rule was not ideological but pragmatic, upholding the arrangements in
prevailing in local administration, this option being the best means toward maintaining
Russian rule.
Sovietisation brought the following peculiarities of elites and society to
Kazakhstan: a Europeanisation of the population and accompanying acculturation; the
loss of majority status by ethnic Kazakhs in the original KSSR; a wholehearted
transformation in the production basis of their society; a clear divide between urbanised,
industry-employed Russians and rural Kazakhs; the onslaught of literacy; a change in
the character but an overall strengthening of kinship at the lower levels of society; and,
the elevation of the zhuz to a primary unit of allegiance. The tragedies of the Soviet era
were to spark a period of collective amnesia, of which our next subject, the Alma-Ata
events of 1986, are just one example. The analysis of 1986 is the indispensable
background to what is the essence of Chapter Two: the institutional architecture behind
contemporary elite formation and competition.
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CHAPTER 1.2
THE STRUCTURE OF POWER:
ELITES, INSTITUTIONS AN]) SOCIETY
This chapter analyses how President Nursultan Nazarbaev has employed elites and
institutions to consolidate his power. The empirical evidence on institution-building will
enable us to draw some conclusions on:
(1) the institutional architecture of the Nazarbaev regime; this will enable us to make
some preliminary conclusions on whether, institutionally, this is a pluralist or power
elite;
(2) the relationship between national and regional power centres;
(3) the interaction of elites and institutions; and,
(4) the nature of power and the state in post-independent Kazakhstan.
The analysis begins with a chronological account of how the new constitutions
and institutions in Kazakhstan were devised. Chronology is important: timing and
interaction of institutions are crucial to an understanding of how the President had by
1998 managed to amass exclusive institutional control of his administration. The
account will also introduce some of the major actors who have been shaping
Kazakhstan's politics. These individuals cannot be ignored. Individuals continue to
shape institutions, rather than vice versa, and informal networks, not formal structures,
dominate Kazakhstani politics. By identifying the political elite and networks, we are
also better placed to analyse the individuals who appear in Section II.
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A word of caution, however: the principle aim of this chapter is not to consider
democratisation in Kazakhstan, and therefore does not draw greatly on the growing
democratisation literature. Post-independent Kazakhstan has displayed few signs of
democratisation and President Nazarbaev has explicitly denied that democracy
represents Kazakhstan's goal - even if the President has often used the term in
deference to the international community and the nascent opposition.'
Stability has been the watchword of the regime, and the ruling elite has viewed
democracy as anathema to stability. This is because the elite has considered democracy
as conducive to the emergence of parties and movements along ethnic lines and thus the
likelihood of interethnic conflict. Privately, of course, democracy has been feared for
leading to the development of a counter-elite. More helpful comparisons can perhaps
instead be drawn with patnmonialism in pre-modern, pre-capitalist Russia. Donald N.
Jensen has argued that the current Russian political system is best understood as latter-
day patrimonialism, 2
 and the same observation could be made of Kazakhstan. Although
his analysis is rather oversimplified, he compares how under the Russian autocracy, the
Tsar was both ruler of the country and its proprietor; political authority was an
extension of the rights of property ownership. The Tsar "owned" the country, its
resources, and the citizens. Accordingly, the land and its people were at the sovereign's
disposal. Citizens were assigned duties but had no rights. Favoured parts of the nobility
received economic privileges in exchange for political support. The civil service kept a
portion of the revenue they collected, which fostered corruption of government
agencies. According to this argument, the patrimonial state impeded development of a
bourgeoisie and, with it, democracy.
According to Jensen, patrimonialism did not die with the autocracy. The Soviet
state was an "especially virulent" patrimonialism. The party-state owned "everything",
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controlled state revenues and citizens' rights were "for the state to give or to take
away". Nor did it die with the Soviet Union. Under post-communist Russia, there are no
distinct boundaries between the private and public domains. As we examine
Kazakhstan, similar conclusions will be drawn but important differences will also be
highlighted. In the words of the prominent human rights activist whom we shall meet in
Section II, Evgenii Zhovtis: "When the mother is a market economy and the father
communist authoritarianism, the result is a corrupt child".3
POST-11'IEPENDENCE INSTITUTIONS
Between 1991 and 1998 the President survived three governments, three parliaments
and two judiciaries. He survived through Soviet command-administrative methods of
power consolidation. Power consolidation has involved the manipulation of formal
institutional mechanisms to strengthen the ruler's grip on his office. Soviet elite politics
focused on patron-client relations and on policies designed to appeal to the Soviet
establishment: the party apparatus, the state bureaucracy, the military, the police, and
the military-industrial complex. Through a combination of patronage and reward, power
consolidation allowed the General Secretary to surpass rivals and rise within the
leadership. President Nazarbaev has used these same two methods to consolidate his
power. To illustrate this, we need to begin with a chronological analysis of how
Nazarbaev attained and consolidated power.
Nursultan Nazarbaev was born in 1940 in the village of Chemolgan, near the
city of Alma-Ata (now Almaty). He was educated locally at a Russian language-school
and in the Ukraine city of Dneprodzerzhinsk, where he completed a technical school
degree in 1960. His education was thus in the Russian language. Upon graduation, he
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returned to Kazakhstan to work as a metallurgist in the Karaganda Metallurgical
Combine in Termitau. It was here that he first became active in politics. Having served
his time in the Komsomol and the local Communist Party (CKP), by 1979 he had
already been appointed to second secretary of the Karaganda regional committee. A
year later he was appointed Secretary for Industry on the Republic's Central Committee.
In 1984, Nazarbaev was appointed chairman of Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers,
effectively the number two position in the republic after Kunaev. This meant that at the
age of forty-four Nazarbaev was the youngest among all Soviet republic chairmen.
As Martha Brill Olcott highlights, Nazarbaev's election as First Secretary of the
CPK's Central Committee in May 1989, and his co-chairmanship of the Supreme
Council between February and April, allowed him to consolidate power. As chairman of
Kazakhstan's Council of Ministers and the second most prominent Kazakh in the party,
Nazarbaev must have had expectations that he would be picked to replace Kunaev.4
Moreover, his criticism of Kunaev during the period between March 1985 and
December 1986 indicated the reform-mindedness that should have made him a member
of the Gorbachev—Ligachev—Ryzhkov reform team. He decided to take a chance. In
January 1986, at the sixteenth session of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan (KPK),
Nazarbaev criticised Kunaev's brother Askar, then head of the Academy of Sciences,
for his inertia and anti-reformist credentials.
In his memoirs, Kunaev describes his role in the original appointment of
Nazarbaev and his feeling of betrayal: "Igor Ligachev and I, we decided a number of
cadre questions in the republic, in particular the promotion of Nursultan Nazarbaev to
the post of Chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers". 5
 Shortly after this
appointment, Kunaev flew to Moscow and demanded the removal of Nazarbaev.
Meanwhile, supporters of Nazarbaev lobbied for Kunaev's removal and his replacement
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by the young Chairman. Gorbachev, often preferring compromise, opted for neither, and
instead parachuted in from Moscow an ethnic Russian, Gennadii Kolbin. The decision
set off three days of rioting in Alma-Ata, between 16 and 18 December, 1986. These
riots at the imposition of an outsider are often interpreted as the first major nationalist
crack in the supranational Soviet edifice.
Gorbachev's decision to bypass Nazarbaev for a Russian from outside
Kazakhstan broke the traditional rules of Soviet society. As Martha Brill Olcott writes:
What may have seemed rational cadre politics in Moscow - a means of reducing
local political influence, of increasing integration into the greater union, and also
of avoiding falling into the clutches of any local faction - looked from Central
Asia much more like Great Russian chauvinism6
Kolbin returned to Moscow in June 1989 after riots in the western Kazakhstan oil town
Novyi Uzen, and Nazarbaev was appointed as his replacement, first as head of the
Kazakhstan Communist Party and then, in September 1989, as chairman of the
republic's Supreme Soviet. Once elected first secretary, Nazarbaev moved steadily to
bring the republic's administration under his control. Kolbin had not had great success
in putting his own cadre infrastructure in place, which was one reason the Russian had
had little effect on republic policy. Nazarbaev, by contrast, moved to heal rifts with
other Kazakhstani officials that had been opened by his fight with Kunaev, including
making peace with Kunaev himself in April 1991. Perhaps even more important. In
March 1990, following the example set by Gorbachev in Moscow, Nazarbaev converted
his chairmanship of the Supreme Soviet to a presidency confirmed by parliamentary
election. Writing later in his memoirs, Nazarbaev was quick to establish his role in the
1986 events:
In everyone's life there are moments when suddenly a crucial choice has to be
made, a choice between what is familiar, comfortable, and what is unpredictably
complex or painful. A person faced with such a dilemma who does not conform to
the circumstances, who remains true to himself, ultimately gains. When the people
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began their march into town I realised that I faced such a dilemma - either take a
stand or return to the Central Committee offices. The latter seemed an inexcusable
betrayal of the people who were right. I went with them, at the head of the crowd.7
Perhaps Nazarbaev's role in the 1986 events will never filly be known, but critics say
that rather than lead the crowds, he dispersed
	 In any case, he was keen to assert
his version of events. The above memoirs were strategically published four months
before the December 1991 elections. Interestingly, Nazarbaev' s key contender for the
post of President was an undisputed leader of the 1986 riots and a proud ethnic
nationalist, Khasen Kozhakmetov. Collecting his signatures from inside a yurt set up
outside the State Supermarket of Alma-Ata's busiest pedestrian mall, Kozhakmetov
practically obtained the required number to compete for presidential office. As the
election date approached, his yurt was ransacked leaving no record of the signatures.
Nazarbaev now stood alone and on 1 December 1991, under the slogan of "Want a Flag
for Kazakhstan? Cast Your Vote for Nursultan" won outright with a reported 98.7% of
the vote. As we shall see in 11.3 and 111.1, Nazarbaev was never a nationalist, but he was
and remains a strong regionalist who understood that economic and political relations in
the USSR worked to the advantage of Moscow and to the disadvantage of the various
regions.
Crucial elite alliances were forged in this period. Soon after the August 1991
coup Nazarbaev had resigned his party membership but did not follow Yeltsin's
example of trying to uproot the party in entirety. Indeed, Nazarbaev allowed the
Kazakhstan Communist Party to hold a scheduled congress. Part of the reason for
Nazarbaev's relative restraint was the need to secure administrative continuity, because
he was making personnel shifts in his government in anticipation of the increased
financial responsibility that sovereignty or independence would bring. In October 1991
Nazarbaev appointed a number of economists to his cabinet, including Erik Asanbaev as
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vice-president, Uzakbai Karamanov (head of the Council of Ministers) as chairman of a
new Council of Ministers, and Daulet Sembaev (former head of Nazarbaev's economic
advisory council) as vice premier. His choice of Prime Minister was tactical; whilst the
above three were ethnic Kazakhs, he appointed a Russian-Ukrainian, Sergei
Tereshchenko. Born in the Russian Far East and an agronomist by training, he had
earned his degree in Chimkent where, among other things, he had mastered Kazakh.
Nazarbaev also appointed the first of several foreign economic advisers, including
Grigory Yavlinsky, one of the authors of the 500 Days plan of economic transformation
Gorbachev had commissioned, then rejected. During the latter part of 1991, Yeltsin and
Nazarbaev forged political alliances.
Nazarbaev was blessed with one individual in particular, Erik Asanbaev. The
two had been long-time friends and colleagues. Asanbaev was a trained economist and
highly respected amongst many members of the Soviet elite. It is doubtful that
Nazarbaev could have risen so far so quickly without Asanbaev's support. Nazarbaev
probably also knew that Asanbaev did not aspire to the top office. With this knowledge,
but also probably out of genuine acknowledgement for his support, he asked Asanbaev
to stand with him in December 1991 as Vice-President. By granting both posts a
popular mandate, Nazarbaev set up an automatic institutional competitor to the
presidency.
Asanbaev was part of a significant number of reformers within this early
Presidential Administration and Government who promoted gradual democratisation.
Nazarbaev initially sought their advice; in these early days he perceived their support as
crucial to his presidency. As a key concession to the reformers, the President allowed
Asanbaev to head the drafting of Kazakhstan's first post-independence Constitution, or
as Duchacek calls this formal distribution of power within the state, the 'power map".9
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Contrary to some opinion,' 0
 the commission was initially headed by the Vice-President,
not President. In May 1991 a round table discussion involving commission members,
deputies and parliamentarians from other Soviet republics debated the proposed draft,
and in October the revised draft was submitted to a group of academics for comment."
The twelfth Parliament and President differed on whether the Republic should
be called parliamentary or presidential.' 2
 Nazarbaev was not yet strong enough to
impose his own vision on society; he made no secret of the fact, however, that he
wished to see a presidential republic with substantial presidential powers. Aiready in
October 1991 in an interview with the Japanese newspaper Hokkaido Shimbun,
President Nazarbaev stated: "I see Kazakhstan as a democratic, presidential republic,
with a professional parliament, elected on a multiparty basis, and with strong executive
power in the centre and in the regions".' 3
 By the end of December 1991 Nazarbaev had
taken over the Constitutional Commission and persuaded former opponents to
presidential rule to join him. Examples were S. Zimanov, M. Raev, K. Suleimenov and
N. Shaikhenov.
Nazarbaev faced some of the same resistance from his Communist-era Supreme
Soviet as Yeltsin did in Russia. Vitalii Voronov and Aleksandr Peregrin were the two
deputies who actively opposed the draft Constitution in the twelfth Convention.' 4 Both
ethnic Russian, the one a trained lawyer who had worked in the procuracy, the other a
researcher, they were to become founders of a key oppositional movement, "The Legal
Development of Kazakhstan". Nazarbaev ensured that the Constitution incorporated
democratic rules and procedures and parliament was actively involved in its adoption.15
Indeed, unlike Uzbekistan's Islam Karimov and Turkmenistan's Saparmurat Niyazov,
Nazarbaev was not creating a cult of his own personality. The Constitution very clearly
provided for mandatory succession by forbidding a President to serve more than two
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terms; it included a separation of powers between executive, legislative and judiciary
and a legislature with real budgetary and law-making powers. Nevertheless, Nazarbaev
was more successful than Yeltsin in negotiating approval for what he called a "strong
presidential republic".' 6 He successfully argued the need for strong presidential power
which would enable the President to overcome the problems of a transition period
demanding substantial and painful economic reform in a multiethnic state. 17 The
document' 8 was passed by an overwhelming majority at the ninth session of the
Supreme Soviet of the twelfth Convention on 28 January 1993.'
Despite his conviction that "the stabilisation of the economy and the transition to
the market demand a categorical ban on any party, political, or ideological interference
in this process", Nazarbaev began in early 1993 to create institutions which would link
the elites to the masses: political parties. 2° These top-down parties were conceived as
transmission belts on the lines of the former Communist party. The key examples of
these parties were, in the order of their formation, the Union of Unity and Progress for
Kazakhstan, the People's Congress Party (PNEK, later renamed SNEK), and the Union
of People's Unity of Kazakhstan or UPU (renamed People's Unity Party or PUP).
These political parties did not function in the low-key, restrained fashion
intended because the personalities whom Nazarbaev selected as their leaders
demonstrated political aspirations of their own. Of particular note was PNEK whose
chairman Olzhas Suleimenov became an increasingly outspoken critic of the President.
Suleimenov was also buoyed through metals trading, initial funds for which were made
available from the Nevada-Semipalatinsk movement. Both Suleimenov and the head of
UPU, Senk Abdrakhmanov, openly declared in 1994 their intention to stand for the
presidency in the then scheduled 1995 presidential elections. Nazarbaev was thus to
abandon the use of presidential parties until 1998, when, in the run-up to the
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prematurely called elections for January 1999, he again felt the need to strengthen the
relationship between rulers and ruled.
Differences between the twelfth Parliament and the President were to re-emerge
after the passing of the 1993 Constitution. They were dominated by a personality clash
between the President and Speaker of Parliament, Sergei Abdildin. Parliamentary
newspapers such as Sovely Kazakhslana and Halik Keversi, for example, published
Abdildin's articles whenever the President was out of the country. One such interview
was entitled "one mountain, two peaks". Parliament also represented distinct economic
interests which fiercely opposed an IMF-backed stabilisation programme, something
which Nazarbaev and the government of Tereshchenko had tried to push through since
the beginning of 1993. Nazarbaev was getting impatient; Kazakhstan had launched
privatisation back in 1991, but now the country was lagging behind Russia in its
economic reform program. Crucially, he realised that Parliament's control chamber,
headed by Sergei Abdrakhmanov, possessed compromising data on the executive elite.
Nazarbaev seized the initiative and "invited" parliament to dissolve itself in
December 1993. He justified the self-dissolution by stating that independent Kazakhstan
had not yet held democratic elections, which would be scheduled for March 1994. At all
key points in Parliament's history, the President has been personally present and this
was no exception. After hearing Na.zarbaev's passionate appeal for self-dissolution, one
deputy intervened to declare that Nazarbaev's actions were illegal. Nazarbaev stormed
out of the chamber and returned only after a formal apology. Merely a handful voted
against dissolution. Upon dissolution, the president decreed the status and income of the
parliamentarians. Many spoke of a Faustian pact.2'
Simultaneously, another decree granted the President plenipotentiary powers
until the new parliamentary elections scheduled for 17 March 1 99422 These powers
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included the unilateral right to make personnel appointments, to adopt a referendum and
to declare a state of emergency without recourse to Parliament until the first session of
the newly elected parliament. 23
 This law was in open violation of the existing
Constitution, since it gave the President powers which, according to the Constitution,
belonged exclusively to the Supreme Soviet.24
As the March 1994 elections approached, a special Central Electoral Committee
(CEC) was established and foreign observers were invited to monitor the proceedings of
the first supposedly democratic elections. Most concurred that the elections proved far
from democratic. For example, many persons were arbitrarily denied registration as
candidates for Parliament by electoral commissions that belied their ostensible
independence by responding to orders from executive authorities; sharp restrictions
were placed on campaign advertising; some candidates enjoyed material support from
regional and local administrations in registration and campaigning; and ballot urns were
often removed from polling places to homes in search of more voters. Moreover, 42 of
the 177 candidates elected had been picked from a list compiled by the President.
Known as the "gosspisok" (abridged form of "gosudarsivennyl spisok" or state list), the
list was the President's means of placing "his men" in a potentially confrontational
institution. Of the remaining 135, more than half were supporters of the President: only
15 percent viewed themselves as directly opposed to him.
This strategy to create a submissive parliament failed. Instead the parliament
developed into three loosely formed blocs. 25
 In ascending numerical importance, these
were: the undecided; the pro-executive bloc; and the opposition. About 40 deputies, or
nearly a quarter of parliament, did not know to which camp they belonged. It included
individuals with "centrist" positions, who could be drawn to either of the two larger
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blocs, as well as many without clearly defined voting patterns. As many as 10 of these
included deputies from the state list and were predominantly ethnic Kazakh.26
The pro-executive bloc represented and supported the interests of the executive
branch of government. By one estimate it initially held 37% of the votes. Most but
significantly not all state list deputies supported this group. It also contained many
members of the presidential SNEK party. Nearly half of this group worked in
administration positions of various levels before entering parliament. The pro-executive
group was highly educated; primarily Kazakh in ethnic origin, its strongest support lay
in Almaty oblast and city, and the southern and southwestern oblasts of the Republic.
Crucially, the pro-executive group did not function as an organised and powerful bloc.
Core members, outside of speaking at plenary sessions, did not adequately or
consistently lobby for presidential programmes. 27
The opposition formed the largest group. The term "opposition" is misleading in
the sense that these deputies, while questioning the means and speed of reform policies,
did support the principle executive goals of marketisation and Nazarbaev's conception
of democratisation. Also the term conveys unity, which, as with the executive bloc, did
not exist. Instead, the opposition was composed of a number of groups. 28
 The largest of
the opposition's group, Progress, had formed around Gaziz Aldamzharov, who was its
choice for speaker of parliament. 29
 In the end, that post went to a presidential supporter,
Abish Kekilbaev. Progress united individuals supporting Azal, a Kazakh national
movement, and supporters of Lad, the Slavic national movement, which clearly pointed
to a lack of unified positions on linguistic and ethnic issues such as the dual language
and dual citizenship questions. Such issues were a secondary priority in the first months
of parliament; instead, the opposition was united by common concerns about and
approaches to strengthening the social net for the general population. 3° Aldamzharov
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and his supporters had already rallied around a reform plan drafted by Pyotr Svoik, then
Chair of the State Antimonopoly Committee. Progress played a major role in initiating
the declaration of disapproval of the Cabinet of Ministers' economic policy.3'
Another, much smaller, oppositional group was Yevraziia. Composed of
approximately fifteen parliamentarians, it supported the establishment of a Eurasian
union and greater contact with CIS members in all spheres. 32
 Most of their members
were ethnic Russian and supporters of Lad Yevraziia actively supported a dual state
language, but some members expressed a milder opinion on dual citizenship, saying
there was no reason for it if a mechanism could be developed to allow Russians to
emigrate easily should they choose to, and to receive Russian citizenship without
obstacles. Region, the third major oppositional group, comprised about 16 deputies
advocating regional autonomy. 33
 Overall, the preeminence of semi-opposition groups
was a surprise to most local observers and a nuisance to Nazarbaev who had again to
contend with diluted executive power.
Meanwhile, the President himself took steps to distance himself from the
government, separating in April the presidential apparatus from the Cabinet of
Ministers, and restructuring various state management structures. In his 9 June 1994
speech to Parliament, he described his intention to distance the role of the head of state
from government and to concentrate on his role as constitutional arbiter. This he did just
two months before parliament, freshly in office, passed a vote of no confidence in the
Tereshchenko government.
The President had clearly become increasingly dissatisfied with the course of
economic reform and Tereshchenko provided a useful scapegoat. He dismissed
Tereshchenko in September 1994. To the surprise of many, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a
little known 42-year old from the eastern town of Semei, was appointed as his
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successor. Initially chief of a local company named Toman and then head of Semei
enterprise, by late 1994 the Republic's flagship private enterprise, he had served in
Semei's regional administration in the last days of Gorbachev. During the Tereshchenko
years, Kazhegeldin had acted as informal head of a growing number of private
entrepreneurs and had by 1994 been Head of the Union of Entrepreneurs, a rare
industrial lobby group which at the time was pressing for land privatisation. This young
Komsomol worker was later to reveal his KGB past. Here was the epitome of the
young, westernised Kazakh elite, appearing in Italian designer suits and fill of praise
for rapid marketisation.
The policies of Kazhegeldin (1994-1997) were to mark a radical departure from
the conservatism of Tereshchenko. Kazhegeldin was a far more open and flexible
negotiator; whilst Tereshchenko rarely met with foreign investors and reportedly
seldom read the foreign contracts he signed, Kazhegeldin was often criticised for
neglecting the indigenous business elite. He was applauded by Western investors and
institutions. 34
 He was a passionate proselytiser for the market; after all, he had done
well from the liberalisation under the Gorbachev period. Tereshchenko relied on the
style of old-school party apparatchiks, accustomed to getting his way by thumping the
table. One can only imagine how daunting it must have been for Kazhegeldin on his
first day at work arriving to take charge of the country's vast economy; he must have
been acutely aware how weak his power base was at the start. Not only did he belong to
one of the lowest ranking tribes of the Middle Zhuz - the Uak tribe - he was also now
in the seat of traditional, Southern power.
Unlike his predecessor, however, Kazhegeldin took fill charge of economic
policy. By so doing he was able to create a new power base. He surrounded himself
with able economists. He retained the doyen of independent Kazakhstan's
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macroeconomic policy, Daulet Sembaev. Universally respected and considered by most
as a highly upright individual, Sembaev, in his former capacity as Chairman of the
National Bank, steered the country out of the familiarity of the rouble zone to the
uncertainty of an independent currency. Kazhegeldin undoubtedly encouraged
Nazarbaev's appointment of Oraz Dhzandosov as Sembaev's successor. 35 At the age of
thirty-two, Dhzandosov was the youngest Chairman of a National Bank in the former
Soviet Union. Dhzandosov was less of a politician than Sembaev but a brilliant
economist, and was ably served by his deputy, Grigory Marchenko. Zhanna Ertlesova,
Deputy Minister of Economics, also collaborated closely with the IMF and was a
further example of a technocrat. Finally, Kazhegeldin developed close ties with
Kazakhstan's leading commercial bank, Kazkommerslbank, headed by another
Moscow-educated economist, Nurlan Sukhanberdin. Although small, this circle of
trusted and able cadre strengthened the institution of the government vis-à-vis the
presidential administration. And unlike those of his predecessor, Kazhegeldin's policies
reached out to the young business elite, key reformer elites in Moscow and, crucially,
foreign investors.
Nazarbaev could turn his attention again to Parliament. By the end of 1994, very
little legislation had been passed by the thirteenth Parliament and Nazarbaev appeared
to lose patience. But self-dissolution was not an option this time. Instead, a perfect
pretext arose in the form of the complaint lodged with Kazakhstan's Constitutional
Court by journalist-turned-MP, Tatyana Kyatkovskaya. This prompted Olzhas
Suleimenov, poet, writer, politician and former leader of the anti-nuclear movement
"Nevada-Semipalatinsk" to state in March 1995: "In Yeltsin's Russia, to dissolve
parliament you need tanks; in Nazarbaev's Kazakhstan to dissolve parliament you only
need one tank: Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya".37
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Kvyatkovskaya was a former journalist who had stood for election as MP in the
Ablaikhanskii district (ralon) of Almaty in March 1994. Immediately after the elections,
Kvyatkovskaya had lodged a complaint that the unequal size of constituencies resulted
in unequal voting power (constituencies varied between as large as 93,000 in her own
district and a mere 16,000 in the Leninsk ralon), and also that the voting procedure was
complex, resulting in many spoiled ballots. That it took one year for the complaint to
lead to dissolution suggests astute timing on the part of Nazarbaev. On 6 March 1995
the Constitutional Court ruled that some of the CEC's decisions had been illegal back in
1994. Two days later Nazarbaev and Kekilbaev exercised their constitutional rights and
opposed the Constitutional Court's ruling. On 10 March eight of the eleven judges
reconfirmed their resolution, the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution for the
original Constitutional Court's decision to be upheld. One day later again, Nazarbaev
backtracked, stating that he had to "bow" to democracy and accept the Constitutional
Court's decision to dissolve parliament. The government thus also resigned, as did the
CEC. This represented the first time that a post-Soviet President had employed
constitutional means to dissolve parliament.
Soon after the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet, the Constitutional Court, at the
request of the President, ruled that, since the elections of the Supreme Soviet were
considered to be null and void, the 10 December 1993 law, which had granted the
President the power to issue decrees which have the force of laws, including
constitutional laws, would remain in force. Nazarbaev stated that he was forced to rule
as if in a state of emergency until the holding of new elections. In the next nine months
he issued 180 decrees, juxtaposing his output to the eight laws passed by the thirteenth
parliament. Two specific acts in this period, however, were to institutionalise
presidentialism and the personality of the President.
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The first was the April 1995 referendum which asked the population to extend
the President's term of office to December 2000, thus avoiding the 1996 elections. This
was justified in terms of the power vacuum created by the absence of parliament. At the
time it appeared that Nazarbaev feared opposition from two key figures: in the Northern
and Eastern regions of the Republic from the previously mentioned Olzhas Suleimenov
and in the West from Gaziz Aldarnzharov, former leader of the Socialist Party. 38
 Both
had openly declared their willingness to stand for presidential office. He issued a decree
on 23 March 1995 "On the Holding of a Nationwide Referendum on April 29, 1995".
The referendum asked a single question: "Do you agree to extend N. A. Nazarbaev's
term as President of the Republic of Kazakhstan...until December 1, 2000?" According
to official statistics, 91.21 percent of the country's registered voters took part in the 29
April referendum. Of those who voted, 95.46 percent voted to extend the President's
term.
This virtually unanimous support guaranteed that Nazarbaev would remain in
power until December 2000. He used this position to push through a new draft
Constitution, his second act of power consolidation. As mentioned at the outset, this
was the product solely of the President and a group of his close associates. Nazarbaev
opted for a veneer of legitimacy by establishing, according to a presidential edict of 22
May 1995, the EKS, or expert consultative committee whose task it was to "evaluate
independently" the work of the committee. As it happened, it was the EKS that, chaired
by the President, actually wrote the new Constitution. The EKS, rather than providing
an independent evaluation, spent the months of May to August lobbying the regions,
and promoting the Constitution through a series of seminars in all of Kazakhstan's then
nineteen regions.
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Once again the Constitutional Court stepped in, but this time to oppose the
President. In response to the 28 June 1995 edict "On the national discussion of the draft
Constitution of the Kazakh Republic", six of the eleven judges - the "majority opinion"
of the Constitutional Council, among them the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, M.
Baimakhanov and Igor Rogov, published an open letter to the President.4°
Baikmakhanov had played a key role in the 1986 events and had been rewarded for his
loyalty to Nazarbaev by his appointment to Chairman of the Constitutional Court.
Rogov, a mildly-spoken Russian enamoured of the effectiveness of the German judicial
system, was a specialist, both liked and needed by Nazarbaev. Once the Constitutional
Court had been abolished, Rogov joined the presidential administration as a key
presidential assistant. Increasingly, Nazarbaev co-opted those who showed ability into
his own administration. As in many transition or post-independence states, the shortage
of appropriate skills and cadres has meant that the top elite has actively sought able
individuals.
The 1995 Constitution was dubbed the "Nazarbaev Constitution". 4 ' When
interviewed, the Head of the Legislative Department of the Presidential Administration
who was to become Justice Minister, Baurzhan Mukhadmedzhanov stated:
It must be said that the main author of this constitution was the President. He
and his team, of which I was a part, worked late into the night to come up with a
revised draft... .The 1993 constitution was full of compromises between
parliament, government, the courts and the Constitutional Court and it simply
became contradictory. Collision between parliament and government often
occurred... I am not saying that today's constitution is an ideal constitution, but
it lays out far more clearly the competences of each institution.42
Now that the President had physically separated his administration from that of the
cabinet of ministers, he did so constitutionally: while in 1993 the President was the
"single executive system", in 1995 he ceased to be part of the executive system. Articles
40-48 stipulate a new status for the President as a head of state, as its highest official,
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symbol and guarantor of the people's unity and of state power. Said Mukhamedzhanov
again:
Although we do not simply copy the French constitution, we do consider that our
conditions are similar to those prevalent under the Fourth Republic, such as the
distancing of the President from law-making and political struggles. He has now
become the supreme arbitor between various powers.43
Presidential responsibilities include organisational tasks,, personnel appointment,
legislation, and general political, social and foreign policy formation. Whereas the 1993
Constitution provided checks and balances on the powers of the President, its successor did
not make him accountable to any institution. According to the rules operating in 1990, the
President was to be elected for six years; in the 1995 Constitution, as in the Constitution of
1993, the President's term of office was placed at five years.
The 1995 Constitution sealed a presidential republic. The Constitutional Court
and its accompanying courts were swiftly replaced with the Constitutional Council, whose
six members are nominated by the President, Senate and regional maslikhats (two for each
region). 45
 Its activities were to be directly controlled by the President. The status of judges
is not clearly defined. The Arbitration Court has been abolished and the Prosecutor's
Office restructured with part of its functions transferred to the newly-established State
Investigation Committee which is subordinate to the President.
We now reach the second phase in the institutional history of Kazakhstan (1995-6).
The bicameral parliament emerged a pale comparison to its predecessor. The 177 members
of the thirteenth Parliament were now slimmed down to a lower house (Mazhihs) of 67.
The Upper House, or Semit. consisted of 47 individuals, twenty of whom were elected by
the regional maslikhats, and seven of whom were appointed by the President. This
bicameral parliament was elected in December 1995; Marat Ospanov, whom we met
earlier, became its chairman and Raev the chairman of the Senate. Vitalii Voronov, who
had now become Chairman of the Non-Governmental Organisation "Legal
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Development of Kazakhstan" and whose movement was well-represented in the
previous parliament, stated in an interview that the elections were far from honest, free
or secret. The election law, in his view, was itself unconstitutional - the President was
not at any time empowered to change the Constitution by referendum when parliament
was in recess. Whereas in the March 1994 elections the electoral commissions of the
individual constituencies had been formed by both the then elected regional councils
and the centrally appointed regional administrations, this time only the regional
administration, appointed by the President, could influence who would sit on the
committees. It was well known, Voronov added, that colleagues or friends of the
administration's chief often headed the regional election councils. Carlos Robles
Piquer, a Euro-MP and election observer was quoted in Karavan as stating: 'Por us,
today is very strange. We are not used to seeing elections where only two candidates are
running against each other. It is a shame that candidates were pre-eliminated".47
Deprived of an Audit Chamber, which was dissolved together with the last
Supreme Soviet, and deprived of the right to appoint the Prosecutor General, parliament
has lost all levers of influence on the presidential office. It lost a say in the formation of
government as approval by parliament was now stipulated only for the designation of
prime minister and the chair of the National Bank. Instead, according to Article 64, Point
3, the government "in all its activity is accountable to the President of the Republic". This
rendered a vote-of-no--confidence in the government irrelevant. The Parliament reserved
the right to impeach the President, but only with a three-quarters majority and strictly in
the case of "high treason". And even in that event an impartial outcome would be unlikely
because the Senate would conduct any impeachment proceedings and its members were
appointed by the President.
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The fledgling opposition movement had to seek alternative channels to influence
the elite. Formed in Spring 1996 by a group of intellectuals united in their anti-government
stance, Azamat was headed by Petr Svoik (former Head of the Anti-Monopoly Committee
who was asked to resign due to his oppositional stance), Murat Auezov (with a famous
Kazakhstani writer) and Galym Abil'siitov. The movement distinguished itself from any
oppositional predecessors in its multiethnic leadership. Nurbulat Masanov, the leading
oppositional academic in the country, was also closely involved in its activities.
By selling off several strategic enterprises, Kazhegeldin ingratiated himself to
the foreign investor community. Many of these foreign investors were closely linked
with Russia's emerging capitalist class. In what was to become his last year in office in
1997, he also tried to capture the domestic Russian vote. Unlike Tereshchenko,
Kazhegeldin was happy to appear on talk-shows, chair press conferences and represent
his country abroad. It was only a matter of time before Nazarbaev was to perceive him
as a rival. Focus CeniralAsia, one of the more outspoken of local journals, wrote in
1998 that the crisis between Kazhegeldin and Nazarbaev was concealed in the
alignments that were increasingly pitting government against presidential
administration.
As we shall see in 11.2, by 1997 Nazarbaev had surrounded himself with a core
elite considerably smaller than that of 1991. That core predominantly comprised family,
relatives and close friends. Key family members were his eldest daughter Danga
Nazarbaeva, who in 1997 continued to head the largest state television company,
Khabar; Dariga's husband Rakhat Aliev, a surgeon who in October 1997 was made
head of the Tax Inspectorate while continuing to own a sixty percent stake in the
national sugar company, Sakharniy Tsentr; Nazarbaev's other son-in-law, Timur
Kulibaev, Deputy Head of Kazakhoil (the state national oil company which replaced the
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Ministry of Oil and Gas in 1997)); and, his more distant relative Akhmetzhan Esimov,
who as of 1997 had been appointed head of the presidential administration.
A row was sparked by Kazhegeldin's former business partner in Semipalatinsk,
Galimzhan Zhakiyanov. He and Kazhegeldin had been inseparable in the Gorbachev
years when they formed and managed Toman and then went on to set up what was to
become the Republic's most successful private business, Semei. With his partner Prime
Minister, Zhakiyanov in early 1995 was appointed regional head of Semei region. In
1996 the government, in its attempts to make akims accountable to regional economic
performnce, criticised Semei region's poor economic record. Zhakiyanov interpreted
this as a personal snub and Nazarbaev, ever quick to profit from elite conflict, invited
Zhakiyanov to head a new Agency for Strategic Resources in Almaty.
This quarrel set the stage for deeper rifts within the elite, and highlighted the
narrowing of Kazhegeldin's power base. Kazhegeldin indirectly accused his Oil
Minister of misappropriating oil revenues. 49 To retaliate, Aliev investigated
Kazhegeldin's involvement in the Shymkent oil refinery where a significant proportion
of shares was reported to have been purchased by Kazhegeldin. To abet Oil Minister
Nurlan Balgimbaev in this struggle, Nazarbaev in March 1997 radically re-organised the
government's administration. The Ministry of Oil and Gas was abolished and the state
oil company Kazakhoil (modelled on Norway's Statoil) was formed in its place. Two
primary opponents - Kazhegeldin and Balgimbaev - were institutionally separated. This
move also weakened Kazhegeldin's position vis-à-vis foreign investors, as privatisation
of key oil ventures was now temporarily on hold.
President Nazarbaev continued to deflect attention from his personal quarrel
with the Prime Minister. Various options were considered. At one point it was rumoured
that the President even considered scrapping the post of Prime Minister; 50
 however,
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both Tereshchenko and Kazhegeldin had acted as useful buffers. Galymzhan
Zhakiyanov supported another constitutional variant - the construction of a parallel
administrative structure in the presidential administration, called the Presidential
Council, to which a share of government would be assigned. Instead, the President
appeared to have opted for an old-style Soviet discreditation campaign. Former Almaty
mayor Zamanbek Nurkadilov was the front-man who exposed alleged widescale
corruption on the part of Kazhegeldin. Nurkadilov had been evicted from office four
months prior to Tereshchenko's removal and would be reinstated as Almaty regional
head after Kazhegeldin's departure. Tereshchenko had been in league with the mayor's
key rival at the time, Viktor Tche, head of the Kramds financial-industrial group.
On 22 September 1997 Kazhegeldin suddenly left Kazakhstan, reportedly to
seek treatment of a blood clot in Switzerland. Commenting on the resignation of the
Prime Minister, the Almaty newspaper Novoe Pokolenie wrote:
Amassing money for his private future, the prime minister probably neglected
the unwritten rules of the ruling elite....He strongly believed himself a reformer.
He tried to enter the ruling elite by using his business qualities, despite the
unwritten rules of the steppe. He did not want to enter the clan game. However,
he forgot that it is difficult to be a pro-Western moderniser model leader in the
Orient.5'
Soon after publication of this editorial, the newspaper was closed. Kazhegeldin was
replaced by his erstwhile Oil Minister Balgimbaev in October 1997.52
For our purposes, Kazhegeldin's departure prefaced our third final phase in the
development of national government (1997-). This stage was marked by the official
move of the capital 1,500km northward to Astana in June 1998 and the calling in
October 1998 of early presidential elections for January 1999. Both initiatives can be
regarded as a strengthening of centralised, executive power.
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The presidential decision to relocate the capital Almaty 1,500 km north to the
north-central town of what is now called Astana53 was made in 1994, begun in 1997 and
completed in 1998. The official reason for the move was that Almaty was located in
an earthquake zone and where surrounding mountainous terrain allowed limited
expansion. Unofficially, the move grew principally from the fear of northern
secessionism. In theory, relocation should enable government to exert a tighter grip on
the northern regions, dominated by ethnic Russians and, according to the government,
open to possible secessionism and eventual union with Russia. The move was also
privately said to have been prompted to distance the capital from China. This
represented the fourth move of the territory's capital in seventy-five years and within
six months a Potemkin capital had been constructed, as most of the buildings bore
elaborate but artificial facades. The capital's relocation may thus be regarded as a graphic
example of the importance of geopolitics in the leadership environment. The move
demonstrated an acute awareness of the country's geostrategic location as a landlocked
country between China and Russia, and with almost all the bordering regions having a
Russian minority.
With the new seat of government officially opened in June 1998, it took the
president only three months to call premature parliamentary elections. Two key writers
who had predicted the early elections: Sabit Zhusupov and Nurlan Ablyazov. Zhusupov
was formerly a presidential aide but who established his own independent Institute of
Political and Sociological Analysis in late 1997, and Ablyazov was the brother of the
Ministry of Trade and Industry responsible for the new industrial policy. In addition to
predicting that Nazarbaev would hold early elections they also stressed that, unlike the
1995 referendum, the early elections would not be replaced by a referendum as the
president required a democratic "vote of confidence".55
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As part of his election campaign, Nazarbaev tightened his grip on the media.
Crucially, Karavan, Kazakhstan's most popular tabloid newspaper passed into new
hands. The paper as of 1997 enjoyed weekly sales of 300,000 - ten times the circulation
of any of Kazakhstan's other major newspapers. In 1999 it remained the only
newspaper in Central Asia to possess its own printing press. At the end of June 1998,
the paper's owner Boris Giller, sold it, along with his TV Channel KTK, his radio
broadcasting channel (also called) Karavan and his two printing houses in Almaty and
Astana. The purchaser remained anonymous. 57 Since 1995, Karavan had become
openly critical of government policies, but tacitly agreed not to criticise the President
directly. The Giller media concern was beginning to exert an important influence on the
formation of popular opinion.
Giller's decision to sell was reportedly provoked by government pressure. 58
 In
1995, as Karavan's articles became more critical, a tax audit led to the imposition of
fines totaling several million dollars. Karavan then accused authorities of an arson
attack on its US$1 million printing house in Almaty. Recently, relations between Giller
and the government became particularly sour when Giller reportedly attempted to
support former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin as a potential alternative candidate
to Nazarbaev by publishing excerpts from Kazhegeldin's book and airing an interview
with Kazhegeldin on KTK. 59 Local analysts differ in their opinion on who bought
Karavan. Some contend that Giller did not actually sell it, but that the purchaser,
reportedly an offshore company, is owned by him. Others say that government officials
loyal to the President have become its proprietor.60
With the 1998 state purchase of the major independent TV and radio station,
KTK, almost all audiovisual media is state owned. The largest state TV station, Xabar,
is run by Nazarbaev's daughter, Dariga Nursultanovna. Twenty-First Century was
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forced to print in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan, as several small publications had already
been doing, including All Over the Globe and Kazakhstan's version of Russia's
Argumenly ifakty. In 1999, All Over the Globe launched its first Russian and English
language editions. Nevertheless, these publications still exist, as does the somewhat
oppositional Delovaya nedelya - though this last publication has largely refrained from
direct criticism of the President. The launch of another critical newspaper, 451 Degrees
Fahrenheit, would indicate that authorities were intent to give at least the semblance of
media diversity.
This absence of any separation between the three branches of government was
further dramatically demonstrated in Autumn 1998 when parliament supposedly asked
President Na.zarbaev, first, to shorten his term of office by two years and, second, to call
early presidential elections on 10 January 1999. Parliament cited the Russian crisis as
one reason behind the need for early elections, arguing that avoiding a protracted
election campaign would maintain unity and stability. Events, however, suggested a
political pact. One local independent newspaper called the decision a "spectacle" which
resulted in a "barter of privileges" between President and Parliament. 6 ' Nazarbaev's
televised national address on 30 September 1998 promised far-sweeping
democratisation and ruled out early elections. 62
 In return for their support, both Houses
of Parliament would see their next term of office extended by one more year each
(parliamentary elections being due in December 1999). Also, parties and movements
participating in parliamentary elections at the close of 1999 would need to pass only a 7
instead of a 10 percent hurdle of the popular vote to sit in parliament. But the most
important of parliament's amendments was extension of the President's term of office
from five to seven years (the next President will be in power until 2006). The
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President's minimum age has been increased from 35 to 40, and the age limit of 65
lifted.63
In the event, however, the elections of 10 January 1999 did not prove
democratic. The calling of early elections left only three months for campaigning, and
only the incumbent President possessed the financial and organisational means to
conduct the electioneering. More seriously, the election commission barred certain
individuals from standing for office, on the spurious grounds of minor offences. The
commission claimed that it was within its constitutional right, since the 8 May
constitutional amendment to the electoral law of that year. In particular, Clause 4.1
stipulated that no one with a criminal record, including a minor offence such as
possession of a parking ticket, was allowed to stand for electoral office.
Not only does the date of this amendment suggest some political foresight on the
part of the President, but it served to bar Nazarbaev's only serious contender, former
Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin. Kazhegeldin was charged on two counts; one for
money laundering and one for participating in an unsanctioned meeting of the yet
unregistered "Movement for Honest Elections".
ELITES AND INSTiTUTIONS
What can we extract from the above with regard to the relationship between elites and
institutions? Do institutions, as Geddes contends, simply "reflect the interests of those
who devise them"? 65 Or do, as Whitefield contends, political institutions in Ka.zakhstan
preserve a balance between social groups? Where institutions mould interests they
may be said to be relatively autonomous of those interests; where interests mould
institutions, the latter may be said to be relatively captured. Still at its embryonic stage,
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institutional reform - according to the 1997 United Nations Development Program
report - led to a delegitimisation of state institutions in the eyes of the Kazakhstani
population. Citizens were lacking confidence in institutional longevity.67
The President used elites to weaken institutions, particularly by appointing a
weak Minister, a mere figurehead or the proverbial dummy in a shop window, to a
traditionally strong Ministry. For example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the
appointment of Kasymzhomart Tokaev was headed by a two innocuous individuals,
Suleimenov and Saudarbaev. The Ministry of Defence, elsewhere traditionally a strong
institution, has also housed weak ministers. By contrast, the pairing of a strong
individual with a strong ministry - such as Kairbek Suleimenov as Minister of Internal
Affairs - probably signalled Nazarbaev's confidence in that individual, both that
Suleimenov was competent at his job and that he would not amount to a political rival.
In addition, if the combination of institution and individual were to become too
powerful, Nazarbaev could always move him. In any case, many of the key strategic
security questions have been decided instead within the Presidential Administration in
the KGB successor institution, the National Security Committee.
In reverse, the President also utilised institutions to centralise his own power. He
abolished the post of Vice-President in 1995. The Presidential Administration, as we
saw, was formally separated from the Cabinet of Ministers in March 1994 and its name
changed from Apparat to Administration in 1995. Also, with the October 1995
Constitution, the President became the apex of government. He made the Presidential
Administration the locus of executive power by coopting the brightest and best to work
for him rather than government or parliament or even business. He assembled a full
presidential bodyguard team.
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Nazarbaev has also increasingly brought economic policy under his control.
Kazakhstan's Anti-Monopoly Committee, resurrected in June 1998 continued the long
line of agencies that would thereafter report directly to the president instead of to the
government. Other agencies that have shifted from governmental to presidential
responsibility include the National Statistics Agency, the Agency for Strategic Planning
and Reforms, and, to some degree, the Strategic Investment Committee. Consequently,
the presidential administration sits at the top, followed by the Cabinet of Ministers and
the various Ministries, then Senate, then Mazhilis and then various other committees
and public organisations, such as the Assembly of People's Deputies. As will be seen in
111.2, he has also centralised economic decision-making under his office.
These trends allow us to make some preliminary observations on the relationship
between elites and institutions. It already appears that elites shape new institutions,
whilst institutions furnish the setting within which elites rise and act. Even when
relatively inchoate, institutions have an impact on elite composition, favouring the rise
of some groups and individuals to power over others, and influencing the strategies and
tactics employed by those seeking to win or keep power. The thirteenth parliament
(1994-1995) is the best example of this. Elites have changed significantly when
institutions have not.
Second, institutions can change their names without changing their activities
(such as the security police), while institutions retaining their old names (parliaments,
for example) may acquire very different functions in substance. Third, unlike in East-
Central Europe where important institutional decisions were made very early in the
transition process - especially in the roundtable negotiations between representatives of
the opposition and the old regime - in Kazakhstan the institutional architecture came
after the change in regime, namely post-1991. 68
 Fourth, initial decisions on formal
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constitutional and statutory provisions are only the starting point in a continuing
competition among leading political actors to shape the authority of specific institutions.
In reality, then, Kazakhstan's Constitution between 1991 and 1998 has functioned
decreasingly as a state code and increasingly as a loose frame of government.
Constitutional development has conformed to a top-down model, 69
 that is, the creation
of new Constitutions since 1992 has stemmed largely from the initiatives of leaders
rather than as a response to popular demands. Deliberate contradictions in the
Kazakhstani Constitutions allowed President Nazarbaev to escape accusations of non-
constitutionalism. By 1995 it had become clear that the Kazakhstani Constitution was
designed to camouflage the distribution of authority, not define it.
The institutional architecture, then, has passed through three phases: 1991-4;
1995-6; post-1996. These three phases mark a step-by-step dominance of executive
power at the national level - to the exclusion of all other branches of power. "Dual
executives" in parliament and the judiciary ensure the absence of a separation of power.
Power has been concentrated in one institution, the presidential administration.
Erzhan Utembaev was appointed by the World Bank as Kazakhstan's
enlightened bureaucrat. Under World Bank recommendations he halved the size of the
presidential administration in Spring 1997. The number of ministries has fallen from 19
in 1992 to 12 in 1998. The Cabinet of Ministers Administration was cut by 25%, and
was followed by ministerial downsizing. The most drastic changes occurred with the 4
March 1997 decree that reduced the number of ministries from twenty to fourteen and
state committees from twelve to two. 70
 Like other former Soviet states, Kazakhstan
inherited a sprawling bureaucratic machine from the Soviet period. In its July 1996
report, the World Bank ranked Kazakhstan among countries with the highest level of
government employment, with about 6.4 public employees per hundred--a total of some
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one million employees in totaL 7' Functions of the abolished ministries, state
committees, committees and agencies were transferred to newly established ministries.
In a decree of 22 April 1997 Nazarbaev transferred the powers to investigate corruption
from the KGB-successor, the National Security Committee to the State Investigations
Committee of the Interior Ministry. 72
 Furthermore, on 4 May 1997, as we shall see,
regions were cut by five, from nineteen to fourteen, ousting 5,000 state employees and
saving US$20 million. 73
 Further downsizing has occurred in advance of the relocation
of the capital from Almaty to Astana. In July 1997, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander
Pavlov announced thatlO,000 more state jobs would be axed. 74
 Speaking on Kazakh
Television Channel on 22 April 1997, President Nursultan Nazarbaev stated: "1 have
issued a decree to cut the staff of ministries and departments. By cutting numbers by
half; approximately 0.5 billion tenge have been economised. Moreover, 93 fewer
official cars will be needed. In Almaty alone, 1,000 [public sector workers] have been
made redundant".75
Horizontal division has proven even more effective in weakening rival
institutions. Institutions have camouflaged intra-elite conflict. The Tax Police was
separated from the Ministry of Finance, enabling it to operate from outside the
Government and thus also 'incriminate' the Prime Minister. The Agency for Control of
Strategic Resources was also set up as an autonomous structure to oppose Kazhegeldin.
When an agency proves successful it is then coopted by the presidential administration.
Utembaev's organisation was repeatedly invited back into the presidential fold.
Ultimately, when issues became too sensitive, the President appeared to have simply
opted for abolition of the agencies responsible, as he did with the Ministry of Oil and
Gas in 1997 and the Ministry of Economy in 1998.
102
Despite all these attempts at power centralisation, much confusion remained
over the various prerogatives of the executive branches of power. A number of ad hoc
duplicate and parallel administrations have sprung up largely to deal with economic
policy. It seems to indicate more of a hand-to-mouth response to post-Soviet problems,
and indicates some difference from the Soviet era when, in principle, the Soviet
administrative structure was rather clear and well-established.
CENTRE-PERIPHERY DYNAMICS
The analysis has so far concentrated on central executive-legislative relations. But in a
country 11 times the size of the United Kingdom, the regions cannot be ignored. After
the failure of the 1991 August putsch, Jeffrey Hahn observed of local politics in Russia,
that the implementation of reforms "is contingent upon who governs locally, for
whoever controls political power at the local level will determine how reforms are
carried out and [who] the beneficiaries are". 76 Kazakhstan's 20 regions (14 as of 1997)
have always been extremely diverse geographically, socially, and economically: this
makes for difficult governance. Nazarbaev consistently ruled out federalisation of the
state. During Kazhegeldin's term of office, the power of the government and the regions
grew vis-à-vis the Presidential Administration. This was partly because between 1994
and 1996 Nazarbaev appeared to adopt a more laissez-faire approach to regional policy
and the 1997 centralisation can thus be seen as reassertion of presidential power.
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A brief discussion of the variation among regions is helpful to illustrate the
difficulties of governing such a diverse country. First, however, Table 1.2.1 lists these
overleaf, giving their Soviet and post-independent Kazakhstani names.
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Table 1.2.1
Kazakhstan's 20 re2ions includin2 Alma-Ata cit y (1991- March 1997)
Soviet name	 Post-independence Kazakh name
Aktyubinsk (West)
	 Aqtobe
Atyrau	 Atyrau
Alma-Ata city (South)	 Almaty city
Alma-Ata (region) (South)	 Almaty (region)
Dzhambul	 Zhambyl
Dzhezkazgan	 Jezkazgan
Karaganda (North-central) 	 Qaraganda
Kokchetau (North) 	 Qoqchetau
Kustanai	 Kostanai
Kzyl-Orda	 Qzylorda
Mangystau (West)	 Mangistau
(port) Shevchenko	 (port Aktau)
Northern Kazakhstan	 Northern Kazakhstan
(Petropavlosk (North) 	 Petropaviosk)
Pavlodar	 Paviodar
Semipalatinsk	 Semei
Southern Kazakhstan (Chimkent) Southern Kazakhstan (Shymkent)
Taldykurgan	 Taldykorgan
Turgay (North)	 Torgai
Tselinograd	 Akmola (renamed Astana in 1998)
East Kazakhstan	 East Kazakhstan
(Ust-Kamenogorsk)(East)	 Oskemen
Western Kazakhstan (Uralsk)	 Western Kazakhstan (Oraisk)
Note: Names in parentheses are regional capitals. Spelling of placenames records the
usage in standard atlases.
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The North, Central and Eastern oblasts are more industrial, urban and Russian-
dominated, whilst the Southern and Western regions are Kazakh-dominated and largely
rural. Southern Kazakhstan has the highest population density at 16.8 people per sq.
km., but at a national average of 6.2 people per sq. km . population density is amongst
the lowest in the world. The richest agricultural land is in the North: Akmola, Kostanai,
Torgai, Northern Kazakhstan, Qoqchetau and Paviodar more or less monopolise the
arabic and permanent cropland. In terms of size the largest region is Jezkazgan at
300,000 square kilometres.
The years since independence have witnessed increased differentiation, but
along new axes. The north-south divide has been supplanted by a west - nortWsouth
divide. Whilst the northern and southern regions have grown closer economically, the
oil-producing Western regions - notably Atyrau, Aqtobe and Mangistau - have not only
become richer but also have thereby become the principal donors for the other ten
regions.
Nazarbaev employed five main techniques to maintain centralised power. These
are: the appointment of regional heads and the institution of the regional Presidential
representative, or "inspector"; economic centralisation through central redistribution of
locally raised taxes; the reduction in the number of regions from twenty to fourteen; the
capital move to Astana; and, his role as arbiter between centre, region and foreign
investor interests.
First, both the 1993 and 1995 Constitutions declared Kazakhstan a unitary state.
Nazarbaev's relationship with the regions resembles that of Yeltsin's in his early years
of office. Like Yeltsin, Na.zarbaev implemented a system of vertical integration through
two main institutions: the appointment of the regional head and the use of the
Presidential inspector. As in Russia the regional heads were initally called glavi
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adininistragori, but unlike Russian practice, election of regional heads has always been
ruled out. Regional heads were called akim from 1995.
The institution of local Heads of Administration can be traced back to
Gorbachev. Nazarbaev tended to retain the old heads of administration or executive and
agricultural elites of those regions. Indeed, it is fair to say that up to 1995, there was
very little tendency, and certainly less than the system operating during the Soviet
period, to "parachute" individual administration heads into the regions from outside
areas. In comparison with Soviet obkom first secretaries, one is struck by the fact that
the vast majority of those named as regional and local heads had emerged locally, and
were far less likely to be moved administratively from one oblast to another. In many
cases, former obkom secretaries re-created their old obkom orgamsations.
Heads of town and districts were initially appointed by the regional head with
the President's approval. Right from the beginning, Nazarbaev wished to assert this
command-administrative system. At what was to be the first of several meetings of
regional heads in Almaty in April 1992, he announced that the "penalties for non-
fulfilment of my orders would be most severe". At its January 1992 session, the
Supreme Soviet had already passed a law on local self-government which abolished
regional, city and district executive committees of the Congress of Peoples' Deputies.
Presidential representatives, renamed "inspectors" also in 1995, provided a
second means of central representation in the regions. Unlike Yeltsin's regional
representative, the role of inspectors in Kazakhstan was not codified. Like Yeltsin,
Nazarbaev appeared to have created a chief inspectorate. Unlike Yeltsin who targetted
Presidential representatives to untrustworthy regions, Nazarbaev placed them in all
nineteen. Like their Russian counterparts they enjoy less authority than the regional
heads. On balance they appear rather ineffective, rarely being in the regions for any
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length of time to exert real impact. Issues of institutional infighting at the national level
(horizontal power distribution) and within the confines of the question of federalism
itself (vertical power distribution) have helped shape the nature of this regional policy.
Centralised power did not break down with the collapse of the USSR. Organs of
representative government have been largely symbolic. Clearly, as with Yeltsin in his
early years, Nazarbaev adopted a policy that sought to maximise the power of the centre
generally and the power of the executive President specifically.
Centralisation was also implemented economically: taxes were raised regionally,
transferred to the centre from where they have been redistributed regionally. Since the
amount distributed does not necessarily reflect that originally raised by the region, local
authorities, particularly in the donor regions of the west, have become resentful.
Third, as part of the bailing out of the poorer regions, in 1997 Nazarbaev
decreed the fusion of five poorer regions with their richer neighbours. Table 1.2.2
illustrates the new 14 regions.
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Table L2.2
Kazakhstan's 14 regions includinE Almaty and Astana cities (June 1997-)
Akmola
Aqtobe
Atyrau
Alma-Ata
East Kazakhstan
Zhambyl
Qaraganda
Kostanai
Qzylorda
Mangistau
(incorporating part of Torgai)
(incorporating Taldykorgan)
(incorporating Semei)
(incorporating Jezkazgan)
(incorporating part of Torgai)
Northern Kazakhstan (incorporating Qoqchetau)
Paviodar
Southern Kazakhstan
Western Kazakhstan
The reduced number of regions served to diminish the potential power of the regional
administrators of more prosperous regions. Nazarbaev justified the changes in cost-
cutting terms. When the first regions - Taldykorgan and Torgai - disappeared in April
1997 he stated: "The economy of each of them separately accounts for not more than
1% of the total industrial output of Kazakhstan. As regions they have been running at a
constant loss. 0.5 billion tenge is needed to prop up these two administrations alone... I
think that we would do better to spend the money on salaries for teachers and
doctors".78 The districts, however, renamed intact. In May 1997 a further three regions
were dissolved. Jezkazgan was merged with Karaganda; Qoqchetav with Northern
Kazakhstan; and, Semei with Eastern Kazakhstan. On 4 May 1997 Nazarbaev ruled out
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any further administrative changes. The dissolution of these three regions, he said,
would eliminate 5,000 jobs. "This money will be used to repay pensions and wages,"
the President explained. "The merger of regions will also accelerate regional
development and help reduce the scope for corruption". Significantly, no mergers
occurred in the republic's western regions. Given the considerable resources shared by
these regions, to do so would be tantamount to political suicide and suggested that
greater influence even if only latent, was held by regional administrators.
The most extensive regional shake-up has occurred, as we already saw, with the
capital's move to Astana. My interview with Erzhan Utembaev in Almaty in 1996
happened to coincide with a mild earthquake. Leaning forward Utembaev exclaimed:
"Now you understand why we are moving to Akmola". The move to Akmola, renamed
Astana in 1998, has indeed enabled the discharge of several thousand officials.
Relocated to the north, the President will presumably be better placed to proffer carrot
and stick to the northern regions: the carrot of better infrastructure and the stick against
potential signs of secessionism. He has been physically able to distance himself from
powerful southern power networks and thus achieve greater autonomy in his decision-
making. He has moved close to the region where he spent the good part of his working
life, Karaganda, and to the region where his wife, Sara, was born.
Finally, an unwritten rule existed that when a regional head arrived in Almaty,
he should first go to the head of the Presidential Administration before checking into his
hotel as a sign of respect, rather as nomads of the aid used to do to the wise elder, the
aqsaqal. Foreign investors are increasingly advised to deal with the regions first, but to
not forget the courtesy visit to the Presidential Administration on their way home. 8° The
centre continues to make the final decision on foreign investment contracts. Often, the
President has been able to blame regional heads for unfulfilled contracts. This is
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especially the case where regions have successfiully attracted foreign investment, such
as the resource-rich regions of the West. The remit of regional power has also grown in
the face of the administration's new responsibilities, such as social infrastructure which
was fonnerly supplied by state enterprises (such as schools, local crèches and hospitals).
In this way, just as the government at the centre has acted as a buffer between the
President and Parliament, so in the regions, local administrations have acted as buffers
between the people and central government. So far, then, Nazarbaev has appeared
immune from what the politics of blame.
CONCLUSIONS
At the close of Section I, how can we best characterise Nazarbaev's regime? The
referendum of 1995, which was designed to prolong his rule to December 2000, was a
further power-building tactic. By 1998, however, he appeared to sense that authority-
building could not be entirely neglected and his decision to hold early elections in
January 1999 can be viewed instead as a legitimising tactic. The undemocratic nature of
the 1999 elections, however, did carry some implications for Nazarbaev's standing in
the international community. Deemed a dishonest election campaign by OSCE
monitors, the elections also set a precedent in international monitoring when the OSCE
refused to recognise the outcome. 81 The US and Germany (in its capacity as Head of the
EU) both condemned the elections.
Particularly since 1995, the Nazarbaev regime has been characterised by an
extraordinary concentration of administrative and coercive power and authority in the
hands of the president and his administration, sanctioned by a constitution virtually
foisted on the population. Nazarbaev appears to be isolating himself increasingly from
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outside visitors, surrounding himself instead with an inner circle of sycophants. The
first eight years of independence have demonstrated the overriding significance of
Nazarbaev himself and his family. 11.1 will demonstrate how recruitment practice is also
dominated by the President. There is no conception of the state or nation separate from
the person of the President; officials are the President's servants, not the nation's.
This centralisation of power has grown to the detriment of representative and
judicial institutions and bodies normally associated with "civil society", such as
political parties. The chapter has demonstrated how an 'apertura' occurred between
1994 and 1995 but that it was promptly closed in Autumn 1995 by the introduction of a
second Constitution which firmly established executive power. The exclusion of
effective representative government renders the link between rulers and ruled highly
fragile, and questions the utility of the Durkheimian concept of society mentioned in the
Introduction. Whilst the latter concept depends on the sharing of a set of norms by all
citizens of a geographically bounded space headed by a single source of authority, the
state, Kazakhstan's post-Soviet society is amorphous, fragmented and multiethnic.
Gellner's agro-literate polity illustrated how peasants typically belonged to their own
"societies", sometimes in "historical places" not knowing they were part of this or that
empire;84 Kazakhstan's population has yet to identify in a meaningful way with the new
independent Kazakhstani state.
The absence of democratic norms, a reliable legal framework and a firm
institutional architecture has rendered the study of personality, and the individual
power-holder's relationship with the state, particularly necessary. Although not within
the scope of this thesis, corruption has become an inevitable feature of such a regime,
where the political elite acts as a 'comprador' elite and where responsibility to oneself
overrides that to state or society. Since the political elite has managed to retain its
112
monopoly over the economy, it has been able to extract economic gain from foreign
investors. For the purposes of this thesis it can also be surmised (but this cannot be
proven in detail for reasons of potential hazards in obtaining such information) that
corruption has infiltrated the internal workings of the Kazakhstani political system, for
example through the purchase of office.
The purchase of office is an interesting aspect to the last point in this conclusion,
namely the relationship between central and regional power. In the eight years under
review, Na.zarbaev has maintained his constitutional power to appoint the heads of
regional administrations. It cannot be ruled out, however, that in some cases regional
notables have been able to purchase their office from the President. It is more difficult
for the President to remove these self-appointed individuals. Their power, in alliance
with foreign investors, becomes entrenched. Power is thereby increasingly rooted in
finance, which is diffuse and by definition hard to locate and thereby hard to capture.
This diffusion of power has further important implications for the development
of centre-penphery relations. As we have noted, some of Kazakhstan's regions have
grown at the expense of others. These richer regions have become the donor regions of
the Republic. Without its power to appoint the centre would find it difficult to impose
its diktat on these areas. The majority of donor regions are located in northern and
western Kazakhstan. Thus, although in his state-of-the-nation address, Kazakhslan
2030, President Nazarbaev pointed out the need for both a further decentralisation of
powers to the regional level and even a strengthening of the competitiveness between
the regions, he is unlikely to countenance decentralisation because it is psychologically
equated by the elite with separatism.
Although dejure regions remain part of the unitary state, defaclo they thus vary
in economic profile and geopolitical links. We shall see in 11.2 that it has become
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difficult for Nazarbaev to parachute his own men into the western oil-producing
regions. Foreign capital may thus allow the western and northern regions to become
more autonomous than others. Nazarbaev has found himself occasionally unable to act
as arbiter between the interests of the centre, regions and foreign investors.
Nevertheless, it would be premature to contend that the Kazakhstani state is
disintegrating. Centripetal forces and policies are ensuring its survival. At the regional
level, the akims of richer regions limit their demands to economic changes, not to
demands for political secession. The move to Astana will likely enable the centre to
have a greater impact on northern regions. Furthermore, government of the regions has
been simplified by the reduction in the number of regions from 20 to 14; deliberately,
the western regions were not fused to prevent the formation of one large economic unit.
In sum, in post-Soviet Kazakhstan, private interests are not deep-rooted or well-
protected by law. None of them are strong enough to stand out against the state or
protect themselves from it. But the state administration is fragmented and hard to
control. Government in this context is terribly important. If indeed Kazakhstan becomes
a mineral and raw material rich country then redistribution will be vital. It will not be
administratively or politically easy given the country's great size, ethnic diversity, the
absence of a strong common sense of national identity and the ineffectiveness and
corruption of the administration and the elite. The patronage the political elite offers
matters crucially. The next chapter analyses the donors and recipients of this patronage.
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13 Cited by Vitalii Voronov and Alexander Peregrin in Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 13
July 1995.
' 4 Kawkhstanskaya Pravda, 13 July 1995.
' The text of the draft constitution was published in the press on 11 June and then
subjected to four months of extensive debate during which one survey reported the
improbable statistic that 47.6% of those polled claimed to have read the draft.
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 29 August 1998. Elsewhere it was claimed that over 3 million
people took part in the discussion with more than 18,000 proposals being received by
the constitutional commission In late October the draft went for revision to the
constitutional commission before being forwarded to the Supreme Soviet for discussion
by deputies in early December. Here, extensive discussion led to yet further amendment
before the document was passed by an overwhelming majority at the ninth session of
the Supreme Soviet of the twelfth Convocation on 28 January 1993. See Sally N.
Cummings, "Politics in Kazakhstan: The Constitutional Crisis of March 1995", FSS
Briefing No. 3 (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, August 1995), pp.
1-6.
16 Ogni Alatau, 19 May 1992.
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' Qazaqstan Respublikasynyn konstitutsiyasy (Almaty: Edilet, 1993).
19 Cummings, 'Politics in Kazakhstan", p. 1.
20 Trud 14 May 1992.
21 Informal conversations with local journalists. The author was present at the voting of
ramentary dissolution.
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"Law On the Temporary Delegation of Additional Powers to the President of the
Republic of Kazakhstan and the Local Chiefs of Administration", Sovety Kazakhstana,
10 December 1993.
23 The President was given the right to exercise certain other powers of the Supreme
Soviet (appointing and removing judges, the Prosecutor General, and the Chairman of
the National Bank, ratifying and denouncing international treaties, etc.) and to exercise
independent powers which, according to the Constitution, the president could only
exercise with the consent of the Supreme Soviet (appointing the Chairman of the
Council of Ministers and certain other ministers).
24 For further legislative detail, see Rinat Shamsutdinov, "The Legislative History of
Presidential Government in Kazakhstan", The Jamestown Foundation, Prism, No.16,
Part 4, 7 August 1998.
25 Once in parliament, deputies had the right to form formal groupings of no less than 10
individuals for the purpose of expressing a unified position on issues being considered
by the Supreme Soviet. Groupings based on political parties and movements are called
"factions", others "groups". Deputies can be members of only one faction, but may
belong to more than one group. The speaker and deputy speakers of parliament are not
permitted to lead a faction. Four factions based on political parties or social
organisations initially formed in parliament: the 'People's Unity of Kazakhstan"
(SNEK); the People's Congress of Kazakhstan Party (NKK); the Socialist Party; and;
the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU). Their leaders, Talgat Mamashev, Olzhas
Suleimenov, Gaziz Aldamzharov, and David Gabriel' respectively, became members
the Coordinating Council. The Organisation for the Legal Development of Kazakhstan
(OPRK) also formed a faction, but gained such recognition much later. It was
represented in parliament by Aleksandr Peregrin, actively supported inside parliament
b6y Vitaly Rose and externally by Vitaly Voronov.
2 See the excellent reports on the composition of the 1994-1995 parliament compiled
by Reef Altoma under the auspices of Chemonics International, Contract No. CCN-
0007-C-00-4004, I for the American Legal Consortium under USAID's Rule of Law
Programme: Deputies Elected to the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhsan and
The J3t Convention of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Spring
Session Results, August 1994.
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Dzholdasbekov (Science, Education, and New Technologies), Nurgaziev (Construction,
Architecture, and Housing), Baimuratov (Finances and Budget), Sabdenov (Economic
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28 Most observers agreed that in the thirteenth Parliament factions and party
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resulted in overturning President Nazarbaev's veto on support for certain social welfare
programs.
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32 Their leadership was represented by Mikhailov (Akmola oblast), Galenko (Paviodar
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Their main concerns are the sharp drop in living standards for the bulk of the
population and the drop in production. Region stresses that it is inappropriate to apply a
single market reform program to a country whose regions differ as widely as 'Poland
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'Manifest", Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 28 January 1995; "Gost' Zhelanen Delom...",
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was reputedly close to retirement.
36 By the end of 1994, very little legislation had been passed by the thirteenth
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See "Family Policy in Kazakhstan - Seeking Mount Olympus Power", Focus Central
Asia, No. 6, 31 March 1998., pp. 2-10
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signed a decree changing the name of the country's new capital, Akmola, to Astana,
effective immediately. The decree specifies that the general public, the maslikhat and
the akimat (municipal council and city administration, respectively) had requested the
change in order to improve the new capital's image. According to the president, the
measure was necessitated by the fact that many people "misinterpret" the city's Kazakh
name Aqmola as meaning "white tomb"—a noun with "pessimistic" connotations, the
decree commented. The document posits "white blossoming" as the correct translation
of Aqmola. The Aqmola region will nevertheless keep that name. The capital city's new
name, Astana, is officially translated as "capital".
The decision to relocate 1,300 km northward was first mooted in 1994; was decreed
by Nazarbaev in 1995; the official move occurred on 10 December 1997; and, the
official opening ceremony occurred on 10 June 1998, when it was formally presented
on June 10 to an audience of 1,500 foreign dignitaries and guests.
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78 Khabar First TV Channel, 15 April 1997.
Interfax, 4 May 1997. Over the last few years, he added, about 50,000 migrated from
Turgay to Kostanai and Akmola, leaving a population of only 300,000.
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SECTION 11
Section II fits the political elite into identifiable social structures (H. I) and analyses how
it was recruited (11.2). In this first chapter we look at the 361 members of the March
1995 elite (henceforth referred to as the 1995 elite) 1 - according to our definition set out
in the Introduction, the political class. We also identify our core elite, "those individuals
who actually exercise political power in a given society at a any given time." 2 1995
represents a snapshot of the political elite; while it may fail to capture all the rapid
changes in the composition of the core elite, the choice of 1995 nevertheless gives a fair
representation of the political class. 1995, as seen in 1.2, represents an important turning
point in the history of these first eight years. Also, approximately 85 percent of the
identified political elite was the same in 1992 and 1998 as in 1995. In 11.2 we analyse
recruitmentpallerns by examining three time periods: 1992, 1995 and 1998. We assess
the degree to which these patterns have transformed with regard to the core elite. We
also look at the fate of those who hold top offices (these individuals are identified in
11.2).
This section thus has two, mutually reinforcing aims: to investigate (1)the
degree of elite integration and cohesion amongst the Kazakhstani elite; and (2) the links
between social structures, career patterns and - where possible - personalities and
values. Aspects of elite integration include the recognised political science categories of
social homogeneity, recruitment patterns, personal interaction, value consensus, group
solidarity, and institutional context. 1.2 already referred to the last, suggesting
fragmentation both between and within institutions. This empirical investigation will
provide the basis for a more general discussion of the consequences of elite integration
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in the conclusion. Although, as we shall see, generalisations are possible, it must be
remembered that any elite is comprised of individuals.
What can and can we not hope to achieve by an analysis of the social structure
of the elite? What this chapter cannot do is predict either elite attitudes (covered insofar
as information is available) or policies (Section In). There is no necessary correlation
between origins, attitudes and behaviour. Even if members of the elite come from the
same stratum, their attitudes may vary. Indeed, many have questioned the importance of
social background for elite behaviour3
 and the relevance of changes in an elite's social
origins to policy developments. 4
 Indeed, the resulting conclusions that such correlations
were extremely tentative were made in the context of stable and institutionalised
democracies, and are therefore less likely to apply to transitional states such as
Kazakhstan.
We can, however, hope to say something about the links between the political
elite and social structure. Elite background may be seen as a set of social resources
which are converted into positions and influence. This will enable assessment of the
permeability of the elites in question, or, put differently, whether the independence or
agglutination model, as defined by Harold D. Lasswell, applies. 5 As with all models,
these arguments represent extremes. In the independence model, the correlation between
political status and socioeconomic status is negligible. Any citizen's chance of entry
into the elite is independent of such characteristics as occupation, education, family
background, age, sex, religion, and ethnicity. Every social category is proportionately
represented in the elite. The opposite model posits a perfect correlation between an
individual's place in the political stratification system and his place in the social
hierarchy, so that a socioeconomically privileged class monopolises political leadership.
Lasswell's term agglutination conveys this second model by suggesting that several
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value rankings in society are fused. The powerful are also the healthy, wealthy,
prestigious, and (presumably) wise.
Put differently, and to reiterate our introduction, according to the first model
recruitment is closed, to the second recruitment is open. Various scholars, from Mosca
via Lasswell to Mills, maintain that recruitment is closed: only specific social strata
become members of the political elite.6 By contrast, Dahi emphasises the plurality of
and competition among elites and that recruitment is open.7
Furthermore, elite homogeneity according to social structure can be assessed
within and across institutions. Are these individuals united by anything more than
unusual involvement and influence in politics? Again the results of this case-study and
the necessity of focussing on individuals indicates that this should be a matter for
empirical investigation rather than definitional fiat.
CHAPTER 11.1
THE POLITICAL ELITE AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
This chapter looks at social structure in terms of the following variables: institutional
affiliation, former occupation, parental background, age, sex, place of birth, nationality,
sub-national allegiance, and education. Tables of each variable illustrate the analysis.
INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITE
As outlined in the Appendix, the majority of the political elite in Kazakhstan is an
executive elite. In 1995, the unusual importance of the thirteenth parliament (March
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1994—March 1995) means that only a few of the 177 members of this Parliament, in
addition to a few party leaders, lay outside the executive structure. Otherwise all of the
political elite answered to, influenced or was co-opted by the executive. Crucially,
members of the military and the religious higher echelons did not have any autonomous
power but were co-opted by the elite. The analysis begins with the elite's institutional
affiliations, which are listed in Figure 1, roughly in terms of hierarchy of decision-
making power and influence, and gives a political class totalling 361. It gives the
number of individuals who belonged to each of these institutions. Figure 2 then gives
the names of the individuals who comprised the core elite. To recall, this is not a
circular definition of the elite: Figure One, by listing only selected members of these
political institutions, indicates that not all individuals who were found in these
institutions automatically comprise the political elite.
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Figure One
Background: Institutional Structure of the elite (Chapter 1.2)
Figure 1 The hLstitutioual affiliation of the elite (March 1995)
I) Presidential Admmislration (PA)
	 55
PA (Top Officials in the Presidential Adminitiralion 	 40
(President Vi	 resident presidential security council;
president and vice-president; advisors and assislants
presidential inspedorate)
PA2 (Second-Tier Offlaals in the Presidential Administration	 IS
(department and committee heads)
II) Cabind of Ministers (CM)
	 153
CM (Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers)
	 37
CMD (First Deputy and Deputy Ministers) 	 57
CM2 (Heads of Ministajal Departments and Cabind Committees;
	 59
diplomats)
III) Regional Elite (0)
	 57
AO Akim of Oblasts	 20
AOD Deputy Akim of Oblasls	 21
A02 (Akim of Towns. Distrids, aid Heads of Regjonal	 16
Administration Departments (Economic, Financial, OK!)
W) Cabmd of Misisters Administration (CMA) 	 23
(Head and Deputy Heads; Advisors and Press Secrdary to the Prime Minister
Heads of Departments)
V) Cultural Political Elite (CU)
	 5
VI) State Enterprise Heads and their deputies (EST) 	 10
I VI!)Judiciary (Constitutional Court, Procuracy, Arbitrage Court) (J)
	 16
I VIII) Parliamast (13th, 1994-5) (PT)
	
20
I IX) Private Business Elite (EPR)
	
5
I X)Paity Leaders and Intelligentsia (PL)
	
17
I TOTAL NUMBER COMPRISING POLITICAL ELITE
	
361
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The numbers listed in Figure 1 are not the total numbers in each institution but the
number of individuals who comprise the political elite in each of these institutions.
(Again, the Appendix on Methodology indicates how I determined those individuals).
What follows is a brief explanation of each institution.
At the top of the hierarchy is the presidential administration (group I) and at its
apex stands the President. We saw in 1.2 how the President modelled the administration
on that of his Russian counterpart, changing the name from apparal to administrals:ya
in 1995. Of the 55 members of the presidential administration, 40 constituted what I
term top officials (PA). Included in this top 40 are the head of presidential
administration; the vice-president (an office, as we saw, abolished in 1995); the
presidential security council head; inspectors; and, advisors and assistants. Second-tier
officials in the presidential administration (PA2), of which there were 15, is comprised
of department and committee heads.
The Presidential Security Council decided security questions of strategic
importance (e.g. border issues, Cossacks, disintegration), while the Ministry of Interior
(part of group II, see below) was concerned with public order. 8 Presidential advisors and
assistants acquired a formal role in the administrative structure in 1995. Both essentially
operated in an advisory capacity to the President; assistants were legally higher in rank
to advisors, but advisors were often as influential. Igor Rogov, the Russian former
Constitutional Court member whom we met in 1.2 and who opposed the president's
plans for power centralisation, was in March 1995 still in the Constitutional Court. The
next time I met Rogov he was barely recognisable. Still ever welcoming and helpful, he
showed signs of fatigue in his new role as presidential assistant. But if he was
uncomfortable about his co-option into power, he did not show it.9
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The group of Presidential Inspectors, by contrast, proved unavailable for
interview, suggesting that they were an important - and hence often overlooked - group
in the presidential administration. The writers of Kb est ' Kb v Respublike
Kazaklzstan,'° the first official comprehensive book of elite biographies, were very
proud to have been given an actual list of the key presidential inspectors, and these are
included in the table of my 361 members of the political elite.
Next in line is the government (group H), headed by the Prime Minister. As seen
in 1.2 there have been three very different Prime Ministers between 1991 and 1998, who
diverged in personality, policies and in their relationship with their Cabinet. In 1995,
Akezhan Kazhegeldin (1994-7) was Prime Minister. By now government ministries had
been reduced in number but still the Cabinet was far larger than that under
Tereshchenko. There were two First Deputy Prime Ministers, four Deputy Prime
Ministers and nineteen ministers in 1995 under Kazhegeldin. The Deputy Prime
Ministers often held the post of Minister simultaneously. As we shall see when we turn
to the core elite, five ministries can generally be considered to contain top elite
members: the Ministry of Oil and Gas, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Trade and
Industry, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Interior The absence of the
Ministry of Agriculture in this top hierarchy is important - it signifies the minimal
importance placed on agriculture in the reform process. The small-scale post-Soviet
Kazakhstani army, the transfer of nuclear weapons to Russia, the cash-strapped
economy and the absence of any immediate external security threat made for a low
status for the Ministry of Defence.
The Ministry of Economics typified how institutions continue to be shaped by
individuals. It witnessed the highest turnover of Ministers. The influence of any one
Minister depended on his personality. Altai Tleuberdin, the competent forty-five year
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old Moscow-educated economist, proved the most influential of Economics Ministers
(1994-5); he was soon co-opted by the President into his own administration. Mars
Urkumbaev, another Moscow graduate (in engineering) and famous for his
characteristically flamboyant ankle-length sheepskin coat, survived barely seven
months. He was fired in the midst of one of Nazarbaev's many anti-corruption
campaigns for illegal exports of Shymkent cotton. Like his boss Tereshchenko, he
disappeared into the South (he had been head of the Southern administration between
1992 and 1993) and back to business, but unlike Tereshchenko, to date has not
reappeared in politics. The high turnover of Economics Ministers suggests that
Nazarbaev was never inclined to relinquish too much power to the government on
economic policy; indeed, by 1998 the Ministry had been abolished. Altogether, as
discussed in 1.2, Nazarbaev often used the Prime Minister and Economics Minister as
scapegoats for failures in economic policy.
Apart from the 19 Ministers, the identified political elite in the Cabinet of
Ministers includes influential Deputy Ministers and Heads of Ministerial Departments
and Cabinet Committees. It also includes key diplomatic appointments, notably those
assigned to Russia, China, the UK, the US, and the UN. The total number of members
of the political elite located in the Cabinet of Ministers is 153.
The heads of regional administrations (group ifi) and some of their deputies and
heads of department constituted the third layer of influence on national policy. The
principal departments at the regional level were those of the Interior, Economics and
Finance. Anyone below these positions in the regional administrations appears to
influence only regional politics. In March 1995 there were 20 regional heads, including
the capital, then Almaty city.
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The fourth and final, strictly executive, institutional affiliation of the elite was
the Cabinet of Ministers Administration (CMA) (IV). To a degree this is a duplication
of the bureaucracy of the presidential administration but with far less influence. In a
strategic move discussed in 1.2, the President physically separated the two bureaucracies
in 1994. Approximately 23 of the bureaucrats in the CMA played an influential political
role. In total, therefore, 55% of the total elite thus constitutes this main executive elite.
Outside the main executive institutions we find three other institutions that,
although technically separate, are subordinate to the executive elite. They are the
cultural political elite (group V), state enterprise heads (group VI); the private business
elite (group IX); and, the judiciary (group VII). By "cultural political elite" I mean those
figures who either directly or indirectly influence presidential policy on issues of
education, cultural revival (e.g., the formation of minority cultural centres or language
policy) but who are subordinate to executive power. The state enterprises - particularly
those of strategic resources such as oil, gas, metals and minerals - included are
effectively "owned" by the political elite, whilst the most important "private" businesses
are either sponsored or indirectly owned by the political elite. The judiciary, although
enjoying greater powers than it did after the introduction of the new Constitution in
August 1995, was still appointed by the President and restricted in its autonomy.
The final two categories - the thirteenth Parliament (VHI) and party leaders (X)
constituted a small counterelite, whose influence in early 1995 cannot be ignored (see
1.2). Of the 177 parliamentarians, 20 are deemed of importance - these are either heads
of significant committees, heads of factions or outspoken individuals. As we saw in 1.2,
around two-thirds of parliament in 1995 stood in "opposition" to presidential policies.
10 of the 17 "party" leaders headed what could be more accurately called opposition
groups.
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Finally, there are the less visible men or women behind the scenes. By
definition, they lie outside the formal structure of power and lie almost beyond
detection. As explained in the Annex, I do not purport to have found all these
individuals nor to know their precise number. Key examples of these influential but
inconspicuous individuals were members of the foreign business elite. Notable
examples of these individuals are: Oleg Soskovets (former Deputy Prime Minister of
Kazakhstan who left to take up office in the Russian government); Aleksandr
Mashkevich of TransWorld Corporation (see 111.2), and a number of foreign business
advisors (Dr Bang (11.2), and US businessman Jim Giffon of Mercator Corporation) all
of whom appear to have the ear of the President. Others are listed in the publication Kto
esi ' Kb (Who 's Who), perhaps indicating the desire of the elite to present a public face,
but were rarely, if at alt, mentioned by the panel of experts. Two notable individuals
who are visible but are omitted in all elite biographies are Nazarbaev's wife, Sara
Nazarbaeva and the eldest of their three daughters, Dariga Nazarbaeva.
Figure Two establishes the identities of those who comprise the core of this
political elite. These individuals exerted real influence in March 1995. An even smaller
group within this core political elite constituted President Nazarbaev's closest advisors,
and those individuals are underlined. This smaller circle constitutes the selectorate - in
other words, it is this small elite that actively took part in recruitment decisions, the
significance of which will become clear in 11.2. Where appropriate in this chapter, the
core elite's social origins will be highlighted and compared to the wider political class.
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Figure 2: The core political elite (March 1995)
(i) Presidential Administration (PA)
II) Cabmd of Ministers (CM)
Ill) Regional Elite (0)
IV) Cabmat of Mmisters Administration (CMA)
VI) State Economic Elite and their dquties (EST)
VII) Judidazy (Constitutional Court, Proairacy,
Arbitrage Court) (J)
VIII) Parliameut (l3 1994-5) (PT)
I IX) Private Business Elite (EPR)
I X1)Other
Nursultan Abishevith Nazarbaev; Erik Asanbaev Nurtai
Abaev (Head of Presidential Administration); Tulegen
Thukeev (Seairity Council; later head of Demoaatic Pasty);
Syzdyk Abishev: Marat Tazhsn; Sat Tokpakbaev Bizhanov;
Tursunov Mukhamedthanov; Zhigalov
Akeshan Kaxhegeldm (Prime Minister); Isingarin; Shaikbenov
Aleksandr Pavlov; Sobolev Tasmagambdov Mette Kuhbaev
Kairbe& Suleimonov Balgimbaev Tokaev Altai ileuberdin
(Economies Minister and Presidential Advisor); Kalmurzaev,
Utepov; Peir Svo,k; Daukeev; Karibjanov Khrapunov,
Shkolnilç Esimov
Thakiyanov(Semei); Kulmakhanov (Alma-Ala town); Yurii
Lavrinenko (East Kamkhstan); Tunsbekov, Levitin; Akhmetow,
Qiadybaev
Utembaev; Zhannat Ertle.rova
Jan&'sov; Grigoru Marchenko
Makhalov; Baimakhanov, !gorRogov
Marat Ospanov Kddlbaev Abdildin; Nukad,lov Peregrrn; Raze
Aldamjarov;	 Olzhas SuIe,menov
Sergei Tereshdienko ("Integration Fund"; former Prime
Minister); Oleg Soskovets (Russian Government; industrial
interests); Aleksané Mashkevith (Trans-World Group)Jim
(Iiffm (Meror Corporation); Kalyk Abdullaev (President of
Aiakent Exhibition Centre)
Sara Nazarbaeva (President's wife); Dariga Nazarbaeva
(President's daughter)
TOTAL NUMBER COMPRISING CORE POLITICAL ELITE
	 60
Those in italics indicate inthvz duals interviewed b y the author.
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Former Occupation
How was the elite occupied prior to the collapse of Soviet rule? Whilst in 11.2 we will
look more specifically at the roads to power since 1991, here we are interested in
finding whether power under the Soviet system translated into elite status in an
independent Kazakhstan.
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The pre-1991 principal occupations of the Kazakhstani elite are as follows:
6 individuals were full members of the Republican Central Committee whilst the only
full member of the CPSU Central Committee was President Nazarbaev. There were
very few, if any, ethnic Kazakhs in elite positions of any sort outside the Kazakh SSR in
the Soviet era. The largest percentage of today's elite were former apparatchiki —40
percent. 20% of the elite were former Soviet republican ministers or deputy ministers,
and just under 2% were part of the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR. 13.5% of
the contemporary elite were industrial executives (11.6) (a good many head engineers)
or industrial workers (l.9%) in the Soviet period. Approximately 5 percent were part of
the KGB. Only just over 2 percent of the present elite were employed (either as
executives or workers) in agriculture. Under 1 percent were in the Soviet military and
just 3.6% were in the Soviet diplomatic corps.
92% of the Kazakhstani elite were employed in either executive posts as state
officials or as CPSU apparatchiki in the Soviet era just prior to 1991." This suggests
significant elite continuity rather than renewal. Such elite continuity appears typical of
post-communist states generally.' 2 85% of the elite were members of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). This continuity can be interpreted differently. On the
one hand it might simply be the product of continuity by default. The absence of an
alternative elite forced state-builders to keep the old elite. On the other hand, continuity
might suggest that membership in the Soviet past is essential to membership in the post-
Soviet present for a more subtle reason.
The second explanation is borne out by correlations within each institution. The
same ethnic Kazakhs who held senior posts in the Soviet period also held top positions
in 1995. Typically, those members of the 1995 elite in top positions of the presidential
administration were top CPSU and government executive officials pre-1991, either at
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the national or regional level. Interestingly, it appears that employment in top Soviet
executive posts provided just as good a guarantee of a place in the post-independent
Kazakh elite as employment as a CPSU apparaichik. Examples of those who climbed
the executive rather than CPSU ladder in the Soviet period were Abykaev, Abdullaev,
Isingarin, and Sobolev. 28% of the identified political elite worked at the obkom level.
What is distinctive about both the presidential administration and the cabinet of
ministers is that their officials were drawn from a wide band of the top jobs, ranging
from the Council of Ministers to the position of party writer. Many in the presidential
administration who worked in the oblast administration were actually first or second
obkom secretaries.
Ethnicity has also played a role in continuity. Insert about Russians in Kazakh
SSR Key examples of ethnic Kazakhs who have retained their power posts are President
Nursultan Nazarbaev, Vice- President Erik Asanbaev, Former Minister of Foreign
Economic Relations Syzdyk Abishev, Head of Administration Nurtai Abykaev,
Transport Minister Nigmatzhan Isingarin, and CIS Executive Committee Head Kalyk
Abdullaev. Abdullaev, who in 1995 chaired Kazakhstan's lucrative state-run exhibition
centre, was chairman of Kazakh SSR Gosplan in the dying days of the Soviet Union.
Recruited by Kunaev, he is a formidable figure in Southern politics. He was eventually
to become the South's regional head in 1997. The other figure whose Soviet-era
networks were crucial in the early independence period was Isingarin. By contrast, the
majority of Russian obkom first secretaries appear to have emigrated, often to work in
regional administrations in Russia's regions which border Kazakhstan.
Some homogeneity in prior occupation is discernible among members of the
1995 Cabinet of Ministers. The 1995 Ministers tended to have reached the rank of either
Minister or Deputy Minister in the Soviet period. Of the 19 ministers, six worked as
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CPSU apparatchiki, four at the ministerial level in the Kazakh SSR government, three
as industrial executives, two as researchers, another two as USSR Ministry officials
(Isingarin and 1995 Minister of Foreign Affairs Tokaev), one in a gorkom and one in the
military. Most of the Deputy Ministers or Heads of Department in 1995 worked in
Soviet government institutions. The overwhelming majority of Deputy Ministers served
in various ministries of the Kazakh SSR. The Ministers in office in 1995 also appear
generally to have stayed where they were, in the Cabinet of Ministers, rather than, say
the presidential administration or business. It is thus premature to say that the
Kazakhstani government has become professional in the sense of having its origins in
economic management, diplomacy and the former security services. Although the core
elite (see below) is drawn partly from these sectors, economic managers and former
security service employees have more often been lost to the private sector.
The largest degree of occupational homogeneity among the core elite is found at
the regional level. Of the 20 regional heads, half served in the Soviet period either as
raikom or obkom heads, and half as managers or enterprises or collective farms. Apart
from Saparbaev in Kzyl-Orda, all in 1995 had lived and worked in the regions which
they headed. In contrast to Russia, where the chair of the regional parliament, obiso vet,
often became regional head, in Kazakhstan obkom first secretaries were more likely to
assume that role. This suggests greater executive continuity. Of the eight regional heads
not born in the region, all nevertheless served in these regions for most of their working
life. Eight of the twenty heads had reached the level of Obkom First Secretary
beforel99l. "My experience as head of this oblast in the eighties has served me very
well in my present job. I rely still almost exclusively on the contacts I had in that
period", explained Zhakupov, head of the Western region of the Uralsk.' 3 In short,
bureaucrats and managers dominate the regional level. Gartman and Braun, two ethnic
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German heads of regional administration in the north in 1995, were part of a large group
of Northern sovkhoz and kolkhoz German economic leaders. Turisbekov, head of
Southern Kazakhstan, made his career in the raispolkom and the Komsomol; Djakupov,
by contrast, was one of the lowest-ranking regional heads in terms of Soviet occupation;
he never reached higher than second gorkom secretary. Djakupov, as we shall see in
11.2, became the longest-serving regional head; his longevity is probably best explained
by loyalty rather than ability. Danial Akhmetov recounted: "Finally, regional deputies
tend to have been formerly in obkom/raikom posts, in the regional procuracy or in the
Congress of People's Deputies in the final years of the Gorbachev era".'4
So far, then, the above suggests that a pre-1991 government career has led to a
post-1991 government career. The remaining members of our elite have a somewhat
different profile. The greatest degree of occupational homogeneity is found in the
profession of the judiciary; more than half ofjudicial officials worked in the judiciary in
the pre-1991 period. If members of the judiciary worked in government they tended to
have worked in the security services.' 5 The majority of the judiciary worked in the top
Soviet legal institution, namely the procuracy. Vitalii Voronov is an example of a top
lawyer who worked in the Omsk procuracy in 1995; as part of his promotion in
Gorbachev's shake-up in the judiciary in 1985, he was moved to then Tselinograd (now
Astana) in 1987.
Homogeneity is also found amongst the industrial executives, both state and
private. They were either "red directors" in the Soviet period or heads of new economic
enterprises in the Gorbachev period. The business elite in the Gorbachev period in
Kazakshtan, as in Russia, often emerged from the Komsomol.
A significant 29% of party leaders were professionals, compared to l0% of
parliamentarians. 20% of parliamentarians were formerly academics, 5% were industrial
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workers and 15% were raikom leaders. Little occupational homogeneity can be
observed among parliamentarians, who range from the first cosmonaut of Kazakhstan,
Kenes Aubaliev, to the chief national Greco-Roman wrestling trainer, Daulet
Turlykhanov. This already suggests that the social background of parliamentarians
differs from that of the core executive elite. This in turn is flirther evidence to the
conclusions drawn in 1.2, namely that parliament does not count in policy formation and
that outsiders have been kept out.
What of the core elite? In terms of occupational background, the core elite is not
homogenous. It is drawn from roughly three camps: old Soviet government executives
(including the judiciary) and CPSU apparaichiki; economic and business executives;
and, professional researchers/students.
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Soviet government
executives (including the
judiciary) and CPSU
apparatchiki
Business/Economic!
Former Komsomol
Figure 4: The Core Elite according to former occupation
Nazarbaev (CPSU Republican First Secretary and
President); Abykaev (Council of Ministers Chair and
1995 Presidential Administration Head); Zhukeev
(former CPSU apparatchik and 1995 Security Council
chair); Abishev (Minister and 1995 former Minister of
Foreign Economic Relations); Tokpakbaev (KGB and
1995 Head of Presidential Bodyguard Service);
Isingarin (1995 Transport Minister and former USSR
Transport Minister); Tokaev (former USSR diplomat
and 1995 Minister of Foreign Affairs); Sobolev
(Gosplan and 1995 Deputy Prime Minister); Suleimenov
(former KGB, 1995 Minister of Interior); Balgimbaev
(USSR Ministry of Oil and Gas; 1995 Oil and Gas
Minister); Tleuberdin (Gosplan, 1995 Economics
Minister); Kalmurzaev (State Statistics Committee,
1995 State Property Committee Chair); Karibzhanov
(Gosagroprom; 1995 Minister of Agriculture);
Akhmetov (young CPSU apparatchik 1995 Head of
Paviodar region); Ertlesova (Gosplan)
Kazhegeldin (Komsomol executive and former head of
Kazakhstan's flagship company Semei);
Tasmagambetov (Komsomol executive); Mette (former
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"red director"); Daukeev (Kazgeofizika state geological
exploration enterprise; 1995 Minister of Geology);
Svoik (former "red director", Uralsk Tsets); Zhakiyanov
(took over Semei from Kazhegeldin; 1995 Head of
Semei regional administration); Levitin (red director,
1995 Head of Mangistau region)
Professionals/	 Tazhin (former professor of sociology at Kazakhstan
Researchers	 State University); Shaikhenov (1995 Justice Minister
and former researcher in legal affaris in Sverdlosk and
Uralsk); Utepov (Moscow student, but also served for
five years in KGB); Cherdabaev (former petroleum
researcher in Moscow, 1995 Atyrau regional head);
Kosanov (former student Prime Minister's Press
Secretary)
We also have a small number from the Soviet regional elite, notably Aleksandr Pavlov,
a competent economist in the Pavlodar obkom who went on to head Pavlodar regional
administration before he was appointed Finance Minister; Askar Kulibaev 16; Shalbai
Kulmakhanov (obkom, 1995 Almaty town mayor); Yurii Lavrinenko (obkom, East
Kazakhstan regional head); and, Zautbek Tunsbekov (obkom, Southern Kazakhstan
1995 regional head).
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Family Background: A Chingizid Elite?
Nomadic Kazakhs, we saw, enjoyed a somewhat permeable upper class.' 7 Slaves, or
lelenguts, were integrated by marriage, and the white bone often married the black bone.
Significantly, President Nazarbaev, elsewhere in his official biography, states: "It used
to be that people boasted about their "proletarian" origins. Now the trend is to find some
aristocratic blood among their ancestors. Well there was never one aristocrat in my
background. I am the son, grandson and great grandson of shepherds." 8 It is not
possible to provide genealogical records of the Chingizid descent of the Kazakh
members of the elite. Many members of the elite were unwilling to talk of their
aristocratic descent. Informal evidence suggests that this absence of Chingizid descent
has exposed Na.zarbaev to some criticism. It appears that the search for Chingizid
lineage is strongest at the regional level. Said one Uraisk entrepreneur who prefers to
remain anonymous: "in both elite and business circles, people are quickly divided into
white and black bone". In any case, tracing aristocratic origins is not that significant at
the more flexible national level. A partial explanation for the lack of importance
accorded to pre-Soviet legitimacy may stem from the fact that, as seen in 1.1, khans
were traditionally weak rulers.
Only partial information could be determined on the parental backgrounds of the
elite under investigation.' 9 In 200 of the 361 members of the political elite, 62% of their
parents were manual workers, either in industry or agriculture; 12% were managers;
15% were apparatchiki, 9% professionals; and, the remaining 2% had worked in the
military. Of those I interviewed in the national elite, 52% of their parents were
agricultural workers, 12% manual workers, 16% former apparatchiki, 10% teachers, and
10% professionals. Although not always made clear by the interviewee, the suggestion
140
is that these occupations were actually their fathers' main adult status (rather than
simply being born, for example, the sons of agricultural workers). This suggests a high
degree of first generation mobility.
This high degree of social mobility was characteristic of the Soviet period. It
was estimated that more than four-fifths of the Soviet Central Committee were children
of workers or peasants. Harasymiw also found that a large proportion of the top elite
came from low status families. More rigorous evidence from Yugoslavia indicated that
38 percent of the party and legislative leaders came from proletarian families and
another 31 percent from the peasantry. 2° International comparisons may be helpful here.
By contrast, despite the American "log-cabin" myth, the evidence suggests that far from
having more upward mobility into the political elite than other nations, the United States
in fact has somewhat less. Indeed, since the birth of the Republic, American leaders
have been drawn from upper social strata. 21 A study of 269 prominent political leaders
in Asia, Africa, and Latin America found that their parents were generally in the middle
or upper middle classes.
In other elite studies, generally the higher the level of political authority, the
greater the representation for high-status social groups. There does appear to be some
correlation in the Kazakhstani elite between social origins and political authority. The
higher status families were able to send their children to Moscow schools and the
disproportionate advantage of Moscow graduates increases at each rung of the political
hierarchy - especially among the younger generation. But again this generalisation has
its notable exceptions. Oralbal Abdykarimov, who in 1995 was Deputy Head of the
Presidential Administration and became its head and thus among the top five of the
national elite in 1996, does not hide the fact that his father, Abdykarim, was a shepherd
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and that he too began his Soviet career as a shepherd of Nurinski state farm, Karaganda
region.
In other ways, there were signs toward the end of the regime that first-generation
mobility had already slowed: the Kazakh SSR political elite was increasingly promoting
its own. Vice-President Asanbaev's father, for example, was one of the roughly 100
members of the Kazakh intelligentsia who were shot in the 1930s and who was since
rehabilitated. The father of successful technocrat Uraz Dzhandosov was a senior Kazakh
CPSU apparatchik. Marat Tazhin's farther served as Obkom Second Secretary in
Uralsk. 22
 Other prominent members of the elite who enjoyed the protection of their
fathers' status were one-time presidential opponent Murat Auezov, whose father
Mukhtar Auezov wrote the pathbreaking novel Put 'Abaya; and, successful state-funded
entrepreneur Kozykorpesh Esenberlin, son of another noted Soviet writer, Ilyas
Esenberlin who also, significantly, wrote in Kazakh. Soviet-era ethnic Kazakh
historians also seem to have been rewarded - Kozybaev, for example, was the
individual appointed by Nazarbaev to rewrite the history of Kazakhstan. The past
appears also to have served as protection for the counterelite. The father of Russian Jew
Evgenii Zhovtis, whom was identified in 1.2 as having been an active opposition human
rights campaigner since 1992, was rehabiliated in that year. Alternatively, the elite's
own past individual literary accomplishments can serve as promotion or protection;
pertinent examples are anti-nuclear activist Olzhas Suleimenov whose book Az-i-ya23
was considered the main dissident work to emerge from Kazakhstan in the Soviet
period; and Abish Kekilbaev, who has served as speaker of the 13th parliament and state
secretary. In 1992 Kekilbaev was awarded the title of People's Writer (Narodnyi
Pisalel'). Opposition lawyer Zimanov had as a father one of the highest-ranking ethnic
Kazakh officers in the Soviet army.
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Thus, the basic core profile in 1995 is of people from poor backgrounds
(because their fathers remained farmers or workers). These people, therefore, enjoyed a
considerable amount of first generation mobility, since their fathers remained
agriculturalists or workers. There was also a well-connected minority - (particularly
among the younger members). Among this minority there were a number of people
whose backgrounds seemed to allow them an unusual degree of leeway for semi-
oppositional activity.
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Age
Occupation and A2e (March 1995)
<35	 36-45	 46-55	 >55	 TOTAL
36-55
(%)
1.PA	 4	 15	 12	 9
PA2	 1	 5	 8	 1	 73
Total	 5	 20	 20	 10
2.CM	 1	 11	 22	 3
CMD	 1	 9	 38	 9
CM2	 1	 13	 39	 6	 86
Total	 3	 33	 99	 18
3.AO	 1	 4	 14	 1
AOD	 1	 4	 12	 4	 84
02	 8	 6	 2
Total	 2	 16	 32	 7
4.CMA	 0	 10	 10	 3	 87
5.CU	 1	 0	 2	 2	 40
6.EST	 2	 3	 3	 2	 60
7.J	 1	 7	 4	 4	 69
8.PT	 1	 5	 9	 5	 70
9.EPR	 2	 1	 1	 1	 40
1O.PL	 3	 5	 4	 5	 53
TOTAL	 20	 100	 184	 57
(5.4%)	 (27.7%)	 (51%)	 (15.8%)	 75%
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This is a short time period with which to compare generations, but the following
conclusions may tentatively be drawn. Compared to the Soviet period, the 1995 elite
was significantly younger. In 1995, the trend was for the political elite to be drawn from
the "middle-age" brackets 36-55 (76% in 1995). The highest percentage of the elite lay
in the 46-55 age bracket. The oldest individual among the political elite was born in
1921 but he was among the 1% over seventy years of age. A common age pattern
emerges for the four main arms of the executive elite: presidential administration,
cabinet of ministers, regional administrations and cabinet of ministers apparat. The
president, turned 55 in 1995, just fitted into this age bracket. As noted, until October
1998, the age of the president was not allowed to exceed 65; that age restriction was
lifted in October 1998 and suggests that the president is likely to stand for another term
of office in 2006. The age of the president is rarely seen as an obstacle for him to stand
another term.
In 1995, as many as 40% of private managers were under 35; other institutions
with a fair percentage of under 35s included parties, state economic organisation heads
and heads of cultural organisations. The average age for men was lower than that for
women.
There was evidence to suggest that the average age of the Kazakhstani elite may
be rather higher than in some other Soviet republics. 24 This might partly be explained by
Kazakhstani society's own changing age structure; while the Kazakh SSR had one of
the youngest populations of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, its rising rates of infant
mortality and emigration since 1991 have increased the average of the population, with
the percentage of 20-29 year olds in 1994 having dropped sharply. There also appear to
be some regional differences - generally the youngest members of the regional
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administrations tend to be found in the North. Overall, however, the average age of the
elite is lower than heads of government worldwide. 25
The core elite comprised both old and younger generations. Interviews with the
elite suggested that age did not appear to have a significant impact on attitudes. Some of
the top positions in the presidential administration were staffed by young members of
the elite from private backgrounds and perhaps with Moscow educations. These
younger generations were educated in market economics at financial institutes in
Moscow. Not all were more liberally minded, however. Nor was there a significant gap
between old and young in terms of attitudes towards market reform. Of those
interviewed nearly 90% supported the privatisation initiatives underway, and the
consensus on the overall direction of reform was overwhelming.
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Gender
The gender variable permits an evaluation of the role of women in the political elite and
society of post-communist Kazakhstan, and a re-evaluation of their role in the Soviet
and pre-Soviet past. Table 6 provides a categorisation of employment by gender.
Table 6: Gender
1995
Geader	 M	 F
1.PA	 37	 3
PU	 13	 2
Total	 50	 5
2.CM	 36	 1
CMD	 54	 3
CM2	 57	 2
Total	 147	 6
3.AO	 20	 0
AOD	 20	 1
02	 15	 1
Total	 2
4.CMA	 22	 1
5.CU	 5	 0
6.EST	 10	 0
7.J	 14	 2
&PT	 17	 3
9.EPR	 5	 0
1O.PL	 16
TOTAL	 341	 20
(94%)	 (6%)
93% of the elite in 1995 was male. The highest proportion of females were
found in the judiciary (15%), parliament (12%) and presidential administration (10%).
No females served as regional heads and none were found amongst the cultural-
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political elite or as heads of state and private economic corporations. Only one female
minister worked in the early Kazhegeldin government. Women constituted only 21% of
heads of department and divisions within the government. In the regions, however, ten
of the deputies were women, but no women worked among the top-level municipal
administrations of Almaty. The situation did not differ in other towns and district
administrative centres, although women were often assigned as deputies in towns of
regional significance and in district administrations. In sum, although women formed an
overwhelming majority in the bodies of state administration in Kazakhstan, they exerted
practically no influence on state policy. The higher the status of the position, the lower
the inclusion of women.
Although, therefore, women were better represented in the largely powerless
parliament than in the more powerful executive branch, there were important
exceptions. Women with direct influence on executive policy included Sara Nazarbaeva
(wife of the President), Dinara Nazarbaeva (who, as seen in 1.2, was Head of the State
Television Company Khabar), Zinaida Fetodova (Presidential Administration, Head of
Department), (iulzhana Karagusova (Head of Economic Council, Presidential
Administration), and Rosa Kenzhetaeva ( Head of the Economic Reform Unit in the
Presidential Administration). Other than their gender, little bound these females together
as a core elite; their social homogeneity was less than that of the male political elite and
this confirms that they are largely excluded from the political elite. They were born in
various parts of the country, had different discipline specialisations (economics, law,
sociology) and either made their way through regional party organs or as professionals.
It does seem however, that the party route has been the most assured for females.
Aitimova, Fetodova, Kenzhetaeva all served in rai- or obkoms. Zhannat Ertlesova,
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Deputy Minister of Economics who had worked all her professional life in Gosplan,
played an influential role in the IMF stabilisation programme.
The one female minister in 1995 was the Minister of Youth, Tourism and Sport.
Born in a village in the Western region of Uraisk, Byrganym Aitimova, who made her
career through the Komsomol, is the daughter of two professionals. Again, although we
must be careflil with direct correlation, Aitimova, one of the few females to have risen
to ministerial rank, is also one of the few females to have succeeded to obkom first
secretary, serving in Uralsk between 1979 and 1983. However, this is a low-status
Ministry; the only other female minister as of 1995 was Zaure Kadyrova who headed
the equally low-status Ministry of Labour.
While the majority of females in the executive were ethnic Kazakhs, the largest
proportion of prominent parliamentarians - and hence still lower status females - were
ethnic Russians. Women appeared to be particularly active in forming political
movements. One example was Aleksandra Dokychaeva, supporter of Edinsivo and Lad,
who was educated in mathematics at Novosibirsk University and spent most of the
Soviet period in scientific research. She stood as a candidate for the thirteenth
parliament but her campaign was curtailed after she attacked the government for
neglecting Russians in the northern regions. A similar example is Valentina Sivryukova.
Born to Russian industrial workers in the region of Dzhambul - which probably made
her one of the most militant females of Southern Kazakhstan - she studied engineering.
She remains head of Birlesu, the first independent Trade Union in Kazakhstan. Highly
respected, she sometimes overshadowed her husband, Leonid Solomon, head of the
Independent Trade Union Centre of Kazakhstan. 26
 Tatyana Kvyatkovskaya was
exceptional among females in not having made her career either in the party or in
industry. But then her place in the elite came more by accident. As described in 1.2, she
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was the disgruntled parliamentarian who complained to the Constitutional Court of
irregularities in the thirteenth parliamentary elections and provided the excuse the
President needed to dissolve parliament. Kvyatkovskaya has been a journalist for most
of her life.
In the context of women in power worldwide, the above scenario of female
under-representation and concentration in parliamentary rather than executive office is
typical. The change in female status lies rather in comparison to the Soviet and pre-
Soviet periods of rule in Central Asia. Women are less prominent than in Soviet days.
Even if women in the Soviet period might not always have exerted real executive
influence - indeed membership of the old Supreme Soviets was often symbolic - they
were more visible. The Soviet system established specific quotas for particular jobs. The
Soviet government made a strong drive to "rescue women from bondage." In 1960 there
were higher percentages of Kazakh and Kyrgyz women with specialised education or
enrolled as students in higher education than of any other Central Asian nationality.27
There is a strong call now in Kazakhstan for the restoration of the quota system. One
parliamentarian stated: "I used to be in a top regional executive position. Now I got into
the thirteenth parliament but see little chance of this channel surviving. I think that
women should form political parties to boost their participation". 28
 Signs are that
women have already made political capital on this: we shall see in 11.2 that by 1998 a
minister with the portfolio of women's affairs had been assigned.
The pre-Soviet status of Kazakh women also seems to have been better. A
woman was mistress of her yurt; indeed, she often owned it, for it was usually included
in her dowry along, with household equipment, clothing, and jewellery. A woman could
divorce her husband or, on his death, marry a man outside his family. Kazakh women
were not veiled, and girls associated freely with young men, in horse races, singing
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contests, and other diversions. As Winner has pointed out, in the traditional heroic epics
of the Kazakhs the heroine was "usually endowed with qualities similar to those of the
balyr (hero)", and was "depicted as the equal of her husband or lover in moral worth
and intelligence."29
 They were not traditionally as powerless as women in settled
Islamic lands. Some of these regional differences are born out today. Fewer females
appeared to work in the Southern Kazakhstan oblast, a sign of the influence of their
sedentary southern Islamic neighbour, Uzbekistan. Women were fairly highly
represented in political office in the North and West. Female Kazakhs tended to occupy
executive office.
Both Russian and Kazakh women have promoted the place of women in post-
independent political office; Russian women tend to have espoused the fate of ethnic
Russians in the north. The dual influence of Asia and Europe is felt in male attitudes to
women in Kazakhstan. Although enjoying greater status than their Uzbekistan
counterparts, Kazakh women are, in popular estimation, not legitimate power holders,
as they appeared to be in Kyrgyzstan. In that republic women play a far more important
political role and hold significant ministerial posts and ambassadorial appointments.
One of the most prominent diplomats, Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to London and former
foreign minister, is female; one gets the feeling that Kazakhstan's elite would not allow
the easy ascent of women to senior posts.
Ultimately, perhaps their clearest avenue for influence is as wives. Wives were
often very vocal at khan gatherings before Russian colonisation. Similarly today, wives
can exert important influence on the male member of the elite. Sara Nazarbaeva has
used her popular appeal to construct a bridge between the presidential house and the
people. She is head of a children's charity called Bobek. She has and is allowed to have
a public profile. She is also said to exert informal power - she is said to have strongly
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supported the move of the capital to Akmola, her birthplace. Mixed marriages are also
common amongst the elite. Informally, marriage to a Russian or Jewish woman
delegitimises a Kazakh male member of the elite in the eyes of the population (when in
Soviet times intermarriage was often favourably regarded). A key example here is the
wife of the second Prime Minister Kazhegeldin, who is a Russian Jew.
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Institutional Affiliation and Place of Birth (March 1995)
Table 6: Institutional Affiliation and Place of Birth (March 1995)
Rur Urb N S E W R 0th
1.PA	 24	 16	 17	 12	 4	 3	 4	 1
PA2	 9	 6	 3	 10	 1
Total	 33	 22 20	 22	 4	 4	 4
2.CM	 21	 16	 4	 13	 5	 3	 11	 2
CMD	 33 24 8	 20 7	 8	 12
CM2	 33	 26	 11	 27	 10	 2	 10
Total	 87	 66	 23	 60	 22 13	 33
3.A0	 18	 2	 4	 6	 1	 3	 6	 4
AOD	 13 8	 6	 9	 3	 1	 5
02	 15	 1	 3	 4	 1	 1
Total	 46	 11	 13	 19	 5	 5	 11
4.CMA	 14 9	 3	 10 6	 2	 2
5.CU	 2	 3	 1	 2	 2
6.EST	 3	 7	 2	 5	 2	 1
7.J	 12	 4	 3	 5	 1	 2	 5
8.PT	 12	 8	 4	 7	 1	 2	 5	 1
9.EPR	 1	 4	 2	 2	 1
1O.PL	 9	 8	 5	 8	 1	 3
TOTAL	 219 142 76 140 41 29 67 8
%	 (61) (39) (21) (39) (11) (8)	 (19) (2)
Key: Rur Rural; Urb Urban; N North; S South; E East; W West; R Russia;
0th Other
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61% of the elite claimed rural origin. The urban/rural divide is important. In his study of
comparative elites, Putnam highlights how many elites are drawn disproportionately
from cities, in particular the larger metropolises. The under-representation of villages
and small towns, he writes, "characterises both developed and undeveloped countries,
both capitalist and communist systems." 3° The reverse appeared to be the case for this
political elite. This reinforces the point made earlier with regard to the high degree of
social mobility in the Soviet era. This also begs the question as to how much the
location of one's early childhood and adolescent upbringing have influenced later
character development. By most accounts they do, although socialisation within urban
areas and institutions in later education and professional life also serves to redefine
cultures and values.
The overwhelming majority of the elite came from the North and South, with
21% drawn from the former and 38% from the South. The East and West each shared
9% of the elite. Interestingly, filly one-fifth of the political elite was born in Russia. A
significant number of the latter were Kazakhs; this suggests an elite that was highly
integrated in the Soviet Union. There are logical explanations for this. As we shall see
in 11.2, recruitment policies under Kunaev favoured Kazakhs from his region, the South.
Many of Kunaev's clients of the South appear to have retained power. Many Kazakhs
fled to the south of Russia in the eighteenth century with the Zhungar onslaught; many
ethnic Russians settled in the Kazakh steppe and then Kazakh SSR in the Russian and
Soviet periods.
The technical specialists, especially the Russians, came predominantly from the
North. The East and the West have been less represented in the national elite. The
regional elite has been recruited locally. 12 of the 20 regional heads in their posts in
1995 were born in their region; of the 8 that were not, 6 spent much of the Soviet period
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in that region. The predominance of the Southerners suggests a somewhat unified
mindset, but also suggests that there is a split between Northerners and Southerners.
Some of these differentiating characteristics were shown in the interviews.
Being born in Russia has become a sensitive topic for some members of the
elite. Kazakhstan's first Prime Minister, Sergei Tereshchenko, for example, deliberately
omits his birthplace in all official biographies even though his birth in the Russian Far
East is well-known. What he does include in his biography is his knowledge of Kazakh,
which distinguishes him from other Sla ys (and from 60% of the Kazakhs). Prominent
members of the Kazakh elite were called back from service in Russia or the Ukraine,
such as Kasymov and Isingarin, Ministers of Defence and Transport respectively in
1995.
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Nationality
Figure 8: Occupation and Nationality (March 1995)
Ka Ru Uk Ger Kor Tat Bel Jew Ot
1.PA	 29	 8	 2	 1
PA2	 11	 1	 1
Total	 40	 9	 3
2.CM	 22	 9	 3	 2	 1
CMD	 42 10 2	 1
CM2	 41 7	 1
Total	 115	 26	 5	 3
3.A0	 14	 4	 2
AOD	 16 4	 1
02	 9	 4	 1	 1
Total	 39	 12	 4
4.CMA	 18 4	 1
5.CU	 3	 2
6.EST	 9	 1
7.J	 7	 8
8.Vf	 11	 5	 1	 1
9.EPR	 3	 1	 1
10.PL	 10	 7
TOTAL	 255 75 11 7	 6	 2	 2	 1	 2
%	 71	 21	 3	 2	 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.5
Of the March 1995 elite, 71% were Kazakh, 21% were Russian, 3% Ukrainian, 2%
German, 1.6% Korean, 0.5% Belorussian, 0.5% Tatar, and 0.3% Jewish. Kazakhs
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comprised 73% of the top positions in the presidential administration. The Prime
Minister in 1995, Akezhan Kazhegeldin, was Kazakh. 12 of the 19 Ministers in 1995
were Kazakh; the two First Deputy Prime Ministers were Kazakh and of the four
Deputy Prime Ministers, three were Kazakh and one Russian.
72% of the deputy ministers were Kazakh. In the case of the six Russian
Ministers all of their first deputies were Kazakh. 78% of the Cabinet of Ministers
Administration with political influence were Kazakh; only 4 out of 23 of those holding
influential administrative posts in the Cabinet of Ministers were Russian; only 1
Russian, compared to 11 Kazakhs, occupied an important administrative role in the
presidential administration.
14 of the then 20 regional heads were Kazakh; of the remaining six, four were
Russian and two German. The latter six all have exclusively Kazakh deputies. Russians
were best represented in parliament at 27% of parliamentarians, compared to 59%
Kazakhs. 6% of parliamentarians are Ukrainian. Also of note is that Kazakh and
Russian representation was fairly even in the judiciary and social movements, and thus
again not proportional to the overall population. 9 out of 10 leaders of economic
organisations, by contrast, were Kazakh.
Nevertheless, the fact that 32% of Ministers were Russians (6 out of 19) is
significant and, as we shall see this, marks a notable change from 1992 and 1998 when
the percentage of Russians was much lower. The Russians with greatest staying power
appeared to have been the first Prime Minister Tereshchenko, Minister of Finance
Aleksandr Pavlov, Minister of Health Vasilii Devyatko, and Minister of Coal and
Energy Viktor Khrapunov. The latter two might be explained by the relatively low
status of their ministries. Pavlov, who survived into 1999 as First Deputy Prime
Minister lost his financial portfolio. Tereshchenko's Soviet status, knowledge of Kazakh
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and entrepreneurial connections with the state, set him apart. Ethnic German Vitalii
Mette, although dismissed from his post as Deputy Prime Minister on charges of
corruption in 1996, was reappointed as Head of East Kazakhstan in 1997. This relative
ethnic mix is duplicated in the core elite. 3 ' Nevertheless, only very few of these non-
Kazakhs of the core elite, as we shall see in 11.2, were also trusted by Nazarbaev.
Thus, Ka.zakhs have risen to dominate national and regional power structures -
and to a disproportionate degree relative to their percentage of the population. Ethnic
Kazakhs have come to dominate the regional administrations of the ethnically
dominated North. Security factors predominantly shaped the ethnic configuration of this
regional political elite and charges of Kazakhisation appear justified by the above
evidence. 111.2 analyses the implications of this configuration and the conclusion
assesses the repercussions for the republic's stability.
How does the elite interpret its ethnic origins? Overall, those interviewed
stressed their identification with Kazakhstan, not their Kazakh origins. Prime Minister
Kazhegeldin nevertheless expressed his pride at being Kazakh:
Kazakhs were never embarrassed about being Kazakh. We are a strong people,
descended from our ancestors, the great Kipchaks. Ethnically, I know that I am
descended from Turkic tribes, although as regards my religion, there I have more
difficulty. Even if my wife is Russian, my sons know that they are Kazakh. But
make sure when you write this you use the Kazakh transcription, Qazaq.32
When interviewed, ethnic Russians Pavlov, Sobolev and Khrapunov were
particularly defensive about their nationality. Sobolev experienced some difficulty in
defining his own place in the new Kazakhstani state:
Of course, cultural markers - like songs, national cusinine, folkiores - remain
with you and those for me are Russian. But in my day-to-day life these markers
are diluted as I sit around a table with Uighurs, Koreans, Kazakhs, Germans. I
think it is for the state to promote national-cultural revival. My ultimate loyalty
lies to Kazakhstan and I am proud to be part of this new entity.33
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Said Head of the Presidential Legal Department Baurzhan Mukhamedzhanov: "To be
Kazakh today is to be a citizen of Kazakhstan". 34
 As a member of the counterelite, Pyotr
Svoik could afford to be much more relaxed but admits after he left power that his
ethnicity would never allow him to stand for the Kazakhstani presidency. Ethnicity did
seem to affect the types of jobs. Pavlov was probably one of the highest placed
Russians, but he was a trained economist. Yuni Kim appointed to head electoral
observation by virtue of being Korean and thus an arbitor. Tatars appeared to head
recruitment sections in regional administrations.
The majority of the political elite interviewed used the Russian language in their
daily work and appeared to converse in Russian with their colleagues. 35
 Many stressed
that they tried to speak Kazakh at home with their children; in the same breath,
however, they would also emphasise that the language for the ftiture was English.
Although Prime Minister Kazhegeldin appeared to feel more comfortable with Russian,
he stated : "The people of Kazakhstan would like to see the Kazakh language develop.
At work I always use Kazakh and at home increasingly too. My children must
understand that this language exists".
None placed importance on Islam; thirty-four year-old Mukhamedzhanov stated:
"The Islamic religion does not play an important part in my life. We grew up in a period
where Islam did not matter. Today there are some moves to revive this religion, but, if!
were to speak frankly, this is not important to me". 37
 This view would appear to concord
with society at large; a USIA poll concluded that "Muslim Kazakhstanis know little
about the basic tenets of Islam. They practice those elements of their faith that are
cultural, humanitarian, or least time-consuming".38
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The older members of the elite nearly all displayed a detachment with the Soviet
past. When asked about the collectivisation, sedentarisation and repression of the 1930s,
they replied that this was a necessary component of the Soviet era and that it was
compensated by the advantages that the Soviet system had offered Kazakhstan. Daulet
Sembaev added a further point:
Yes, hundreds of thousands may have perished and all that is of course bad.
However, those who lived under the system experienced it together, and there
was a certain cameraderie. The attitude to the Soviet past is likely to change with
the next generation, however. In twenty years from now those who look back to
the Soviet era will not have this same understanding.39
Byzhuz
As described above, the Kazakhs believe themselves all to be descended in the male line
from one ancestor. Tribal genealogies collected by nineteenth-century observers vary
greatly in detail, even to the name of the pnmogenitor.
To recall 1.1, the Kazakh nation and all its subdivisions were traditionally
regarded as ramifications of an extended family group. The nation as family is an old
metaphor.The tribal genealogies were highly idealised. The genealogies themselves
often recognised the engrafting of unrelated groups by attributing one subdivision to an
adopted son or by the name of the subdivision, such as Zhetiru, "seven tribes". As seen
earlier, these traditional structures were transformed but not eradicated in the Soviet
period, and rural life still operated very much around kinship.
Zhuz affiliation of the contemporary political elite is almost impossible to obtain
and what follows can only be a very rough approximation. As we saw in 1.1, juz
affiliation is not simply cotenninous with place of birth; it is determined by the place of
one's ancestor seven generations back. But very few Kazakhs today know their seven
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generations of ancestors. Moreover, the nomadic ancestors of today's elite appear to
have stayed in their regions; it is thus likely that the ancestor's region of birth is the
same as for his descendent. Put simply, the Kazakhs have not shifted much.
Rediscovery of zhuz identity is occurring and that rediscovery is often occurring at the
level of the region in which the elite lives; it is thus possible, after all, to gain a rough
estimate according to the region in which the elite was born. Exceptions to this were
Kazakhs who fled to China and Russia through persecution, this was a small number of
the elite. The Eastern region is particularly complex, as half of it falls in the Senior
Horde and the other in the Middle Horde: we are fortunate as the borders of these juz
are fairly well defined. Moroever, juz membership is not something easily asked of the
elite in interview. This suggested to me, and the point is supported with anecdotal
evidence, that juz identity is an important part of the growing regional identities of the
elite. Indeed the two are often used synonymously.
While it cannot be overemphasised that the following figures must be treated
with caution, approximately 40% of members of the 1995 political elite appeared to be
from the Senior Horde, 28% from the Middle and 9% from the Small. About 10% of
ethnic Kazakhs were born in Russia, of which roughly 5% could be said to belong to the
Inner Horde.4° In 11.2 we shall determine whether juz status played a part in
appointments, but for the moment can we can gain some notion of the degree to which
sub-ethnic identity matters to the elite? That the elite opted not to speak about its juz
origins suggests one of three possibilities: that ju.z origins do not matter; that the
phenomenon is extremely important personally to him/her; and/or that he/she has
expressly been told that juz affiliation is a non-issue for public consumption. The first
two reasons seem less likely. This is partly because socialisation in Soviet elite
institutions ensured a distancing from traditional networks and partly because in the late
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Soviet period issues of ethnicity rather than subethnicity predominated— with the
sponsorship by Kunaev of an ethnic Kazakh as opposed to Russian elite. Moreover,
Kunaev diluted the juz issue by sponsoring individuals predominantly from the Senior
Juz.
There are indications that recruitment (11.2) and nation-building (111.1) policies
are re-emphasising the importance ofjuz, and even, tribal divisions. Contrary to most
nation-building projects which seek to overcome regional or ethnic cleavages, post-
Soviet Kazakhstan's efforts at "national-cultural revival" have served to accentuate sub-
ethnic differences rather than ethnic unity. This is because the most readily available
symbols for this national-cultural revival are lineage-based. Many of the Kazakh elite
interviewed referred to folk-heroes and fairy tales of their early childhood, and nearly
all were associated with juz history; this is not surprising - instances of unity amongst
the juz were the exception rather than the rule. The extended family seems to hold even
more importance, as it did in traditional steppe society; Zamanbek Nurkadkilov from
the Senior Juz writes:
Concern of close relatives for the family of a brother who had passed away was,
even in the postwar troubles, a distinguishing feature of the behaviour of
Kazakhs. Not the change of regime, not the relatively new code of ethnic
establishment of powers, not the little-allowed observance of traditions of the
ancestors of the steppe generations [kolen] were capable of shaking the eternal,
sacred duty of relatives to care for their close ones who had come upon
misfortune.4'
Nevertheless, for the juz factor to be of critical importance in elite attitudes it
appears to need reinforcement from other factors - i.e. ifjuz, clan, economic and
regional interests coincide, only then can divisions become entrenched and decisive for
state unity. This sort of mix appears to be the case for the Western oil regions of Atyrau
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and Mangistau which are becoming increasingly compact on all four counts and thus
increasingly autonomous.
In his own work on the Middle East, Geliner understands tribes as separate from
the state apparatus; evidence for their existence is considered tantamount to state
ineffectiveness. 42
 President Nazarbaev has repeatedly stated his desire to eradicate tribal
ideology from positions of power. In the traditional steppe, in entertaining, honoured
positions in seating and the assignment of servings of food were conducted according to
the seniority of the line of the guests. In entertaining protocol, for example, a member of
the Great Orda would take precedence over members of other ordas. In today's elite,
there remains a tribal pecking order; Prime Minister Kazhegeldin was often informally
criticised for being a member of an insignificant tribe of the Middle Juz. Nevertheless,
this factor appears to be only one - and by no means the most important - factor for his
alienation and dismissal, providing further evidence to the point that economic and
regional differences are just as important.
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Education
Figure 9: Occupation and Education
University	 Institute	 Sec
A-A R M Ot A-A R M 01 OnI)
1.PA	 12	 3	 1	 1	 5	 1	 1	 13 3
PA2	 3	 2	 1	 3	 2	 4
Total
2.CM	 4	 1	 12	 5	 6	 54
CMD	 8	 2	 2	 11	 11	 9	 144
CM2	 20	 1	 1 12	 8	 2	 11
3.A0	 6	 7	 1	 65
AOD	 15	 7	 2	 9
02	 1	 5	 5	 10
4.CMA	 9	 1	 10	 1	 2
5.CU	 3	 2
6.	 1	 15	 1	 2
ESTABLI
SH
7.J	 10	 1	 2	 3
8.PT	 3	 1	 16	 2	 7
9.EPR	 1	 4	 1
10.PL	 5	 4	 4	 2	 1
TOTAL	 78	 8	 13	 5 78	 55	 27	 81 16
%	 22 2	 4	 1	 22	 15	 7	 225
	
29%	 66%	 5%
A-A=Alma-Ata; R= Russia; M=Moscow; Ot = Other; Sec Only = Secondary Only
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97% of the political elite possessed some form of higher education, although the quality
of that higher education varied. 31% had a university education, compared to 66% who
went to technical schools or institutes of higher education. Of the 208 in the presidential
administration and upper ministerial level, approximately 45 reached Kandidat level
(very roughly equivalent to a Western master's degree) and 25 doctorate level. Just over
half of the 31% obtained their university degree at Kazakhstan's most prestigious
institution, the State University at Alma-Ata. Just over 8% studied in Russia, and just
over half of those in Moscow itself Most of the Moscow-educated have been coopted
into the executive elite, although five were parliamentarians. Parliament, to recall, is
filled with the highest number of professionals.
This is testimony to the remarkable development of the school system and of
literacy in the Soviet period. By the 1950s the percentage of literacy in Central Asia was
much higher than elsewhere in the Muslim Middle and Near East. In 1940, Kazakh
students made up only 30% of the total at the Alma-Ata State University named Kirova.
By the mid-1990s, renamed Al-Farabi, the overwhelming majority of the student body
had become ethnic Kazakh. Part of this change occurred in the 1970s under Kunaev.
Indeed, by the 1969/70 school year, the proportion of Muslim students throughout
Central Asia attending such institutions had become proportionate to the number of
Muslims in the total population of the republics (better than that in Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, slightly worse in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan).43
Soviet educational statistics were especially impressive with regard to Muslim
women, who before the Bolshevik Revolution took no part in public life. Until World
War II, attendance by Muslim girls in secondary schools and universities had been poor
(between 5 and 8 % of the USSR average in 1939). The younger women in the March
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1995 political elite appeared better educated than their older counterparts. Deputy
Economics Minister Ertlesova is a prime example of woman who reached similar
educational standards to those of men.
A higher percentage of ethnic Russians than ethnic Kazakhs appear to have
attended Russian institutes and universities, although of those attending Russian
universities in Moscow (18) as many as 12 were Kazakh. These were the privileged
Ka.zakhs, and, in interviews conducted with some of these they tended to be the children
of established communist apparatchiki. Jandosov, for example, stated: "If it had not
been for the high status of my father in Soviet Kazakhstan, I would never have had the
opportunity to study in Moscow."45
 These children of the privileged were younger than
the average, and tended to serve in crucial departments of economics and finance.
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The creation of a native Muslim technical and scientific elite can be counted as another
achievement of the Soviet regime, strongly sponsored by Kunaev. Strong incentives for
native students, including outright privileges (easier admissions, more available
scholarships, and more lenient grading) began to bear fruit. By 1975 Muslim technical
and scientific cadres in Uzbekistan had reached 57.6% of the total, quadrupling in
number from 1960s. Rasma Karklins points to a survey conducted in West Germany
among Volga German émigrés from Kazakhstan and Central Asia. An overwhelming
majority of the respondents mentioned nationality as a key factor in admissions to
institutions of higher education in those republics.
One serious weakness was the qualitative gap prevailing between Russian-
speaking schools and their graduates, on the one hand, and the native ones on the other.
More Kazakhs had completed a higher or specialised secondary school education by
1960, than the Turkmen and Kyrgyz. When specialists with a higher education were
separated from those with specialised secondary education, however, the picture is
rather different. Only 45.7% of Kazakhs in 1959 had a higher education - this changed
with the appointment of Kunaev. Statistics show that in 1960 only 2 1.4% of the
research personnel in Kazakhstan was Kazakh. It is possible that Kazakhs making a
transition from pastoralism to an industrial economy preferred the freedom of driving a
truck or tractor to the restrictions of a desk or research laboratory. On the other hand, it
may be that the Soviet government, in view of the large Slavic population and the
important mining and industrial enterprises in Kazakhstan, preferred to employ
scientific personnel trained in Moscow.
Higher education enrolment statistics suggest from the late I 960s a new trend
among Kazakhs in favour of advanced education. They constituted a core of partly
I 68
Russified individuals whom Soviet leaders expected to act as transmitters of Russian
culture to their people. As intelligentsia, in favoured positions, they acquired European
clothes and placed European furniture in at least one room of the home.
Few members of the political elite had a knowledge of foreign languages. This is
largely because the graduates of Kazakhstan's best linguistic school, the Foreign
Languages Institute, sought employment with foreign companies rather than in the
government. And it is the children of today's elite who are obtaining an education in the
West.
CONCLUSIONS
In sum, certain social groups do appear to be dominating the political elite in 1995.
These form a typical profile of the elite which may be described as: membership of the
Soviet elite; blue-collar background; age between 36 and 55; male, and ethnic Kazakh.
But there are also important features which appeared to divide the elite: their birthplace,
juz membership and education being among the most important. Members of the core
elite appeared to have a similar typical profile. One important way in which the 1995
core elite departed from the typical elite in 1995 was its inclusion of non-Kazakhs; as
11.2 will indicate, however, this is a departure from the 1992 and 1998 Kazakhisation
trends and appears to have occurred as a concession to the Russian community.
Indications are that the divisions manifested themselves in different economic
interests and state fragmentation rather than divergent attitudes. In other words, a
considerable consensus existed among the executive political elite over the broad
direction of economic and political reform. 1.2 indicated that even the parliamentary
counterelite agreed on the broad parameters of reform. However, this consensus was
169
increasingly held hostage to powerfiul interest groups which were forming on the basis
of economic divisions. These interest groups were in turn fragmented by self-interest.
These divisions were also heightening regional and, by default, clan differences. The
elite was not an integrated elite in terms of social homogeneity or personal interaction,
even if there was a broad degree of value consensus.
While the thesis is concerned with the national elite, some reference has been
made to regional administrative leaders, and the findings can be summarised here. The
regional elite does appear to have a common profile. Professionally, of the twenty
regional heads analysed in 1995, half served in the Soviet period either as raikom or
obkom heads, and half as managers of enterprises or of collective farms. Apart from
Saparbaev in Kzyl-Orda, all in 1995 had lived and worked in their respective regions.
The regional heads of administration tend to fall in the 46 to 55 age bracket, which
conforms to the average age of the national political elite. All twenty heads of regional
administration were male in 1995. At lower echelons of power, it was noted that fewer
females appeared to work in the Southern Kazakhstan oblast, while women were fairly
highly represented in political office in the North and West. 90 percent of regional
heads came from rural areas. 14 of the 20 akims in 1995 were ethnic Kazakh, 4 Russian
and 2 German. The majority of the regional administration heads have studied at
technical institutes and none at universities. Despite this common profile, the regions
themselves, as we saw in 1.2, are increasingly diversifying due to varying economic
performance. We have seen briefly that the behaviour of each regional leader can thus
vary, as can his relationship to the centre, the fill parameters of which lie outside the
scope of this thesis.
170
Endnotes to Chapter 11.1
'See Appendix One on Methodology for an explanation of how this elite was identified.
2 Tom Bottomore, Elites and Society (Middlesex, England: Pelican, 1964), p.10.
S.J. Eldersveld, Political Elites in Modern Societies. Empirical Research and
Democratic Theory (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1989).
See Klaus von Beyme, Die Politische Elite in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
Munich: R.Piper, 1971).
"Ruling minorities are usually so constituted that the individuals who make them up
are distinguished from the mass of the governed by qualities that give them a certain
material, intellectual, or even moral superiority; or else they are the heirs of individuals
who possessed such qualities. In other words, members of a ruling minority regularly
have some attribute, real or apparent, which is highly esteemed and very influential in
the society in which they live". See Harold D. Lasswell, World Revolutionary Elites:
Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, Mass.: MIII Press, 1965), p. 9.6 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class, 1939; C.Wnght Mills, The Power Elite (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959).
Dahi, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1961).
Kairbek Suleimenov was the brainchild behind the Security Council and he came into
conflict with its activities as Minister of Interior. Many of the powers he had originally
suggested were abrogated from him. Interview with the author, 10 February 1996.
Interview with the author, 23 August 1996.
'°Kto Es! 'Kb VRespublike Kazakhsian (Almaty: Evraziya-Polis, 1995).
Executive and CPSU posts could, and often did, overlap.
12 See the discussion by Anton Steen
' Interview with the author, 13 May 1996.
14 Interview with the author, 26 May 1996.
15 This career pattern is starkly reminiscent of the old Tsarist pattern.
16 Askar Kulibaev was to become one of President Nazarbaev's son-in-laws. He worked
in the Western and Almaty regions.
17 Elizabeth Bacon, CentralAsians, p. 39, writes: "The Kazaks were not very class
conscious".
' 8 Nursultan Nazarbaev, Without Right and Left (London: Class Publishing, 1992),
p.2.
19 Only some of the entries in Kb est 'Kb included references to parental origin.
20 Thigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, Political Power: USA USSR (New
York: Viking Press, 1964), p. 135; Allen H. Barton et al., Opinion-Making Elites in
Yugoslavia (New York: Praeger, 1973), p. 125.
21 Thomas R. Dye and L. Harmon Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy, 2" edn (Belmont,
CA: Wadsworth, 1972), p. 34.
22 The father of Zhanibek Marabaev, deputy head of the state oil company involved in
the Caspian Sea offshore exploarations head of Atyrau.
23 Az-i-ya's title denotes both "Asia" and the last letters of the Russian alphabet;
Suleimenov challenges the claim that there are purely Russian sources in Russian
national poetry by illustrating the large number of Turkish references.
24 Compare Anton Steen, Between Past and Future, passim.
25 On average, a leader of the contemporary world is about 50 on coming to office. Of
the 900 or so leaders whose age was known, 498, or 55 percent, were over fifty when
171
they were first appointed as heads of the government; only 129—or less than 15 percent
- were under forty, while 195 (21 percent) were over sixty- also on reaching the top
?osition in their country for the first time.
6 Informal conversation with a South Kazakhstan trade union activist, Shymkent, 12
April 1996.
27See Michael Rywkin, Moscow 's Muslim Challenge: Soviet Central Asia (Armonk,
NY and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), esp. ch . 8.
28 Interview with the author, 2 July 1996.
29 Bacon, Central Asians, p. 41.
30 Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1976), p. 32.
31 This included ethnic Russians Zhigalov, Pavlov, Sobolev, Utepov, Svoik,
Khrapunov, Shkolnik, Lavrinenko;, Levitin, Cherdybaev, Peregrin, Marchenko,
Tereshchenko and Soskovets; and, Germans Mette and Roze.
32 Interview with the author, 22 February 1996.
Interview with the author, 18 November 1995.
' Interview with the author, 1 December 1995.
For example, during the interview with Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin he
received a phonecall from the President and asked me to leave the room. In past similar
scenarios, the members of the elite had tended to revert to Kazakh on the telephone -
albeit broken Kazakh. Ethnic Russian Igor Rogov, for example, spoke some Kazakh on
the telephone during our interview. See also, M.S. Mashanov and R.S. Arynova,
"Kulturno-Lingvisticheskaya Situatsiya V Respublike Kazakhstan: Tendentsii
Razvitiya", Sayasat (September 1997), pp. 32-41.
36 Interview with the author, 22 February 1996.
" Interview with the author, 1 December 1995.
38 
"Islam Yes, Islamic State No for Muslim Kazakhstanis", Opinion Analysis, USIA
Office of Research and Media Reaction, 24 December 1997.Approximately half of
Kazakhstanis are Muslim, and a third are either Russian Orthodox or some other type of
Christian. See also, S. B. Aidosov, 'Mirovozzrencheskie Orientatsii Studentov:
Otnoshenie K Religii", Sayasat (September 1997), pp. 46-50.
Interview with the author, 6 September 1996.
40 To recall, the Inner or Bukeev (Bukey) Juz between the Ural and Volga rivers was
formed at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when part of the Small Juz migrated
westward into an area vacated by the Kalmuks.
41 Zamanbek Nurkadilov, Ne To! 'ko 0 Sebe (Almaty: Shartarap, 1996), p. 11.
Ernest Gellner, "Tribalism and the State in the Middle East" in Philip S. Khoury and
Joseph Kostiner (eds), Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990).
u Rywkin, Moscow 's Muslim Challenge, passim.
Rywkin, Moscow 's Muslim Jhallenge, p.104.
Interview with the author, 22 February 1996.
Rywkin, Moscow 's Muslim Challenge, p.104.
172
Chapter 11.2
Cursus honorum:
THE RECRUITMENT PATTERNS (199 1-1998)
This chapter is a study of co-option into, and promotions within, the top leadership of
the Kazakhstani elite. As such it is concerned with political recruitment, defined here as
"the processes that select from among the several million socially favoured and
politically motivated citizens comprising the political stratum those several thousand
who reach positions of significant national influence".'
Such a study will give us an indication of the institutional permeability and thus
homogeneity of the elite, and provide indications of cultural and social networks
Robert Putnam looks at "five critical issues" in his assessment of recruitment and I
shall use four here, in a redefined order. 2 They are:
1. Gates and gatekeepers. How and by whom are the chosen few actually chosen?
2. Credentials. What criteria must successful aspirants meet?
3. Channels. Through what routes do aspirants for political leadership most commonly
reach the top?
4 So what? Turnover and succession. How (and how often) do incumbents leave
office? How do recruitment patterns ultimately affect the character of the elite and
its politics?
Given the available statistics and the above definition of the political elite as the
core decision-makers, our concern here is with the fate of the top individuals rather than
with the thousands. At times we will look at the general fate of individual positions,
such as the regional heads or ministers. But mainly, to reiterate the Introduction, the
concern is with the political elite previously defined for this study (which includes
prominent regional heads) and within this a core, identified in 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Whilst the political elite generally exerts decisive influence on policy-making, the core
elite, including Nazarbaev, is comprised of individuals who also have the trust of
Nazarbaev. Recruitment criteria in the regions operated according to somewhat different
criteria and these will be highlighted where appropriate.
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The core elite: 1992, 1995 and 1998
Before we begin, we need to establish whose political career paths are principally under
scrutiny. We are analysing the core at three different time periods: 1992, 1995 and
1998.
Table 1: The core political elite
1992- 1994
	 1994- 1995
	 1996- 1998
Nursultan Nazarbaev
	 Nursultan Nazarbaev
	 Nursultan Nazarbaev
Sara Nazarbaeva	 Sara Nazarbaeva	 Sara Nazarbaeva
Nurtai Abykaev	 Nurtai Abykaev	 Dariga Nazarbaeva3
Sergei Tereshchenko	 Akezhan Kazhegeldin	 Akhmetzhan Esimov
Erik Asanbaev	 Enk Asanbaev	 Askar Kulibaev
Olzhas Suleimenov	 Olzhas Suleimenov	 Nurlan Balgimbaev
Serikbolsyn Abdildin'
	 Abish Kekilbaev	 Marat Ospanov
Zamanbek Nurkadilov 	 Daulet Sembaev	 Rakhat Aliev
Daulet Sembaev	 Tulegen Zhukeev
	 Nurtai Abykaev
Kairbek Suleimenov	 Marat Tazhin	 Zhanybek Karibzhanov
Syzdyk Abishev	 Sat Tokpakbaev	 Mukhtar Ablyazov
Nagashbai Shaikhenov	 Nigmatzhan Isingarin
	 Oraz Zhandosov
Nigmatzhan Isingarin
	 Vitalii Mette
	 Altai Kakimzhanov
Serikbek Daukeev
	 Aleksandr Pavlov
	 Aleksandr Pavlov
Oraz Zhandosov	 Sarybai Kalmurzaev	 Igor Rogov
Grigorii Marchenko 	 Zhanybek Karibzhanov
Oleg Soskovets	 Serikbek Daukeev
Viktor Sobolev
Kairbek Suleimenov
Saginbek Tursunov
Igor Rogov
Erzhan Utembaev
Oraz Zhandosov
Grigorii Marchenko
174
Two introductory remarks may be made about the core political elite. First, the core
elite of 1998 is narrower than that of 1991, which suggests a centralisation of power.
Second, it had become both more and less homogenous - more, because its members by
1998 were almost exclusively Kazakh and urban-born, but less because they were from
different zhuz and occupational backgrounds. Socially by 1998 the core elite had
bifurcated primarily into members who were relatives of the President and into business
executives co-opted by the President.
Gates and gatekeepers
Control over recruitment is an extension of elite power. Not only can certain formal
qualifications be imposed, but so can other selective devices to establish the
appropriateness of any particular candidate for entrance. Elites, psychologically and
politically, like to recruit like-minded individuals; often this is more a question of
values and behaviour than of social origins. This means, of course, that the elite is by
definition and by practice, an exclusive group. The nomenklatura system allowed the
CPSU to maintain its self-appointed prerogative of the selection, training and allocation
of cadres4, and this task now fell after independence to the selectorate of the
Kazakhstani elite, that small number around and including Nazarbaev that could appoint
and dismiss senior political advisors to officials.
Monocratic regimes are usually charactensed by a selectorate of one. In the
difficult years after the Turkish revolution of 1919, Ataturk, undisputed leader of the
new regime, took personal charge of nominations to the Grand National Assembly.5
There is some indication that Nazarbaev's recruitment has become increasingly
monocratic since 1991. Nevertheless, many informal accounts describe a President who
continues to be influenced by advice from an inner circle of advisors. 6
 That inner circle,
in line with the developments among the political elite, has undergone some changes.
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Table 2: Nazarbaev's inner circle of trusted advisors
1992 - 1994	 1994- 1995
	 1996- 1998
Sara Nazarbaeva	 Sara Nazarbaeva	 Sara Nazarbaeva
Nurtai Abykaev	 Nurtai Abykaev	 Dariga Nazarbaeva
Sergei Tereshchenko	 Akezhan Kazhegeldin	 Akhmetzhan Esimov
Erik Asanbaev	 Erik Asanbaev	 Askar Kulibaev
Olzhas Suleimenov	 Olzhas Suleimenov	 Nurlan Balgimbaev
Seribolsyn Abdildin'
	 Abish Kekilbaev	 Marat Ospanov
Zamanbek Nurkadilov	 Daulet Sembaev	 Rakhat Aliev
Daulet Sembaev	 Sat Tokpakbaev	 Nurtai Abykaev
Kairbek Suleimenov	 Aleksandr Pavlov
	 Imangali Tasmagambetov
Syzdyk Abishev	 Syzdyk Abishev	 Syzdyk Abishev
Up to about 1995, Nazarbaev appeared to involve other individuals in recruitment
decisions, and the post of Head of Presidential Administration was conceived primarily
for cadre appointments. 7
 The first to occupy this post was Nurtai Abykaev, testimony to
his long-standing friendship with the President. But when Abykaev was appointed
Ambassador to the United Kingdom, his replacement by Saginbek Tursunov, although a
personal friend of Sara Nazarbaeva, signified a downgrading of the status of this
position which has continued ever since. Another figure possibly intimately involved in
cadre recruitment in the early years was Vice-President Asanbaev. This would explain
the very different composition of government in the immediate post-independence
period, which included a number of more liberal-minded individuals.
Between 1995 and 1998 the selectorate became smaller, more homogenous and
centralised. This would confirm the general tendency we noted in the two preceding
chapters and in the core political elite. The selectorate by 1998 was immediate to
Nazarbaev: it was composed of family, relatives, close friends and loyal colleagues. The
move to Astana appeared to have abetted the narrowing of the selectorate and political
elite, as former members of the elite not selected by the President remained in Almaty.
This narrowing of the selectorate is significant. It implies that the elite as a whole was
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likely to become smaller, more homogeneous and centralised, which is again borne out
by 1.2 and 11.1.
Criteria for selection
According to which criteria does this selectorate choose its recruits? In this section we
shall discuss the applicability of the patron-client model to post-Soviet Kazakhstani
recruitment practices. If patronage occurs but is not universal, what is its scope and
extent, what criteria alternative to patronage were used in personnel decisions, and in
what circumstances were appointments the result of patronage? Here we are keen to
refer, even at times only implicitly, to the structured and organised character and
context of recruitment (which will be elaborated in the chapter's conclusion).
Achievement and Ascnptive Criteria
First, let us approach the question by way of elimination, by identifying examples of
patron-client relations which do not appear to have concorded with Kazakhstani
recruitment practice, and where different typologies are necessary. Three criteria outside
patron-client relations appear particularly important: co-option by virtue of the
individual's independent political resources; individual achievement criteria; and the
aseriptive criteria of ethnicity and sub-ethnicity.
Nazarbaev attempted to buy off independent-minded politicians. Olzhas
Suleimenov, along with Gaziz Aldamzharov8
 back in 1994, expressed their intention in
1994 to stand for the then scheduled 1995 presidential elections; the elections were
changed to a referendum in 1995 and Suleimenov accepted the post of Ambassador to
Italy. In the event, his decision did not appear to have been difficult; when interviewed
he stated: "It will be an excellent opportunity to complete my new book; there is no
time here in Almaty".9
 In November 1997, Murat Auezov, then co-chairman of the
opposition movement Azamat, declared his intention to stand for the presidential
elections originally scheduled for December 2000. By February 1998 he had accepted a
position as Head of Department of Social Accord of Almaty Regional Administration
under former Nazarbaev-critic and now regional akim, Zamanbek Nurkadilov.'° Baltash
Tursumbaev, whose appointment as Ambassador to Turkey was seen as a means of
removing him from Almaty, returned in 1998 and like Auezov declared his intention to
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stand for the Presidency; he was appointed Deputy Prime Minister in the 1998 reshuffle.
This co-optation appears to have worked - since the political elite is small enough, its
best policy may well be to enlist individuals from a different, non-elite background -
this has good propaganda value, includes individuals who are probably harder-working
and implies that these individuals are easily bought off. There have also been
individuals who, occupying alternative and significant power bases to Nazarbaev, were
then co-opted by the President. Examples were Abdullaev and Nurkadilov; both
originate from more powerfiul southern clans than Nazarbaev himself
Second, individual achievements also seem to have become important criteria in
recruitment policy, particularly since the appointment of Kazhegeldin as prime minister
in 1995. Sabit Zhusupov, who, to recall, predicted the premature calling of presidential
elections for 1999, stressed that contemporary recruitment has "a strong grain of
pragmatism"." Kazhegeldin surrounded himself with a fair number of technocrats.'2
Examples were Head of National Bank Uraz Djandosov, his deputy Grigori Marchenko
and Head of Kazakhstan's largest commercial bank, Kakommertsbank, Nurlan
Subhanberdin. At the ministerial level, the 1998 elite included young appointees such as
Altai Kakimzhanov. In 1994, at the age of thirty, Kakimzhanov had already been
appointed head of the National Savings bank (former Sperbank). Similarly, 31-year-old
Mukhtar Ablyazov was appointed to head the Trade and Industry Ministry. Of these, all
with the exception of Dzhandosov came from business into politics. This group is
overwhelmingly Moscow-educated. This technocracy was still, however, a minority in
1998; moreover, unlike the first quasi-counterelite group, the technocrats did not appear
to enjoy an independent power base (even if the President might have feared that they
would develop such).
Those conforming to the above typologies appeared in turn to be outnumbered
by those characterised by the third and final type of criterion for recruitment (other than
a strictly patron-client model): the ascriptive properties of the recruit. Two criteria have
figured particularly prominently in the selection of the post-independent Kazakhstan
political elite: ethnicity and sub-ethnicity.
1.1 and 11.1 outlined the ways in which ethnic Kazakhs were already gaining
power in their republic during the Soviet period under the influential native First
Secretary Dinmukhamed Kunaev. Without the enormous leverage enjoyed by Kunaev
in recruitment, Kazakhs would not have occupied the number of posts they did by 1991.
Furthermore, upon independence, Kazakhisation of elite structures became the most
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visible means of displaying autonomy from Russia; in the opinion of one member of the
political elite, recruitment of ethnic Kazakhs to top posts was tantamount to
preservation of the state.' 3 In these early years, the President was also hostage to an
influential Kazakh nationalist camp. For example, at the ministerial level, of the 25
ministers in 1992, 88 percent were Kazakh. By 1995, this number had fallen to 71
percent (with the government including four Russians, one German and one
Ukrainian).'4 This adjustment was possibly related to the democratic interlude of the
republic and the stark reality that by 1994/5 more than one million ethnic Russians had
emigrated, increasing the ethnic confidence of the Kazakhs and allowing Nazarbaev to
make concessions again to the non-Kazakh constituency. Moreover, that several of
these Russians in 1994/5 were not merely appointed to symbolic posts - such as Deputy
Prime Ministers Sobolev, Pavlov, Mette and Minister Shtoik - may have been because
of their personal links to then Prime Minister Kazhegeldin. As we saw in 1.2,
Kazhegeldin made the first, albeit tentative steps toward some sort of technocratic
government, and often the best economists and financiers - certainly at the regional
level - were Russians. By 1998 Kazakhisation of ministerial posts had again risen, to an
overwhelming majority of 86%.' This Kazakhisation can in some ways be interpreted
as a loss of power on the part of Nazarbaev - because of bitter power struggles between
Kazakhs and his own strongly "internationalist" background, Nazarbaev has often felt
more secure in a balance of Russians and Germans.
A similar Kazakhisation in the regions occurred since 1991. Again, already
significant concessions to ethnic Kazakhs were made at the close of the Soviet period.
In some obkoms, both first and second secretaries were Kazakh, breaking the usual
tendency noted by John Willerton of dyarchy, where the first secretary tended to be
Kazakh and the second Russian. Kazakhisation of the regions was, however, less in the
early years of independence than occurred at the national level, and many deputy akims
remained ethnic Russian or German. These deputies, as their second secretary
predecessors, were often the eminences grises behind the top office.' 6 Nevertheless,
whilst in 1991 only half of then first secretaries were ethnic Kazakh, by 1992 the
number of ethnic Kazakh akims had risen to 70 percent and thence to 72 percent in
1995; by 1998/9 only I of the 14 akim was not Kazakh. But that one individual, Viktor
Khrapunov, was in any case mayor of the town that had ceased to be the capital. A
Russian, he would be a loyal official for Nazarbaev as the President moved to the
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northern capital of Astana. Greater detail of the ethnicities of the regional administration
is provided in the table overleaf
180
Table 3: Regional Administrations: National Composition
1991	 1992	 1995
1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3	 1	 2	 3
Alibmsk	 R	 K	 IR	 K	 R	 4K	 R	 K	 2R
1K	 IR	 1K
IG
Alma-Ala	 K	 R	 3K	 K	 R	 4K	 K	 R	 4K
1k	 IR
Ea-kazaklman	 R	 K	 IR	 K	 R	 4K	 R	 1k	 3K
1K	 4k	 1K	 2R
IG
Alymu	 K	 R	 R	 K	 R	 5K	 K	 A	 1k
4K
Dambul	 K	 K	 1K	 K	 K	 2R	 K	 2K	 3K
2R	 3K	 2R
Deazagan	 R	 K	 2K	 R	 1K	 3K	 K	 K	 3K
IR	 IR	 1k	 2k
Karanda	 R	 K	 2R	 R	 K	 4K	 R	 K	 3K2
1K	 IR	 R
KzyIda	 K	 K	 2K	 K	 2K	 4K	 Ka	 2K	 3K
Kokthav	 K	 R	 1R	 K	 1R	 3K	 K	 2K	 K
1K	 1K	 1k	 1R
Kuanai	 R	 K	 2k	 K	 R	 4K	 K	 R	 4K
3k	 3R
Mmgau	 R	 K	 2K	 R	 2K	 3K	 K	 1K	 3K
IR	 1R
Pavkxlar	 R	 K	 K	 K	 1K	 3K	 K	 1K	 2K
1R	 R	 1k	 2R
Noilh-Kazakhslan	 Ru	 Ka	 1K	 G	 Ka	 3K	 G	 Kaz 2k
2k	 3R	 khsia 2k
n
Semipalatinsk	 K	 k	 2K	 k	 K	 3K	 K	 1K	 1K
1k	 3k	 1k	 IR
Taldy-Kuran	 K	 R	 3K	 K	 R	 3K	 K	 R	 3k
IR	 1k
Turgai	 K	 R	 2K	 K	 K	 3K	 K	 R	 3K
IR	 1K
Uralsk	 K	 R	 1K	 K	 K	 3k	 K	 3R	 K
1R	 2K	 1U
1K
Tselmogjad	 G	 K	 1K	 G	 K	 3K	 K	 R	 4K
JR	 IR
chimkmt	 Ru	 Ka	 2Ka Ka	 Ka	 3Ka Ka	 Ru	 4Ka
1 Ru
A-Atown	 K	 K	 K	 R	 3K
1k
'U
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1 = Obkom First Secretary (1991); Glavy Administratsii (GA) (1992); Akimy
(1995)
2 = Obkom Second Secretary (1992); First Deputy GA (1992); First Deputy Akim
(1995)
3= Obkom Secretary (1991); Deputy GA (1992); Deputy Akim (1995)
The initials in bold indicate where the same individual occupies office.
It is noticeable that the process of Kazakhisation had already become evident in
1991, with one half of first secretaries ethnic Kazakhs. With the important exception of
Chimkent, all Southern first secretaries were Kazakh. As mentioned above, however,
Chimkent's final first secretary was Sergei Tereshchenko, who could speak fluent
Kazakh. Two of the four Western regions, Atyrau and Uraisk, already had Kazakh
heads by 1991. The only Northern region with a Kazakh head by 1991 was Turgai, but
Turgai is the smallest of the Northern regions and was indeed abolished in 1997. It is
surprising that the Kazakh second secretaries, often considered the real power behind
the Russian puppet, have ,ioi become important in the post-communist elite. By 1998
any notion of dyarchy had gone. 17
Kinship and Tribalism
On balance, however, it is probably fair to say that concerns of intra-Kazakh balance
have been greater than those of achieving some ethnic proportionality.' 8
 After all, with
the high rate of non-Kazakh emigration, by 1995 the Kazakh elite could already be
confident that ethnic Kazakhs would soon have achieved a majority. In his recruitment
decisions the President was undoubtedly aware of the internal divisions between ethnic
Kazakhs, and the sharing of the spoils at the apex of the regime required delicate
manipulation. This recognition alone would lend some credence to the theory that
recruitment post-1991 has been more about balancing the three zhuz interests, a theory
most closely associated with Nurbulat Masanov, professor of history at Kazakhstan
State University.'9
Masanov states that the decisive criterion which explains appointments amongst
the core elite - and here he distinguishes it from second-tier officialdom - is zhuz
affiliation. This he terms the "clan factor" (kianonoifakiori), and explains it to be a
direct continuation of the policy conducted by Dinmukhamed Kunaev. Kunaev was
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known to promote the Senior Horde, and our findings in 11.1 did indeed show that the
political elite is predominantly from the South. Nazarbaev, himself a southerner, carried
on this tradition. But, says Masanov, Nazarbaev's game became more subtle. Aware of
the potential struggle between the different zhuzes, Nazarbaev was concerned with
attaining a critical balance between all three.
The Senior Zhuz, he contends, was accorded positions of low status but high
influence. He cites two of its members, Nurtal Abykaev and Esimov, as key examples.
The Junior Zhuz, which has often acted as broker between the Senior and Middle
Zhuzes, has been appointed to positions of low profile, high status and relatively high
influence. Here he cites Marat Tazhin whom he names "the regime's ideologist";
Tulegen Zhukeev, state advisor on national security; Abish Kekilbaev, speaker of the
thirteenth parliament and then the undefined post of State Secretary; and, Nurbutai
Shaikhenov, former state advisor and Minister of Justice by 1995. Finally, members of
the Middle Zhuz - most notably members of its leading Argyn tribe - were placed in
important but not overtly political posts. Examples included Murat Auezov, Sabit
Mukhanov, Esenberlin, and Olzhas Suleimenov. Masanov himself is from the Middle
Zhuz. Finally, Masanov, contends, the Middle Zhuz is likely to grow with importance
after the move of the capital to Middle Zhuz territory, to Astana.
A number of points can be advanced in favour of this thesis. The first point to
stress again is that the political elite will not speak openly about either their own zhuz
membership or its importance in the political system. Masanov's described
configuration of zhuz suggests that there is some deliberate balancing act on the part of
the selectorate. Moreover, and crucially, the political elite was placing importance on
the zhuzes. We shall see in 111.1 how nation-building has created sub-ethnic lineages by
default and how regional elites are celebrating their zhuz's folk-hero. This suggests that
post-independent Kazakhstan is - for the first time in written form - conceptualising
the zhuz and creating new associations which are zhuz-based. They are convenient
markers and have meant that zhuz affiliation has become more important amongst elites
than the general society, whilst clan affiliation is more important at society level.
Unlike the genealogies (shezhire) of the pre-Soviet period, which were largely
committed to memory and transmitted orally, the genealogies of the post-Soviet period
were published for consumption by an almost universally literate Kazakh population.
Kazakh-language newspapers depicted the revival of genealogies as an imperative for
all Kazakhs. "To know one's origins is a sign of a good upbringing" (Tegin bilu -
183
tektilikting belgisi). 2° The attributes understood to underlie Kazakhness - language,
genealogical knowledge, and connection to events or personages of historical
significance - were sorely lacking, especially among the members of a largely Russified
political elite. Distinguishing oneself from the ethnic other was a crucial political tool.
All this considered, however, there are serious difficulties with Masanov's
thesis, the details of which he had also come to revise by 1997 (see below). The zhuz
labels are only really effective when allied with economic interests. Also, are these zhuz
affiliations really more than geographic origin? The Small Zhuz sits on the enormous
wealth of the Caspian Sea; its regional elite are thus mainly employed in oil and gas
positions at the national elite level. This would make sense in any country.
Instead, what really matters is that the elite propagates the idea that these
networks have a cultural, and not just, geographic content. It has been so successful at
this propagation that over a third of the population asked in one poll believes that the
zhuz factor is decisive in recruitment. 2 ' On the one hand, this helps legitimisation of the
elite. Descent, or "the use of genealogical principles to form exclusive categories and
groups for the allocation and transmission of social position" 22, can be used as a
legitimising tool. Moreover, the zhuz word is a convenient cover for the unashamed use
of existing networks which, in the event can include members from any ethnic
background. Ultimately, then, it appears that kinship might be more relevant, and that it,
to follow Beattie's and Needham's views of kinship, has no kin-specific content, but
only becomes real when expressed through economic or social interests.23
 However,
these two attributes are frequently absent, and recruitment can be driven by the simple
reality that economic interests are tying people together.
PATRONAGE AND CLIENTELISM
It is important to note that Gellner is probably right when he contends that kinship
cannot constitute patronage - even if patronage often borrows the language of kinship.24
Write Lemarchand and Legg,
Political clientelism may be viewed as a more or less personalised, affective and
reciprocal relationship between actors, or sets of actors, commanding unequal
resources and involving mutually beneficial transactions that have political
ramifications beyond the immediate sphere of dyadic relationships.25
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This definition of "patron-client relations" (the inverted commas hereafter omitted) is a
usefi.il starting point. It embodies, as highlighted by John H. Miller, 27
 three points
usually made by definitions of patronage: first, the development and use of personal
relationships of mutual obligation; second, their purpose for the furthering of political
ends; and third, the unequal command of resources by "patron" and "client". 28 A
"clientele" can therefore be distinguished from an interest group or an ideological
movement, and its leaders can hence be labelled "patrons" and their followers "clients".
Patrons are powerful since they can have access to and distribute tangibles -
government contracts, jobs, loans - and it is through the shrewd development of these
resources that they may build and maintain their personal clientele. In principle, the
greater the resources controlled the more powerful the patron. 29
 In purely kinship
societies, men look for their security to concentric groups of cousins, "sons of paternal
uncles"; they expect their support in feud or at the collective oath, and recognise the
corresponding duty to provide such support. In such circumstances, the unsymmetrical
relationship of patronage may be of secondary importance.
Let us first consider, and then put aside, the peculiar difficulty of applying the
definition of patron-client relations to secretive societies. As with the USSR, the bulk of
our evidence for Kazakhstan is circumstantial; very rarely do we encounter a direct
attestation of political relationship. 30 Also, we cannot tell definitively which factor
above all others was vital in the recruitment choice. But there is nothing that can be
done about speculative constructs; the best that can be done is to weigh up the
maximum number of accounts against each other. Let us go now to a typology of
appointment criteria in the post-independent Ka.zakhstani elite based on patron-client
relations.
First, personal associations may have tipped the balance in one person's favour
out of a short-list where, to use our parlance, all appear competent and are considered
reliable. Close associates of Nazarbaev who have remained part of his inner circle of
advisors between 1991 and 1998 are Erik Asanbaev, Akhmetzhan Esimov, Syzdyk
Abishev and Nurtai Abykaev. They were associates from the Soviet era. The longest
serving Minister Daukeev appeared to be a good friend of Nazarbaev and Interior
Minister Kairbek Suleimenov seemed highly respected by Nazarbaev.3'
Next there were appointments in which political loyalty, and hence in all
likelihood past associations, are themselves a qualification. This appears to be the case
of the advancement of the ethnic Russians Aleksandr Pavlov, Viktor Khrapunov Igor
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Rogov, Sergei Tereshchenko and the ethnic German Vitalii Mette. All were prominent
members of the political elite throughout the period. Other examples of politically loyal
individuals were Zhukeev, Zhigalov, Sat Tokpakbaev, Kalmurzaev, Tokaev,
Karibzhanov and Shkolnik. 32 Ethnic Russians, devoid of any social roots of power and
deriving their place amongst the political elite almost exclusively from the benevolence
of their patron, have often proven more loyal clients.33
A third type of appointment in which patronage clearly played a role was where
a secondary patron presented the qualifications of an individual to a top patron, in this
case Nazarbaev. Sembaev, for example, was a key player in the promotion of
Zhandosov to the post of National Bank Chairman; Erik Asanbaev was the sub-patron
of a number of appointments, including of his assistants Erzhan Dosmukhametov and
Grigorii Marchenko; and Kazhegeldin brought to Nazarbaev's attention talent from the
regions, such as Zhakiyanov. Zhabagin from Pavlodar probably brought both
Akhmetov and Pavlov to Nazarbaev's attention.34
Prior association played a role in patronage of these last three types. They are to
be sharply distinguished from cases where no prior association appears to have existed;
the notion of patronage arises not as a reason for the choice of one person rather than
another but because clientelist bonds were created by the appointment. Marat Tazhin is
a case in point. Nazarbaev probably hoped that the recruitment of technocrats, though
primarily driven for reasons other than patronage, would ensure their loyalty to him.
Patronage in this sense is the singling out of people for rapid promotion, thereby placing
them under political obligation where past association was not a reason for their choice.
Also to be subsumed under the heading of patronage were such classical moves
as befriending one's enemies' enemies and judicious recruitment from the followings of
defeated rivals. A notable example was Nazarbaev's cooption of Galimzhan
Zhakiyanov who had fallen out with his former best friend and co-director Kazhegeldin.
Nazarbaev created an institution for Zhakiyanov - the Agency for Strategic Resources -
to give him resources to outmanoeuvre Kazhegeldin. Such rewards for the clients of
one's competitors appear prudent ways of consolidating power, and also of signalling
that factional politics have their bounds, that the struggle could not be carried to
extremes.
Two broad senses of the word "patronage" have thus been distinguished: the
crealion of patron-client bonds through personnel policy, and drawing on pre-existing
bonds. There remains patronage in a strict, irreducible sense - the kind of preferment or
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favouritism in which we suspect that obligations or reliance den ying from past
associations count for more than qualifications of any sort. The chief hallmark of such
appointments is their unexpectedness. Many commentators were surprised at the
appointment of twenty-eight Nurlan Kapparov, former head of the trading conglomerate
Accept, to head the country's only state oil company Kazakhoil in 1997. But it soon
became clear that, however competent he might become, he was the front-man for his
deputy, Askar Kulibaev, one of Nazarbaev's son-in-laws. The President's other son-in-
law, Rakhat Aliev, was more visible, having been appointed Tax Police Chief in 1996.
As already noted, the tendency has been for Nazarbaev to allow his family - in the
extended sense, with Esimov, for example, a distant cousin - to play an active role in
political life. The reversion to patronage in this strict, irreducible sense implies that
Nazarbaev is narrowing his power base and distancing himself from wider, but
potentially less reliable networks.
What of the role and scope of patronage? First, virtually no-one in the
Kazakhstani political elite enters the leadership as an unknown quantity. 36 We can say
that in the case of at least 90 percent of leadership co-optations, that particular person
would not have been chosen but for the factors of personal knowledge or personal
bonds. In this sense, the hackneyed label applied to Soviet cadre of a "self-perpetuating
oligarchy" remains apt in the post-Soviet period.
Why have patron-client relations dominated over clan or ethnic background? If
an aspirant for a top job is ethnic Kazakh but not as evidently loyal as an ethnic
Russian, then Nazarbaev would opt for the ethnic Russian. These networks matter
because they became deeply entrenched in the Soviet era. Martha Brill Olcott notes in
The Kazakhs that a dual power system emerged whereby the Slavic community
dominated those areas of the economy and administration which were directly
responsible to Moscow - for example, oblast level government and industrial production
- while Kazakhs held sway over the livestock breeding economy and raion level party
and state agencies. 37
 In turn, Kazakhs generally made their career within the Socialist
Republic of Kazakhstan, whereas Slays were able to profit from positions Union-wide
institutions. This system had the effect of reinforcing local political links in Ka.zakhstan
while at the same time creating widespread, broadly Kazakh patronage networks and
thus provided the means for a smooth transfer of power.
Moroever, as will be shown in ffl.2, private and public interests have remained
blurred in the context of what is a very weak, post-Soviet state. A different kind of
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patronage arises when a modern or semi-modern state operates in an idiom as yet
unintelligible to a large part of the population who then need brokers to obtain benefits
or to avoid persecution. The weakness of the state, allowing for the emergence of
patrons, may have different forms. It has been said, for instance, that whereas the
Lebanese state is an association of patrons, the Tunisian state is a machine for the
making and unmaking of patrons. 38
 Kazakhstan appears to display a kind of spectrum,
ranging from a state which is an association for the protection of a pre-existing patron
class (the ex-communists), via a state which plays off patrons against each other, to a
state which creates and destroys them through temporary allocation of political
positions. Political benefits are almost incalculable, incommensurate and long-term,
which makes them peculiarly susceptible to patronage.
Regional Recruitment of Akims (Heads of Administration): criteria
Which of these recruitment criteria most apply to regional heads of administration?
Since Nazarbaev has appointed regional heads, he has effectively continued to act as
their patron. The one important exception has been in the re-appointment of Levitin (see
table below) in the oil-producing region of Mangistau. This seemed to be a case where
Nazarbaev was unable to keep his choice - and had to bow to the individual whose
networks had become so entrenched and without whom activity could simply not be
enforced in the region.
Table 3: Regional Recruitment of Akims
_____________	 1992-19945	 I	 1995-1997	 1997-1998
AkmoIa	 Bratui (Feb92 97)	 Kulagm, Sergei (Od 97)
Akmola city	 Not regional status until June 1998	 Dzhaksybekov, Adilbd
Aqtobe	 Kulmakbanov, Shalbai
(Feb92 Nov 93);	 Musin, Asian (Sep 95-98)
Pathin, Savelii
(Nov93 -Sep95);
Alymu	 Tugel'baev, Sagat
(Feb92 - 01 94)
	 Oierdabaev, Ravil' (O 94 98)
Imangali Tasmagambetov (Feb 99)
Almaty city	 Nurkadilov, Zamanbei, (Feb92
	 Kuhnakhanov, Shalbal
	 Khrapunov, Viltoc
July94)	 (Ju1y1994-June1998)	 (June1998-)
Almaty (region)	 Esimov, AkhmdAani	 Uzbekov, Umarzak
	 Nurkadilov, Zamanbek
(Feb92 O.i 94)	 (Od 94 Mar 96)	 (Od 97-)
Umbdov, Serik
(Mar96 Dec97)
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______________	 1992-19945	 1995-1997	 1997-1998
Jezkazgn	 Yurthako, (ingoni	 Nagjnanov, Ka2hmurat (Aug94
	 Abolished
(Feb92 Aug 94)	 Apr11 96)
Smailov, Erlan
(April96 May97)
Qaraganda	 Nefedov, Pr (Feb92 )
	
Esmbaev, Majit (Od 97)
Qoqthdau	 Kaiibjanov, Thanibek
	 Abolished
(Feb92 Jan 93);
Iskaliev. Nathamedun
(Jan93 Dec93)
Thumabaev, Kyzyr (Dec93 Jun 96)
Thangalov (Jun 96 May97)
Koanaa	 Ukin, Kenihebd(	 Kadambaev, Tokiflarbay	 Sbukeev, Umirza k
(Feb92 Nov 93)	 (Sep95 June 1998)	 (June 1998)
Baltash Tursumbaev
(Nov93 -Sep95)
Qzylorda	 Shaukhamanov, Seilbek
	 Saparbaev, Berdib (Sep 95 1998)
(Feb92 Sep95)
Mangiau	 Novikov, Fedov
	 Levitin, Vyatheslav (299 95 97)
(Feb92 Nov93); Liazzat Kiinov
	 Racy, Nikolai (15 12/97 Jun98);
(Nov93 Sep 95)	 Levitin, Vyadieslav (June 1998)
Liazzat Kimov (Feb 99)
Nothn	 Gariman, Vladimir (Feb92 May 97) 	 Akhmdov, Danial
Kazakhslan	 (May 97-)
Pavlodar	 Zbabagin, Asygat (Feb92 Jan 93)	 Dthaklhanov, Galymzhan
Akhmdov, Danial (Jan 93 May97)
Semei	 auniov, Vyadieslav	 Delakthanov, Galymthan
	 Abolished
(Feb92.June94)	 (Jun94 0d95)
Southan	 Urkumbaev, Mars
	 Abdullaev, Kalyk
Kazakhstan	 (Feb92 - Dcc 93) 	 (Dec97 98)
(Shymkat)	 Tunsbdov, Zautbek
(Dec93 Dec97)
Turgai	 Kulagin, Sgá	 Brynkin, Vttalii	 Abolished
(Feb92-Jun93)	 (0d95-Sep97)
Kosabaev, Zhakan
(Jun93 0d95)
Ea Kazakhstan	 Bektemisov, Aniangeldy
	 Yurii Lavrinko	 Mdte, Vitalii
(Feb92 Jun 94)	 (Jun94 (Xi 95)	 (May 97-)
Nag,nanov, Kathmurat
(Apr96 May97)
Weatsan	 lskahev (Feb - Od 92)
	 Dthakupov, Kabibulla (Od 92 - 1998)*
Kazakhstan
Although it is too early to speak of phases in recruitment, it does appear that Nazarbaev
applied three criteria between 1991 and 1998, but all of which were subsumed to the
key one of loyalty. In the early phase, the selectorate appeared to prefer continuity,
selecting leaders from the regions. In 7 out of 20 cases, therefore, the Obkom First
Secretaries became akims. 39
 The preference was for "home-grown" elites. During
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Kazhegeldin's government there was a half-hearted attempt to introduce performance-
related criteria to the longevity of the akim. Technocrats or former businessmen were
sometimes selected. Prime examples were Semei's Galymzhan Zhakiyanov, East
Kazakhstan's Leonid Desyatnik, Aqtobe's Saveliy Pachin and Jezkazgan's Nagmanov.
Pachin and Desyatnik, both Russian Jews, were sacked and departed for Moscow. 4° It is
noticeable that all these younger technocrats and businessmen have been appointed to
the East or West. None survived for more than a year.
In the third phase since 1997, Nazarbaev appeared to have parachuted members
of the national elite into some regions, such as Tasmagambetov, Shukeev, Mette,
Esenbaev, Kalmurzaev. 4 ' Mette, who disappeared from his post as Vice-Premier under
Kazhegeldin in disgrace for corruption, but as the only non-Kazakh left at the end of
1998 (and at that a German and not a Russian), he is again part of this centralisation
drive. 42
 As part of this tightening up of regions to consolidate the elite as part of the
move to Akmola Nazarbaev appears to have felt most comfortable with the older loyals,
Viktor Khrapunov (Almaty), Serik Umbetov (Jambyl), Liazzat Kiinov (Mangistau) and
Abduallaev (Shymkent). 43
 The centre still did not seem to trust the North enough to
make appointments of such new recruits, believing that those with a Soviet career were
more guaranteed to prevent secession from the Northern regions. It is too early to tell
how the regional administrations are reacting to these national recruits or Presidential
clients. With the political elite's fear of disintegration and of its desire to maintain a
unitary state, it is not surprising that loyalty - and hence patronage - have been the
uppermost criteria in appointment. Loyalty may explain why in 1995 the only two
original akims (then named heads of administration) of 1992 who were still in place
were ethnic Germans Andrei Braun and Vladimir Gartman. The following comment of
opposition leader Azamat Petr Svoik, himself an ethnic Russian, is not surprising:
There is no defined border between Russians and Kazakhs in the oblast
administrations. Of course many Russians have left positions but some have got
good positions. In North Kazakhstan oblast for example, the akim is German.
Most akims are loyal to the government which illustrates that the ideology of
nationalism is secondary to the ideology of power.
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Channels of recruitment
Given these examples, what are the most effective channels for a young Kazakhstani
eager to aspire to top office? Key channels remain these informal networks or social
institutions; political institutions do not yet have "personalities", no collective ethos or
standard operating procedures with which to socialise recruits. Nevertheless, institutions
do play their role: to be effectively obstructionist or even just visible, individuals must
be allied to certain institutions. The following table indicates career patterns of recruits
after 1991.
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As in other countries, there have been various channels into the elite: educational
institutes, political parties, local governments, lateral entry from business, and the
bureaucracy. Each are discussed in turn, but the overwhelming impression from the
table is that a position amongst the existing executive branch is the safest guarantee of
cooption and promotion.
What about educational institutions as a channel of recruitment? Two principal
national educational institutions have been established since 1992 with the intention of
training the "new" elite. These were the Kazakhstan Institute of Management,
Economics and Strategic Research (KIMEP) and Kazakhstan's Supreme School of
Public Administration (NSSPA), modelled on France's Ecole Nationale
d'Administration (ENA).
KIMEP was established in 1992 at the initiative of President Nazarbaev and
with the invaluable assistance of California-born South Korean advisor, Dr K. Bang.
Three main departments offer MBA, MA (economics) and MPA programmes, which
draw on European and US models. KIMEP's faculty originate from a number of
different countries, including Denmark, France, South Korea, the United Kingdom and
the US. Many of the original teaching faculty wereUS Baptists, who were prepared to
work for moderate salaries. The Institute continues to be sponsored by the Technical
Assistance for CIS countries (TACIS) of the European Union, the British Know How
Fund, USATD, multilateral donors and the Soros Foundation. In co-operation with
KIMEP, George Soros founded the International Institute for Market Economics to
provide training for public servants and entrepreneurs dealing with privatisation in the
country.
The history ofNSSPA is less remarkable. Established in 1994 by an agreement
with France, the school was specifically designed to train Kazakhstan's top officials.
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Says Danenov, a passionate Francophile, then Deputy Foreign Minister and tireless
promoter of the school:
We would like to see NSSPA develop into the ancient Oxbridge colleges of
England, the elite grandes écoles of France, the Law School of Tokyo
University, Makerere University College in East Africa, Tunisia's Sadiki
College, the National University of Mexico City, or the Political Science Faculty
of Ankara University in Turkey. All these have traditionally furnished a very
disproportionate share of the recruits to their respective national elites.45
But there are few signs that a similar merging of educational and political recruitment
systems will occur here. The School has lacked the funding and external support
enjoyed by KIMIEP. Already the awarding of its scholarships were marred by
corruption. More fundamentally, there is also a sense that these are not the institutions
of the future. The majority of today's political elite have sent their children abroad,
mainly to Turkey and a growing number to Western Europe and some to the US. This
elite will become increasingly Western-orientated and Europeanised, which we explore
in 11.3. And for the moment, a Moscow-based education provides the nearest equivalent
to these elite schools.
What has been the specific role of parties in recruitment? In the Communist era,
the CPSU was the best springboard to national leadership. More than 80 percent of the
members of the Soviet Politburo had served previously as party functionaries. 47
 In some
parliamentary democracies, such as Austria, Italy and India, the party organisation itself
is an important source of elite recruits, while in others, most notably Britain, the party's
parliamentary delegation supplies virtually all national political leaders. Parties in the
Third World are frequently evanescent, but many political leaders in Asia, Africa, and
Latin America have achieved power by virtue of their role in party activities or
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nationalist movements. None of these functions apply to Kazakhstan; parties have
instead played a more subtle role in sifting out elites.
Parties did not play a defining role in the election of candidates to the thirteenth
Parliament. First, 42 candidates, amounting to 24 percent of their total number, were
elected from a presidential list (or gosspicok). Surveys prior to the election indicated
that the population voted for individuals rather than parties. And third, the candidates
themselves seemed confi.ised about their party affiliation. Although far from complete,
biographical data published by Kazakhslanskaya Pravda indicated how candidates
appeared to have affiliation with more than one major political movement. Whilst the
first column of the data indicated candidates who listed a party affiliation and the
second listed deputies whom the parties/organisations themselves identify as members -
the two often differed.
On the other hand, in cases where individuals have been able to use the
institution of a party to fi.urther their oppositional stance they have often been considered
a threat and thus co-opted. Aldamjarov and Abdrakhmanov were classic examples.
Murat Auezov who, as we saw in 11.1, has been somewhat protected by his father's
illustrious background, declared his candidacy for Presidency in November 1997. By
February 1998 he had accepted a job in regional government. One of his co-chairman of
Azamat, Petr Svoik, admitted privately that his co-optation did not signify the end of his
struggle with the government. Indeed, Svoik proceeded to argue, his appointment in
Almaty's regional administration under Zamanbek Nurkadilov, the fiery and dominant
player in Southern politics whom Nazarbaev reluctantly re-admitted into the elite,
assures that the two will provide a fifth column, a halt on power centralisation. 5° It is
much rarer for the elite to transfer into the counter-elite, although there are notable
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examples: Svoik, Abiilsitov, Kazhegeldin and Tursumbaev, all of whom were
discharged from office.
The most important way, however, in which parties have controlled the
recruitment process has been through the President's own parties - SNEK, the
Democratic and the most recent in the run-up to the 1999 presidential elections, the
Liberal Party. The latter was chaired by Nazarbaev's press secretary, Asylbek
Bisenbiev. Nominations and affiliations of members of parliament were predominantly
tied to these parties. They have sifted elites and have served to marginalise other
"parties" and movements on the political spectrum. Moreover, alternative parties have
been very poor at garnering numerous supporters. Kazakh nationalist organisations such
as Alash, Azat, and Jeltoqsan all complained that their power base of popular support
has greatly diminished in the course of the decade and that most of them have struggled
to get anyone to attend their meetings or support their policies.5'
A third channel of recruitment to the national elite has been regional service in
the Communist period. In the post-communist period, individuals who served in obkoms
were: Esimov, Mamashev, Uzbekov, Shtoik, kAldamzharov, Pavlov, Asygat
Zhabagin52 and Medvedev. 53 The two key examples were the two first Prime Ministers,
Tereshchenko and Kazhegeldin. 54 Nurkadilov, as mayor of Almaty city, also became a
prominent member of the elite. Khrapunov, who served as first deputy to Nurkadilov
and his successor Kulmakhanov, temporarily became Minister of Coal and Energy
before returning to become their successor as Almaty town akim in 1997. Regional
"Red" directors have also enjoyed a meteoric rise in the post-communist elite. They
were Soskovets (1991-99 head of Karmetkombinat); Salamatin (1989-92 head of
Karagandaugol)..
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Subsequently, regional leaders who have become prominent in the post-
independence period have also become prominent in the national elite. Urkumbaev was
first regional head of Chimkent and became Minister of Economics. Shukeev, another
Minister of Economics, served under Urkumbaev's successor in Chimkent, Turisbekov.
Frequent lateral transfers from jobs in the party apparatus to managerial posts in
the state-run economy and back again, have also become channels of recruitment.
Examples are provided by Ablyazov, Kakimzhanov, Dzhakijanov, Zhabagin,
Tereshchenko and Esenberlin. This tendency has increased notably since Kazhegeldin's
departure in 1997 and has been heavily criticised by the opposition movement Azamat.
But we must keep this in perspective: the most striking case of permeability and
lateral entry is found in the United States. Cabinet and sub-cabinet positions are
typically filled by men and women from industry, commerce, education and the
professions. As one administration succeeds another, many officials return to their
private jobs, only to reappear in Washington when their party regains power. 55 Based on
his study of elective careers in the United States, Joseph A. Schlesinger concludes:
"There is no clearly marked cursus honorum or set of stages of office advancement. Nor
are there any offices, including the very highest, which have not gone to men from
outside the ranks of officeholders or active party workers."56
Still, in Kazakhstan, the safest recruitment channel remains the executive - the
Soviet bureaucracy itself. Those in the Presidential Administration or Government have
tended to stay in those institutions. Other executive institutions can ensure a meteoric
rise. Especially with regard to agencies with interlocked industrial, regional and
crucially foreign interests. The rise of Kalmurzaev as head of the State Property
Committee here is exemplary - at the close of 1998 he had been appointed Head of
Administration.
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Sequential overlap?
One fundamental feature of any elite structure is the extent to which individuals hold
key posts simultaneously in more than one organisation or sector and can thus co-
ordinate diverse activities. This practice was found in the traditional Kazakh steppe
society in which the religious shaman also served on the council of elders, or the bil, the
local judge, was simultaneously the key arbitrator and tribal leader. Roles were very
fluid. The Central Committee of most ruling Communist parties included senior
officials of the state administrative and economic bureaucracies, the military, the
diplomatic corps, and the secret police, as well as the top members of the party
apparatus itself. Two points on simultaneity can be made about the post-independent
period. Between executive institutions there is a lack of the sort of overlap noted in the
Communist period between, for example, military and civilian posts (there was no
national liberation and no cash for it). Second, the President had his appointees in
almost every political institution: principally in parliament, government and the
judiciary. This was taken to its extreme in the case of the thirteenth parliament, where
the state list consisted of 42 nominations by the President himself. The gosspicok can be
viewed as a means of interlocking institutions, of creating institutional homogeneity.
Simultaneous incumbency in local and national elites is embodied in the role of the
Presidential Inspector. This system of dual executives met with mixed success. The
gosspicok dramatically failed to provide the sort of institutional cross-cutting and
consolidation that had been hoped. The regional inspectors seem to have very little, if
any, effect on the implementation of daily policy in the regions, and are increasingly
viewed with suspicion by local authorities. Where there is a high degree of
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simultaneous membership in a variety of elite positions there is always danger of the
concentration of power. 57
 In Kazakhstan, this intrusive power is still the domain of the
political rather than the corporate elite.
Even more important than simultaneous overlap among elite positions is
sequential overlap, that is, the successive holding of top posts in diverse sectors. C.
Wright Mills was particularly impressed by such links among US business, government,
and military elites:
The inner core of the power elite consists, first, of those who interchange
commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in
another. By their very careers and activities, they lace the three types of milieux
together.58
The archetypes in Kazakhstan are harder to find. This tells us that sequential overlap is
rarer and, by virtue of the reduced interaction between institutions, likely to lead to a
less integrated elite. For example, members of the core elite do not appear to have
moved between more than two institutions, and those are often parliament and cabinet
of ministers, or cabinet of ministers and presidential administration. Indeed, the
President in 1994 deliberately prevented this sequential overlap by splitting a hitherto
unified government and Presidential bureaucracy. The lack of sequential overlap is not
surprising: a regime dominated by professional long-serving bureaucrats is likely to
have less overlap, hopping from office to office, or from department to department.
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CONCLUSIONS: IMPLICATIONS OF RECRUITMENT FOR ELITE
CIRCULATION AN]) STABILITY
The only constitutional rules that exist for elite change cover elected offices. These rules
themselves have easily been subject to renegotiation in Kazakhstan, as evinced in the
results of the pact between parliament and president in October 1998 which allowed
Nazarbaev to call early Presidential elections. The president's term of office was
extended from five to seven years and that of parliament, which is due to be re-elected
in December 1999, was lengthened from four to five years. Unlike its predecessor, the
1995 constitution set out clear succession procedures: the first office-holder to succeed
the President is the head of the Senate, followed by the Prime Minister.
There are no codified rules for elite turnover. Even if they did exist, the
persistence of informal networks outlined above suggests that they would in any case be
inoperable. At the national level, a change in elite does not necessarily follow a change
in government. Instead, the key determinant appears to be loyalty to the president. If at
any point an individual appears to be too influential he is removed to a post of
insignificant status. The most frequently used has been the post of ambassador. Key
examples were Baltash Tursumbaev, Olzhas Suleimenov and Kuanysh Sultanov.
Difficult or incompetent individuals have been often conveniently removed through
corruption scandals. Examples were Mars Urkumbaev, Asygybat Zhabagin and
Nazarbaev's first two prime ministers. But, as highlighted earlier, these individuals
often reappeared, and frequently in better posts. What does seem to be the case,
however, is that the frequent reshuffling of the top posts has reduced the ifinctional
identity of the various institutions. The increasing interchange between the corporate
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elite, the higher civil service and the top political offices has concentrated power in a
small number of individuals and, in particular, loyal technocrats. This small elite at the
top appears highly integrated. At lower tiers, however, the degree of institutional
interaction and integration, by virtue of the relatively little transferral from one
institution to another, has made for an institutionally fragmented political elite
Circulation also appears to apply at the regional level of elite formation. It does
appear that elite reshuffling has been less frequent at the regional than national level,
which suggests that the regional political elite has become more entrenched and is more
reliant on existing networks than is the national elite for policy implementation.
At the expense of some oversimplification I have suggested that this circulation
of the political elite is characterised above all by political patronage and that patron-
client models are the most useful There are some counter-tendencies such as the co-
optation of people with alternative power bases, but this only took on real significance
in 1997. The alternative model of recruitment - based on zhuz affiliation - is an
oversimplification, indeed distortion, of reality. That is not to say that kinship is not an
important element in the decision of patronage but rather that it is part of a wider set of
relations rather than an element in its own right. This would support the camp in the
kinship debate which states that kinship has to be expressed in other relationships to be
given content.
Various criteria have thus been applied to the recruitment of the regional elite
between 1991 and 1998. We have mentioned purchase of office as one possible factor,
but one which is difficult to document. The chapter has attempted to demonstrate that in
the initial period of transition regional heads were appointed because they were deemed
effective managers, either because they had worked in that region in the Soviet period
for several years, or because they demonstrated a knowledge of economic reform and
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proved themselves with the economic regeneration of the region. However,
Particularly since 1997, Nazarbaev appears to have parachuted in members of the
national elite; the move to Astana has ensured a further centralisation of political
appointments. However, as already noted, Nazarbaev has found it increasingly difficult
to parachute in his own men in economically rich regions where elites have become
entrenched. Levitin in Mangistau, as we saw, is an example of a regional notable who
has returned despite two attempts by Nazarbaev to remove him. Overall, as with the
recruitment of the national elite, the principle criterion has been loyalty to the President.
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making and unmaking of patrons.
These were Umirbek Baigel'diev (Dzhambul); Seilbek Shaukhamanov (A-A);
Novikov (Mangistau); SaginbekTursunov (Taldy-Kurgan), Nazhameden Iskaliev
(Uraisk —who ony survived four months); Braun (Tselinograd); and, Zamanbek
Nurkadilov (A-A town).
° Pachin is reportedly working in a private company whilst Desyatnik has joined the
CIS Ministry.
41 Tasmagambetov is suitor of Dinara Nazarbaeva, daughter of the President whose
rumoured divorce to Rakhat Aliev continued into 1999.
42 Although born in and having been an industrial executive for most of his working life
in East-Kazakstan born, he has spent all of his independence years in the capital.
Abdullaev is a prominent member of the Southern Kazakh Soviet elite who went on
to chair Gosplan and deputy chair the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers between 1986-
1990. He spent the first five years of independence in the capital of Almaty, as head of
the formidable Atakent exhibition hail (home to the very lucrative annual foreign
investment conferences) and CIS affairs. His predecessor, Turisbekov, whom I
interviewed, was rumoured to have been unpopular.
' Cited by Timothy Edmonds, 'Power and Powerlessness in Kazakhstani Society',
Central Asian Survey (Volume 17, Number 3, September 1998), p. 467.
Author's interview with First Deputy Foreign Minister Nurlan Danenov, 5 June 1996.
Many of the members of the core elite are known to have sent their children to
predominantly Western institutions for their further education.
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More than 80 percent of the members of the Soviet Politburo had served previously as
party functionaries.
8 See Kurt Steiner, Politics in Austria (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).
See Putnam, Political Elites, Chapter 3.
50 Conversation with Pyotr Svoik, 3 July 1998.
51 Edmonds, 'Power and Powerlessness", p. 467.
52 Zhabagin is also from Pavlodar and, like Pavlov, also someone who served in
Pavlodar obkom in the 1990s. Pavlov had been a secretary of Northern-Kazakhstan
(1988-92) and became First Deputy Prime Minister in Tereshchenko's government.
Obkom First Secretary of Northern Kazakhstan (1989-91) became Minister of
Ecology between 1992-1995.
Sergei Tereshchenko was Obkom First Secretary of Chimkent and became
Kazakhstan's first Prime Minister. His second secretary, Rashid Ibraev, became an
outspoken member of the thirteenth parliament and was sent in disgrace to the post of
Ambassador to India. Akezhan Kazhegeldin was one of the Secretaries of Semipalatinsk
obkom.
" One study found that two-fifths of the American business elite have served in high
government jobs at one time or another, and five out of every six government based
their careers primarily in the private sector. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power,
(New York: Wiley, 1960).
56 Joseph A. Schlesinger, 'Political Party Organisatio", in James G. Marsh (ed.),
Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally,1965), p. 781.
57 John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971). Porter
notes how the corporate elite in Canada, as no doubt in other western societies, can
extend its power more than other elite groups can. Bishops or university presidents in
the board rooms of large corporations are exceedingly rare, but corporation directors on
the boards of universities or publishing chains, or as members of synods or councils of
churches are quite frequent.
58 Mills, The Power, pp. 288-289
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SECTION III
In a post-independence environment, it is often assumed that the meaning of leadership
has changed. Rule can no longer be reduced simply to occupying political office. Elites
who lack authority in society, who cannot enforce their decisions, or who find
themselves the targets of mass protests can hardly be considered "ruling elites" in the
traditional sense in which the words were used in the Soviet period (See Introduction
and 1.1). Nevertheless, the distinction between pre- and post-1991 has been blurred by
the authoritarian regime that has governed Kazakhstan since 1991, wherein elite
transformation and elite succession remain the domain of the elite, not the masses.
Accountability of the rulers to the ruled is still limited. However, Section I also outlined
the ways in which Kazakhstan's authoritarianism is circumscribed by a number of
social and national cleavages, a relatively free media (up to 1997) and the periodic
presence of open contenders for the post of Presidency. These three factors, as already
illustrated, have encouraged Nazarbaev to be extremely sensitive to elite and mass
support. In this light, there are three reasons for analysing the policies of the elite:
(1) Output cannot be guessed. Even if there is a relationship between identity and
output, it is not always definitive and it is almost impossible to separate the
influence of identity on output from other factors;
(2) Output must be explained. Given the existence of an array of distinctions among
peoples in a multinational society and the potential for conflicts among them, this
analysis will assess which factors are critical in determining those distinctions
which may be used to build political identities;
(3) Output must be assessed. Did policies originate from or are they leading to intra-
elite conflict? Were they obstructed or supported by society at large? Overall, are
the policies likely to enhance elite legitimacy and elite-society linkages?
This section applies these questions to two policy areas prioritised by the elite in 199 1-
1998: nation- and state-building and economic reform.
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CHAPTER 111.1
CONSTRUCTING A POLITICAL IDENTITY:
NATION- AND STATE-BUWD1NG
In an elite's desire to create at least a veneer of legitimacy, ethnicity and elite identity
become increasingly important. Elite legitimacy depends on a number of factors,
including successful modernisation, economic management and ideologies of, for
example, freedom or socialism. However, it is to a great extent on the basis of ethnicity
that new elites have undertaken to build their followings, consolidate state power and
establish a legitimacy for their rule. This chapter seeks to analyse, in Paul Brass' terms,
"the process by which elites and counter-elites within ethnic groups select aspects of the
group's culture, attach new values and meaning to them, and use them as symbols, to
mobilise the group, to defend its interest, and to compete with other groups." In short,
has Kazakhstan's elite used ethnic mobilisation to improve its economic and political
place in society?
ASSUMPTIONS AND WORKING DEFiNITIONS
Over recent years academic discussion on identity politics has flourished. People live
with multiple identities and these do not necessarily have a clear or permanent hierarchy
in relation to each other, and are often mutually contradictory. Ethnicity, however,
remains a very enigmatic concept. Although it appears to be an expression of individual
identity, it is available to be used and misused by political elites for their own purposes.
In certain circumstances, it can serve to consolidate state power. Such a form of politics
is usually thought of as arising from historical change. People once had a defined and
recognisable location in all-encompassing and rigid social structures and the family.
The "problem" of their location in these structures therefore did not arise in any
fundamental way. But these "traditional" social structures have now begun to
"detraditionalise" or collapse, as the consequence of a number of changes including new
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social movements.2 To cite Pile and Thrift, "it has become a normal part of life to
question identities, to construct them reflexively rather than simply recognise them.
Consequently, social conflicts are no longer seen as just the epic clash of antagonistic
social blocs but as a distributed deconstruction and reconstruction of social identities".3
As a framework for discussion, the chapter draws upon the expansive literature
on nations and nationalism. Anthony Smith's definition is one of the most all-
encompassing and will be used: "a named human population sharing an historic
territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common
economy and common legal rights and duties for all members". 4 Smith's notion that the
ethnie is a precursor to the modern nation will also become relevant, as will Clifford
Geertz's distinction between the civic, cross-national state identity and that of an
organic, ethnic identity. 5 The notion of instrumentalism, clearly illustrated by Ernest
Geilner, will also be applied. 6 Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind, as Ronald
Grigor Suny writes in The Making of the Georgian Nation, that if "there is any
conclusion to be derived from such a study of the longue dziree of a small nation, it
might be that a nation is never filly 'made'." 7 Indeed, some national identities can
weaken over time.
THE RHETORIC OF NATION-BUILDING
Unlike many elites in other successor states, Kazakhstan's political elite enjoyed the
luxury of a choice upon independence. This choice was shaped by two realities. First,
the absence of a "liberation movement" and of any strong nationalist movement (see
Section One) meant that the elite was not forced to adopt exclusive, nationalist policies
(or indeed any other policies, such as socialism). Second, as a multiethnic and
multiconfessional state, albeit where the governing elite is largely Kazakh, Kazakhstan
could opt for either a civic and cross-national political identity or an ethnic Kazakh,
organic one - even if, as we shall see, their choice is constrained by geopolitical fears
and realities.
The leadership from 1992 onward chose in its rhetoric to promote a civic, rather
than ethnic identity. From the start of 1992, the President stressed that the multicultural
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and multiconfessional nature of Kazakhstan had determined the inescapable path of
civic responsibility and a cross-national state identity. 8
 Already in 1992 placards and
billboards promoting interethnic harmony were posted by the government in even the
remotest rural area. One example of a placard encouraging a civic identity can be found
on the nigh-deserted dusty road from Shymkent to Saratai: 'Kazakhs and Russians unite
in your new state of Kazakhstan!"9
President Nazarbaev and his closest advisors assigned various individuals and
departments to roles in the creation of this political identity. At the apex of policy
implementation, as with all spheres of policy, is the President. A governmental
committee, independent of any Ministry, is charged with the administration of
nationalities' policy. In reality, its powers are weak. Instead, national policy and the
formulation of a political identity is conceived in the Presidential think-tank, the Centre
for Information and Analysis. As we saw in Section II, its most influential figure is
Marat Tazhin, a professor of sociology in his early thirties. As the manager of the team
of Presidential ghost-writers, Tazhin recruited some of the brightest individuals in the
country in the fields of political science, history, economics and sociology, most of
whose ages were between twenty-five and forty. In many ways, the Centre is a
microcosm of how the elite sets out to build its nation's civic consciousness - from
above, controlled, and accompanied by many placards and much propaganda. Over the
past five years, this think-tank has concentrated on policy implications as diverse as
those concerning the Cossacks, territorial integrity in the face of perceived
secessionism, ethnocratisation of the regions, religion and the impact of ethnicity and
"clans" on political recruitment.'° In turn, in every regional administration, the
Department of Internal Politics - the regional branch of the Ministry of Interior -
employs officials in "Nationality Affairs". In all three regions surveyed, the Department
of Internal Politics ranked amongst the top three departments in terms of status and
importance. Unlike Tazhin's think-tank, these latter institutions are mere executives.
THE POLICIES
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This emphasis on political rather than cultural identity - as problematic as most
dichotomies - or, put differently, the typical republican, civic, French tradition over the
ethnic, organic German one, was partly translated into policy initiatives in the first years
of independence. What we shall be observing is the constant pull between these two
conceptions of identity, as the fortunes of various societal and governmental interests
and groups wax and wane, with the French conception eventually giving ground to the
German. The three major policy areas of nation-building considered here are: religion,
language and citizenship.
Religion
Multiconfessional Kazakhstan, reminiscent of the religious tolerance practised under the
Mongol Empire, was declared secular upon independence." President Nazarbaev also
told a Russian newspaper in 1995 that "Islam and Christianity are the two flanks of
Kazakhstan's spiritual legacy.' 2 The model often invoked was modern Turkey (despite,
of course, the absence of a large number of Christians in Turkey).' 3 Of the political elite
interviewed, 70 percent confirmed that Kazakhstan initially sought emulation of
Turkey, and over 80 percent claimed that by 1994 Kazakhstan no longer sought models
of development, but had sought its own path. 95 percent confirmed that this path
remained secular.
The elite has not permitted the registration of what they consider extreme
religious groups, such as Alas/i (See Section I). Nevertheless, they have indicated
relative freedom in registering foreign religious organisations, such as the American
Baptist Group. The religious elite, represented since 1991 by mufti Ratbek Nysanbay-
uli and Orthodox Russian Archbishop Aleksei were, as seen in Section I, answerable to
the Presidential administration, as the elite of both principal religious groups are
appointed by the President. Mufti Ratbek has on several occasions been attacked by
Muslim believers for being too "soft".' 4 Neither has been known to openly contradict
the President.'5
Language
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By contrast, the underlying dynamics of language, ethnicity and power were marked by
considerable bargaining and negotiation.lb Already in 1989, under strong pressure from
a small but then relatively vocal nationalist movement, Nazarbaev in his previous
capacity of Regional First Secretary of the CPSU insisted on passing a language law
which, for the first time in the territory's history, established Kazakh as the state
language to replace the Russian language. This was a prime example of the elite using
the symbols of Kazakh nationhood to secure itself in power. It was also an underlying
sign of nationalist pressure at that time even on the Central Asian leaders, of their need
for alternative legitimacy and perhaps too of their nervousness. Upon independence, no
new language law was introduced, and the Kazakh language retained its status as state
language in both the 1993 and 1995 Constitutions. Soon, the President was again able to
manipulate the language issue. In what was seen by the elite as a major concession
primarily to the Russian-speaking minorities, Russian was elevated from its 1993
designation as a "language of interethnic communication" to that of "official language"
in the 1995 Constitution. This possibly reflected varying levels of confidence and
different perceptions of threat. Only in 1996 did the draft of a revised language law
appear, of which elaboration follows below.
Citizenship
The elite's third, and most important, element of constructing a civic identity was its
introduction of an inclusive citizenship law in 1993.' In contrast to the citizenship laws
promulgated in two former Soviet Republics which also house a large Russian
community - Estorna and Latvia - Kazakhstan's 1993 citizenship law (including the
minor changes introduced in 1995), did not include naturalisation laws, stiff language
requirements, or stringent descent stipulations. Kazakhstani citizenship derives from
residency, not descent. Like Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan adopted the policy of zero-
option, where residents of the Kazakh SSR were automatically entitled to Kazakhstani
citizenship but had to rescind any other. A deadline on citizenship adoption was also
imposed. Even if the process ultimately proved more protracted than had been hoped,
with the deadline postponed thrice, approximately only 20,000 Russians opted for
Russian citizenship.' 8 As a symbolic gesture to its Russian minority abroad, the Russian
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government, represented by the Chairman of the Commission on Citizenship. Abdulat
Mikitayev, embarked on a mission to "persuade Kazakhstan to conclude an agreement
on dual citizenship." 9 Kazakhstan's elite, however, was united in its decision to permit
only single citizenship20, believing, understandably, that dual citizenship would breed
split loyalties, something a young nation could not afford 21 Dual citizenship would also
provide endless possibilities for Russian intervention in Kazakhstan's internal affairs
And to any criticisms made by minority communities of ethnocratic policies, the elite
points to the Peoples' Assembly of Kazakhstan, a body established in 1994 to hear out
the demands and defend the rights of minorities 22 Moreover, both the 1993 and the
1995 Constitutions banned parties based on ethnic lines. 23 This enabled the Kazakhstani
government to refuse registration of, for example, the Cossacks' movement.
The relatively liberal citizenship law probably reflects a part of the Kazakh
mentality that considers itself genuinely tolerant. Nations often feel the duty to fulfil at
least partially their self-ascribed myths. Many of the elite interviewed referred to the
Kazakh tradition of hospitality in their self-definition, nurtured on a territory that has for
centuries served as a crossing point and a melting-pot of a myriad of ethnies. The
Minister of Culture, when interviewed, illustrated his nation's generosity by pointing to
the historically proven fact that it was only when travelling over that part of the Silk
Road coterminous to contemporary Kazakhstan that merchants did not deem it
necessary to carry extra foodstuffs, in the knowledge of the kindness of the Kazakhs.24
(He did not mention that merchants travelled very well-armed.)
THE UNWRITTEN AGENDA
Upon closer examination, however, the policies conceal a long-term agenda of Kazakh
ethnic regeneration. Multi-confessionalism, far from being a concession to the hundred
or so minorities of Kazakhstan., expresses the religious world of the Kazakh tribes,
outlined in LI, which was informed by two sets of beliefs. a sub-stratum of animism
onto which was gradually grafted a veneer of Islam. The former had its roots in ancient
Turkic and Mongolian tradition. The rhythm of nomad life, with its constant movement
over long distances and lack of a permanent base, was not conducive to a spread of the
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orthodox, mosque-centred faith of the sedentary people. Few members of the elite,
outside the older generation of Kazakhs, can recite passages from the Koran or say the
Islamic prayers (baia) correctly. The first Kazakh translation of the Koran did not
appear until 1993, around the same time as the Uzbek and Turkmen translations. Put
another way, if Kazakhstan had been a mono-national state, it is almost certain that it
would have been secular.25
However, it is noteworthy that Kazakhstan's government increasingly has
identified itself publicly and officially with Sunni Islam. It was with unqualified support
from senior Kazakhstani officials, confirmed also by my findings, that a separate
muftiat was established in 1990 in then Alma-Ata, still within the framework of the
Soviet Islamic hierarchy, but no longer under the jurisdiction of the Tashkent-based
Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Central Asia. 26 Even if this move might be interpreted
as a show of independence more than anything else, up to then no Kazakh had ever
served as head of the Central Asian muftiat, in which Uzbeks far outnumbered Kazakhs.
As such, the muftiat's establishment can be considered the first step towards an official
acknowledgement of the Islamic element in the national heritage. The political elite has
accepted generous foreign donations, notably from Saudi Arabia, for the financing of
mosques.27 Only sixty-three mosques existed on Kazakhstan's vast territory before 1990
- now there are more than four thousand. Almaty's only Soviet-era mosque, deserted
for decades, completed its face-lift with Saudi Arabian money, in 1996.28 In the last five
years, eight more mosques have opened in Almaty, even though the city's population is
still mostly Slavic. Foreign donors have also ensured the wide distribution of Kazakh-
language Korans.
The elite interviewed confirmed religion's increasing place amongst the pomp
and circumstance of public ceremonies. Public displays of prayers and chanting have
become chic among Kazakhstan's political elite. Public gatherings are invariably now
begun with a small prayer, as recently occurred on 16 December, 1997 when President
Nazarbaev opened a ceremony in commemoration of those who were killed in the
Almaty riots of 1986 30 Religious holidays were made public holidays; the Muslim
festival of kzirbanbairam as well as the springtime celebration of nawruz -
commemorated by few Kazakhs during the Soviet era - are leading examples. In short,
the government of Kazakhstan is careflully using Islam to foster among its citizens an
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identification with state-sponsored religious institutions.
On the second question of language, even if the Russian language was elevated
to so-called "official" status in 1995, not one member of the elite interviewed could
provide a definition for "official". The government openly sponsored Qazaq Il/i, a
movement, as its name suggests, pursuing the specific aim of promoting the Kazakh
language. This was not a pragmatic choice. Only a reported 40 percent of Kazakhs
know Kazakh3 ' - and that often badly - and there is an acute shortage of Kazakh-
language textbooks and teachers. Consequently, opinion polls indicate that Russians
fear being stranded on linguistic islands as the state begins to open Kazakh-Ianguage
schools.32 The President outlined his plans. "All schools in Kazakhstan should teach
Kazakh properly and there should be a state Kazakh language examination to obtain the
secondary education certificate. At higher educational establishments, Kazakh must be a
compulsory graduation examination."33
 In other words, a non-Kazakh science student,
for example, would have to know advanced Kazakh to graduate from university.
Moreover, all parliamentary proceedings are now bilingual. Already in 1993, a
law required documents to be drawn up in both languages in all government bodies.
Nevertheless, the common language of communication remains Russian. As witnessed
at larger meetings, in confidential matters in the company of other nationalities, the elite
tends to revert into (albeit broken) Kazakh, which automatically excludes non-
Kazakhs. 34
 As we found in Section II, the elite's mastery of Kazakh is poor, but the
state has nonetheless insisted upon financing Kazakh language lessons after work at
government institutions, businesses and universities. These same provisions were not
granted by the elite to other languages. Linguistic disagreements also arose over the
introduction on 15 November 1993 of the republic's sovereign currency, the lenge. The
government's tardiness in rectifying a policy error was revealed in an interview on 15
April 1996 with the doyen of Kazakhstan's independent macroeconomic reform, Daulet
Sembaev. He stated that it was only after considerable deliberation that the second batch
of notes of the new lenge were issued in both languages, those prior to 1995 were
written only in Kazakh; and both versions featured Kazakh folk-heroes.
The notion of a language law based on civic identity was most seriously
questioned, however, by the revised language law draft which was introduced in 1996.
Significantly, unlike the 1989 language law which originated in parliament, the
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brainchild of the 1996 draft was the government. Passed in 1997, the revised Language
Law requires Kazakh to be spoken fluently by Kazakhs by the end of 2000 and by non-
Kazakhs by the close of 2005. The 1995 Constitution had already stipulated that major
political offices in Kazakhstan require a knowledge of fluent Kazakh. Sergei
Tereshchenko, who, as we saw, was the only ethnic Russian in political office to have
commanded fluent Kazakh had a Kazakh mother. Even if the President would appear
genuinely against the introduction of an exclusionary language policy, he often employs
a quite different content and manner when addressing an audience in Kazakh. On one
notorious occasion, he was quoted as saying "Wait, my Kazakhs, your time will
come! 3b
 Given these stringent new language requirements, it is unlikely to be long
before other demands will be introduced for citizenship, thereby making it exclusive
rather than inclusive.
In short, these three policy areas are creating, in George Schoepflin's words, an
"exclusive moral community". 37 Two further initiatives, which are unique to
Ka.zakhstan amongst the successor states, buttress such indigenisation, and require brief
elaboration: the move of the capital to Akmola (renamed Astana in May 1998), and the
official sponsorship of the return of the Kazakh diaspora.
The first is the presidential decision of 1994, officially confirmed in 1995, to
relocate the capital Almaty 1,500 km north to now Astana (former Soviet Tselinograd
and Kazakh Akmola). Officially, the move is explained by the need to move away from
Almaty's geography of seismic faultlines and limited expansion possibilities. Privately,
most agree that Nazarbaev made a geopolitical decision. Movement to the centre
distanced ethnic Kazakhs from their traditional enemy, China In theory, a central
location would enable the government to exert a tighter grip on the northern regions,
dominated by ethnic Russians and, according to the government, open to possible
secessionism and eventual union with Russia. Of the elite interviewed unofficially, 60
percent were against the move (primarily for reasons of finance and personal comfort
rather than geopolitics). The only elite member who disagreed publicly with the
President over the move was Zamanbek Nurkadilov, former mayor of Almaty and, as of
1997, akim of Almaty region.38
Second, as recently as 1997, Kazakhstan's government reaffirmed its
commitment to repatriating ethnic Kazakhs even though many returnees have found it
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hard to adjust to their new Circumstances. 39 Since Kazakhstan became independent in
1991, its government actively sponsored the return of ethnic Kazakhs from other parts
of the former Soviet Union, China, Mongolia, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In
September 1992, the government convened a worldwide Qazaq kurullay - the name
given to the medieval meetings on the steppe - inviting representatives of the Kazakh
diaspora from all over the world to Almaty. Many Kazakhs fled their native land in the
1 920s and 1 930s to these countries to escape agricultural collectivisation and other
policies imposed by the Soviet government. This exodus, coupled with high Slav
immigration throughout the Soviet period, meant that Kazakhstan found itself at the
1989 census the only one of the fifteen union republics in which the titular nationality
was outnumbered collectively by other ethnic groups. The government has therefore
been keen to encourage as many ethnic Kazakhs to return as would. According to
official estimates, since 1991 over 160,000 Kazakhs have returned, mainly from
Mongolia.
The policy, however, has not been without serious problems. Many of the
newly-arrived, having retained the Kazakh language, are sometimes regarded with
suspicion by those who now predominantly speak Russian. Meanwhile, non-Kazakhs
have complained about a policy that they perceive as favouring the indigenous
nationality. Even if the 1995 constitution did strip the Kazakh diaspora of its privileged
entitlement to dual citizenship when living abroad, its members can still become
automatic citizens of the Republic upon return without any residency requirement 40
Uighurs, for example, many of whom also fled in the Soviet period, are not
automatically entitled to return to Kazakhstan. In practice, too, the government's policy
has put considerable strain on the state budget. Returnees complain about not receiving
allowances from cash-strapped regional authorities. They say that, while they have been
offered land, frequently there is no housing to go with it. Jobs are scarce because the
inability to speak Russian and limited practical experience restrict those returning to
agricultural labour. Many have still not managed to gain Ka.zakhstani citizenship. Those
coming from Mongolia with livestock in tow have faced considerable difficulties in
transit.4'
The government is proud of the fact that, by 1996, ethnic Kazakhs comprised 51
percent of the population. The policy of encouraging repatriation is only partly
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responsible for this new ethnic balance, however. The main reason is the substantial and
continuing emigration by Russians, Ukrainians and Germans. As a result, Kazakhstan
has seen a net drop in its population -- from about 17 million in the early 1990s to just
under 16 million today.42
So far, then, policy output has conformed with the elite structures, recruitment
practices, and values outlined in the first two sections. Covertly, Kazakhs have been
ensuring that policies culminate in the ultimate triumph of the Kazakh ethnos. Of
course, only the more nationalist-minded or higher-ranking Kazakh officials admitted
this privately. By contrast, as noted in 11.1, amongst the elite interviewed the most
fervent espousers of a civic identity were non-Kazakhs. The unstructured interviews
revealed how the latter would unsurprisingly overcompensate for their lack of"Kazakh"
identity by repeating almost to the letter the vision of a Kazakhstani state publicised by
their President. It was often thought in the past that those Russian officials in the non-
Russian republics in the USSR who spent their entire lives in that territory or were born
there were likely to defend local interests with greater vigour than those who came to
the republic at a later age. There is some indication of such local patriotism amongst
Russian members of the Kazakhstani elite today. Their state identity is more marked
than that of their Kazakh colleagues: it has conveniently replaced the former all-
embracing Soviet identity. As non-Kazakhs governing in independent Ka.zakhstan, the
social roots of their power are weak.
ELITE GROUPS, SYMBOL MANiPULATION AND ETHNIC IDENTITY
Our discussion so far has, in many ways, focussed on the primordial view of the nation,
which argues that every person carries with him through life "attachments", derived
from place of birth, kinship relationships, religion, language, and social practices that
are "natural" for him, "spiritual" in character, and that provide a basis for an easy
"affinity" with other peoples from the same background. 43 If policies have direct,
tangible effects on the lives of the ordinary citizen, they do not, however, construct a
nation; regions are, after all, artificial constructs, and people can be made to believe that
they are from a common origin. To secure national loyalty, peoples' hearts and minds
must be won, and constructing and deconstructing myths play a frmndarnental part in that
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process. Such "engineering of human souls", to appropriate Stalin's sobriquet for
writers, belongs to the instrumentalist camp of nation-building, to a perspective that
emphasises the uses to which cultural symbols are put by elites seeking instrumental
advantage for themselves or the groups they claim to represent.
A usefi.il comparison for assessing the manner in which Kazakhstan's elite is
engaged in this conscious selection of symbols from the past is provided by the French
Third Republic. The comparison draws in large part on the account made of France by
Eric Hobsbawm in The Invention of Tradition There is no proof as to whether the elite
referred to the experience of the Third Republic, but we did see in 1.2 that the Kazakh
elite often looks to the French for advice on constitutional and legal reform, and admires
both the cultural confidence and style of leadership of the French. Three methods of
reinventing the past are highlighted by Hobsbawm: historiography, public ceremonies,
and, most effectively, the manipulation of symbols
President Nazarbaev has satisfied nationalist expectations by sponsoring a
collective rewriting of history, of which a six-volume series began to be published in
October 1996. Three main points in the new series stand out. Most important was the
open admission of the suffering that had been inflicted on the Kazakh population during
the period of collectivisation and sedentarisation; this had previously been either
entirely ignored or trivialised with vague statements about mistakes and
misunderstandings. Manash Kozybaev, Director of the Institute of History, Archaeology
and Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences of Kazakhstan, published a series of
articles revealing publicly for the first time that millions of Kazakhs died at the regime's
hands during the early 1930s. Zhuldyz Abulkhozhin, who was a key participant in the
1990 State Committee established to investigate Stalin's crimes, also highlighted the
environmental devastation wrought by Khrushchev's Virgin Lands project of the
196Os. The Central Committee was more hesitant about a second reappraisal, namely
the proposed rehabilitation of anti-Bolshevik Kazakh national communists.
Nevertheless, the "bourgeois nationalists" are now regarded with respect and the period
of government by the Alash Orda praised for its example of independent government.
Third, Kazakh-Russian relations were re-appraised; although it was confirmed that the
Small Horde asked to be admitted into the Russian Empire in 1731 in response to
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Chinese encroachments, it is now stressed that Kazakhs never desired colonisation or
the Russian territorial-administrative system
The second "invented tradition" is that of public ceremonies. We have referred
to the introduction of Muslim ceremonies. The most important secular holiday is
Independence Day, which combines official parades with unofficial popular festivities,
such as fireworks and dancing in the streets. It is, however, interesting to note that the
official date of 17 December has been moved forward to August due to the unspoken
fear of the elite that popular turnout in winter would be low.
The third, and most visible expression of an "imagined community" are
symbols. As elsewhere in the FSU, a plethora of new symbols proclaimed the
emergence of independent Kazakhstan: a national flag, a new anthem to replace the
Soviet one, a constitution, a national bank, (embryonic) defence forces, a national
currency, the lenge, passports and other formal attributes of statehood. The cultural
references were drawn from Kazakh traditions. The new and elaborate flag, for
example, includes a band of Kazakh ornamental motifs and a representation of the
steppe eagle, favoured hunting companion of the Kazakhs of old, the main elements of
the national coat-of-arms are the winged horses of Kazakh myth and the sacred smoke-
hole wheel of the yurt. 47 The national colours of blue and gold, representing the sky and
the sun (as a symbol of harmony), have a universal significance, but also a symbolic
link to the ancient Kazakh cult of the Sky. The flag has been democratised and
universalised in its mandatory presence at every civil wedding or ceremony.
Like the creators of the Third Republic, Kazakhstan's nation-builders sought
more tangible, every-day ways in which to show that the political framework had
changed. One method involved statues. However, as was the case even for the
founding fathers of the French Republic, money is scarce, and statues and buildings
were ultimately often financed by private money. A former member of the elite, turned
entrepreneur, provided capital for the construction of the House of Abai in London, to
venerate and publicise the much-respected poet of Kazakhstan. A substantial museum
and statue were also built to commemorate him in his hometown of Semipalatinsk in
I 996. Zhambyl, one of the Kazakh steppe's most famous bards, as seen in 1.1, had a
yurt and statue erected outside the National Museum in Almaty in 1996. Another
notable statue was completed at the end of 1996; situated prominently opposite the
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Presidential Palace it commemorates those who died in the Almaty riots of 1986 - even
if the official death toll still only stands at two. Meanwhile, only in 1996 was the statue
of Lenin was finally pulled down in Almaty. A handful of protesters stood by. Its
disappearance seemed as ignominious as its appearance, since it was the only statue of
Lenin in the entire Soviet Union which had been erected facing the wrong way, away
from Parliament and hence away from the people.5°
A less costly and more effective means of altering perceptions was the elite's
decision to rename streets, towns and regions to emphasise their Kazakh essence. The
Caspian port of Shevchenko, for example, has now become Aktau; similarly, the Slavic-
named cities of Gur'yev and Panfilov are now Atyrau and Zharkent respectively. In the
capital alone, by 1995 over twenty streets had been renamed. Kommunistichesky was
transformed into Ablai K/san; Karl Marx into Kunaev; and Kirov into Bogenbai batyr,
medieval and modern heroes of the Kazakh ethnos. The spelling of the names of several
towns and provinces was also altered to reflect Kazakh pronunciation; the official
designation of Chimkent, for example, has become Shymkent; Alma-Ata is now Almaty
and Kustanai, Kostanai. 5 ' Ethnic Kazakh Nurbulat Masanov wrote a letter in 1996 to the
Head of the Press Section under the President demanding an explanation for the absence
of streets named after Russian heroes.52
From this short tour of invented traditions, what have we ascertained about the
truth or otherwise of the primordialist versus the instrumentalist view? So far, the
symbols are not proving too effective. Karl W. Deutsch writes that "a nalionalily is a
people pressing to acquire a measure of effective control over the behaviour of its
members."53 Over a landmass eleven times the United Kingdom (size is discussed at
greater length in III 2), there is little assurance that the elite is getting the message
across to all people and to all regions equally. Former Soviet citizens, Kazakhs and
Russians, continue to call place-names by their former, Soviet names. Kazakhs and
Russians alike continue to favour the old Soviet holidays, particularly Women's Day
and Victory Day. Kazakhs are becoming proud of nawruz, but ordinary Russians do not
feel it is "their" holiday.
Research conducted by Masanov suggests that only Kazakhs identify in a
majority with Kazakhstan. In a close second come the Koreans, who have a functional
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approach to the state. 54 Even this is simplistic, however There are important differences
amongst Russians, and also amongst Kazakhs, in how they perceive independence
Constraints
What have been at once the obstacles to and sources of support in the implementation of
nation-building projects?
On the civic side, there are no symbols which unify both Kazakhs and Russians.
One recent event was the Olympics, where Kazakhstan won three gold medals, two won
by Ukrainian Kazakhstanis, and the third by an ethnic Russian. No Kazakh won a
medal. Numerous were the allusions in the media to the pride that the young state
should feel for its sportsmen. But, in reality, the only shared cultural experience was the
Soviet period, and now the government is busy legitimising a post-Soviet future. The
Russian community in particular has little emotional commitment to this state in which
its status has lowered, and in which, even before policies were adopted, it sees a second-
class future.
Even if such common symbols might have been tapped, the elite soon saw the
attraction of ethnic over civic nationalism. Cultural referents drawn from the Kazakh
nation have dominated the nation-building project The changed pronunciation and
transliteration of"Qazaqstan" from its initial "Kazakhstan" is a case in point. Between
1995 and 1997, the ethnic Kazakh elite has insisted on foreigners pronouncing and
transliterating their country the Kazakh way, with a definite emphasis on the Kazakh
hard "q". Kazakhstan was prevented by its multiethnicity from introducing such a
policy immediately, and, since December 1997, with no official reason, has reverted to
the old way of"Kazakhstan". What is notable is that Kazakhisation became more overt
once the peak of Russian emigration had been reached in 1994; it may well be that the
government had given up in its attempts to keep the Russians at home. The President,
unlike his Kyrgyz counterpart Akaev, now hardly pleads for the Russian community to
stay. More frequent are his statements of regret at the departure of the Germans; they
are likely to be better citizens than the Russians and are also likely to stay in their much-
needed positions on now-privatised farms. During the visit by German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl on 10 May 1997, Nazarbaev stated: "I appeal through this microphone to
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all ethnic Germans in Kazakstan, calling on them not to leave. They are our
compatriots, this is their homeland. We will improve the economy together and will get
rich together also."55
 Nazarbaev has often expressed his hope that economic success
will help to bind all communities in a common home, and the reality of this hope is
assessed in the next chapter. After all, the nation is also a conspiracy.
Even if the government has had remarkably free rein in nativisation, what is
striking is the constrained manner in which the government has been using its cultural
symbols. Negative, rather than positive identity has characterised the first stages of
independence. AL. Epstein has distinguished between what he called positive
identities, resting on "self-esteem, a sense of the worthiness of one's own group's ways
and values," and negative identities, based on "the internalised evaluation of others,"
with "much of one's behaviour. . . prompted by the desire to avoid their anticipated
slights or censure " One startling manifestation of this tepid identity has been the
limited manner in which history has been rewritten.
Quite apart from the fact that the elite is a Soviet creation, three major
explanations can be given for its display of a "negative identity": a certain
embarrassment about its nomadic past; the Kazakhs' susceptibility to ideology and
propaganda; and, a divisive rather than unifying history. Coupled with these is also the
elite's Soviet past, its absolute lack of revolutionary nationalist origins, and its
awareness of where whole-hearted identity politics might lead.
Officials display a certain embarrassment about their past. This again is part of
the Soviet heritage. The Soviet identity was self-defined as ultra-modern, against which
a backward past was measured and found wanting. Nomadism also lacks physical
reminders of a great past. One general and one specific example will serve as
illustration. Nomadism is regarded ambivalently. On the one hand, the elite says
publicly that it is proud of its nomadic past, its oral traditions and elaborate customs.
Nomadism is also the Kazakhs' most significant cultural marker against their sedentary
northern neighbours, the Russians. On the other hand, the elite recognises nomadism's
inferiority in a Western-centric view of civilisation and its inadequacy in a modern
world. The specific example of the 1986 riots shows how an event, dubbed my many
observers as the first crack in the Soviet edifice and thus a convenient springboard for
Kazakhstan's independence, has instead been surrounded by investigations,
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recriminations, calls for apologies. retrials and rehabilitations. The reason is clear: the
head of the Committee established to look into 1986, Mukhtar Shakhanov, implicated
President Nazarbaev as one of the officials who helped to instigate the events (as we
saw in (.2), and full details of the criminal proceedings were never made public. In
Shirin Akiner's words, 'there was no freedom struggle: the Kazakhs were bereft both of
the organisational experience of such a period of preparation, and of the ideological
bonding of the tight for a common national goal; hence, there was no legacy of
audacious deeds to celebrate, no emotive slogans and symbols, no heroes, no national
myths."57 This has had a positive side in the resulting absence of the extreme
authoritarianism, intolerance and militarisation that armed struggle can bequeath to
subsequent independent governments.
Second, the ethnic Kazakh elite appeared almost numbed by its past. It, and the
embryonic Kazakh intelligentsia, have not yet capitalised on the plethora of unifying
disasters that is the tragic legacy of their nation's history. To take this century alone:
the Kazakhs have endured the 1930s famine, collectivisation and sedentarisation in the
1940s, together with the Virgin Lands project and substantial Slavic immigration of the
1950s and 1960s. The two million lives lost as a result of the artificially induced famine
and sedentarisation policies of the 1930s have not, for the Kazakhs, assumed the
centrality that the Genocide has acquired in the Armenian consciousness, or the
Holocaust in the Jewish. As noted in 11.1, even if the elite did insist on one of its first
reappraisals being the establishment of a definitive death toll for the l930s, it is
remarkably detached from these events. Various explanations are plausible. Perhaps
also the I 930s famine, as potentially powerful a piece of folklore as the 1 840s Irish
famine59, was lost in what was to be a series of calamities. But that begs the question as
to why Dzhungar atrocities are often remembered and not Russian/Soviet ones. Perhaps
the elite feared an upsurge in anti-Russian feeling if the Committee were to implicate
Moscow and Kazakhstan's local Russians. Whilst mobilisation of memories the Irish
famine memories by Irish intellectual opponents of British colonial rule was in the
nationalists' interests, Kazakhstan's political elite will not capitalise politically on
apportioning blame, since nearly half of its own population would be implicated - as
would the elite's own Soviet past 60 However, this gradual response accredits too much
rationality to an irrational, emotive subject. A more convincing explanation might lie in
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the fact that the question is not so crudely manipulative. Memory is possibly different in
the Soviet context. The pronouncements noted in Section II of the elite regarding its
perceptions of the Soviet past are testimony to the balance sheets that it rationally draws
up on the legacy of the Soviet era.61
Third, and finally on this point, Kazakh history on the whole is a divisive, rather
than unifying force. In the new version of history, government-sponsored historians
have done their best to emphasise those brief periods of history where Kazakhs found
unity. The Kazakh khanate of the fifteenth century is conveniently now portrayed as the
territory's first consolidated state; the 540th anniversary of this event (which cannot, in
fact, be attributed to a precise date) was celebrated in 1995. Historians also highlight the
unity achieved in the eighteenth century against the Dzhungars. Like the founders of the
Third Republic, the Kazakhstani government has preferred such general symbols of
unity. However, the Third Republic had great difficulty with 1789: for much of the
population, this moment defined identity, and in an anti-republican way. Similarly, in
reality, historical figures such as Ablai Khan cut ambiguous heroes and, moreover,
would even be regarded as divisive for the Kazakh nation let alone the Kazakhstani
state, since they could be seen to represent the interests of one horde rather than of the
Kazakh people as a whole. For some of the other Central Asian peoples, the literary
heritage, oral or written, provides a focus for their national identity; for the Kyrgyz, for
example, the Manas epic has traditionally constituted the defining feature of their group
identity, cutting across regional and tribal differences. The Kazakhs have nothing
comparable: almost all their oral epics are Central Asian, while their written literature,
though distinctive and original, is stylistically too indebted to Russian/Soviet models to
serve this purpose. The nineteenth-century "enlighteners", who were instrumental in
shaping the notion of the Kazakhs as a discrete national entity, are also no longer
accorded universal approbation: Chokan Valikhanov in particular is felt by some to
have been too enthusiastic an advocate of Russian culture. 62 And both Abal and
Valikhanov wrote in Russian, not Kazakh.
The young Republic's celebrations of its folk-heroes graphically illustrate inter-
horde rivalry. In 1995, in large part due to the enthusiasm for Kazakh poetry of the then
French Ambassador to Kazakhstan, UNESCO sponsored a spectacular festival in
memory of Abai in his hometown of Semipalatinsk. However, the I 50th anniversary of
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the Great Horde's chief akyn, or bard, Jambyl, had to surpass it. in 1996, extravagant
amounts of state money were lavished on the construction of a yurt in the poet's
birthplace, reminiscent of the extravagant fir yurts that the white bone aristocracy
owned during the previous century with the modem addition of over a million dollars
worth of imported Italian furniture. Every major official was present; any absence
would have been considered a personal snub to the President.
In short, as Epstein has noted, "elements of negative identity are nearly always
present where ethnic groups occupy a position of inferiority or marginality within a
dominance hierarchy." 3 Put differently, identities are usually defined "against" and
never in a vacuum. Negative ethnic identities are characteristic not only of subordinate
groups, but of dominant groups as well. If extreme conformity is a typical reaction to
domination among coopted elites of subordinate groups, then empathy with the
demands of subordinate groups is one form of response to power among dissenting
elites of dominant groups.
THE EFFECTS OF NATION-BUILDING POLICIES
Although this is still very early days for any definitive conclusions to be drawn, and
bearing in mind that cause-and-effect linkages must necessarily be treated with caution,
some present and likely effects of the above policies and processes will be assessed. The
effects will be considered in terms of the revival of Kazakh traditions, inter-horde
rivalry and interethnic relations.
Even in an increasingly authoritarian structure such as Kazakhstan, where
government actions do not require initial legitimacy, polices are not made in a vacuum.
The language policy enacted was in part a reaction to a demand by the Kazakh
population for their vernacular language, a demand channelled to the elite by the Qazaq
till (Kazakh language) movement. Many Kazakhs desired Kazakh-medium
kindergartens and schools; they also wanted grammars, phrasebooks, dictionaries and
other teaching materials. It became a point of honour to use the language as much as
possible. Nevertheless, there are practical constraints on the use of the Kazakh
language. Although Kazakhstan was officially a bilingual republic, in practice, Russian
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prevailed in most public settings. Kazakh nationalists blame the Russians for "closing
down" Kazakh schools in the last decades of the Soviet era, but Russians say it was
done with the fill compliance of Kazakh officials, adding that in most cities, there used
to be no Kazakh schools at all" Most of the young members of the Kazakhstani
political elite neither listened to traditional fairy tales nor know their "seven
generations".65
In Section II we also determined that the official's primary loyalty lies to
himself, to his close family, and to his extended family rather than to the state. For over
sixty years, the official attitude towards the clan-tribal system was that it was primitive,
repressive and an impediment to progress. The first two sections showed how
clientelism in the Soviet period primarily reinforced horde rather than ethnic identities,
even if the two were linked symbiotically. Rather than leading to national solidarity,
indigenisation in the 1960s and 1970s led to corruption and a gradual undermining of
organisational discipline from within.
The process of privatisation is already forming a new business class, but, to date,
networks based on the privatisation of capital (the subject of 111.2) remain on clan,
rather than ethnic lines. Within the army, anecdotal evidence suggests that whilst in
Soviet times Kazakhs feared Russians, today the army is fragmented along horde lines.
The comparison with the Uzbek elite is instructive; the more rigid and cohesive
structure of the Uzbeks means that one clan tends to dominate the present state; in the
Kazakh case (as we saw in 1.1) clans are rigorously exogamous, and the curious
situation may arise where a Russian is part of Kazakh network.
Thus, for the immediate future, clientelism has, to use Beissinger's words, a
denationalising effect on politics. Over time, ethnicity itself can, however, form the
basis of clan loyalty, if financial and business structures are made up of various clans.
As we saw in 11.2, the Middle Horde distrusts Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, an
Uak, largely because he is popular in Russia, the West and among the emerging
Russified business class. The move to Akmola (Astana) may also reduce inter-horde
rivalry - this is given as yet another unofficial reason for the move - by enabling horde
relations to be placed on a new footing, geographically removed from the seat of the
Senior Horde in whose tight grip Nazarbaev is said to make policies.
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Interethnic stability, on the other hand, results to date from a largely self-
regulating situation. Soviet communism had ensured a weak civil society and the inability
of ethnic groups to organise themselves into popular movements. Substantial acculturation
by the Kazakh and Slav ethnic groups occurred during the Soviet period, and both ordinary
Kazakhs and Russians in private relate how they have not accorded primacy to nationality.
Furthermore, emigration by Germans and Slays has vacated jobs and flats for the rural
Kazakhs who are migrating to the cities. Other decisive factors contributing to stability
have been the attitude of the Yeltsin leadership and the overwhelming priority given in
Kazakhstan to socio-economic recovery rather than politics, nationalist politics included.
The existence of over one hundred nationalities has also deflected attention from the two
major groups.
Over and above this happy coincidence of subjective and objective factors, the elite
was also politically astute in its adoption of a policy of Kazakhisation that was covert and
gradual. Both the ethnic Kazakhs' own numerical weakness upon independence and
their competition with an almost numerically equal other ethnic group, the Russians,
posed initial limitations on the elite's ability to manipulate ethnicity and claim
legitimacy on the basis of the Kazakh ethnos. By acting inclusively and not exclusively,
the government felt it can avoid alienating large parts of the population and creating
islands and boundaries of ethnicity which could unleash ethnic conflict. The President,
therefore, seemed to understand the dangers of pushing nationalism too far and must also
feel that demography ensures that the Iliture is on the Kazakhs' side.
In the medium- to long-term, however, the state may prove its own gravedigger.
By maintaining a near-total monopoly over cultural and religious symbols, the ruling
authorities have so far kept a tight lid on the potential mobilisation of public opinion by
independent, non-governmental forces on ethnic or religious grounds. However, it has
empowered new divisive groups on the basis of ethnicity and religion. The Kazakhstani
government has done so by creating cultural markers for purposes of internal
communication. 67
 These cultural markers are becoming cultural boundaries, a position
that is in sympathy with Fredrik Barth's boundary approach to ethnic groups 68 Barth
treats ethnic groups as groups of self-ascription, which develop identities through
dichotomisation with others. Their cultural symbols operate to mark the boundaries of
interaction between "us" and "them". As John Hutchinson explains, "Cultural symbols
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are proposed, according to this argument, not to express a commitment to fundamental
values, but rather to effect a differentiation of the group from others. In this context they
have a functional rather than an essential significance." 69 Politicised ethnicities grow off
each other. The weakness of a strong sense of Russian identity, still less of organised
nationalist movements among the minorities, has to date arguably reduced the incentive
for Kazakhstani nationalism. And in just the same way the relatively gentle growth of
Kazakh nationalism (such as the absence of violence, crude slogans, minimal overt
mobilisation) has not given the Russians too many reasons to mobilise.
The result has been that the Kazakhstani government has influenced the self-
definition of the group and its boundaries, to such an extent that the ethnic community
being created is a very different social formation from its progenitor. If ethnic conflict
does break out in the short-term in Kazakhstan, we may go so far as to say that it will be
almost entirely devoid of cultural content, and will constitute merely "one form in
which interest conflicts between and within states are pursued."7°
CONCLUSIONS
Ultimately, this chapter, then, has been concerned with how the elite itself has chosen to
define its nation. Its image of the nation contains few elements of Ernest Renan's view
of the nation as a form of morality7 ' or of Max Weber's sense of a nation's cultural
mission. 72
 Karl Deutsch, on the other hand, would be pleased to see his functional
definition of nation being implemented, as throughout the country, national and local
governments have been engaged in strengthening and extending the channels of
communication which can ensure a popular identification with national symbols and
norms.73
Kazakhstan is busy reinventing its past. However, the actual evolution of Soviet
Kazakhstan, unlike that of, say Georgia, did not result in the emergence of a conscious
nation with its own national intelligentsia and political elite. A national myth promoted
by nationalists of oppression, struggle and eventual freedom is conspicuously absent.
Consequently, the nation is not seen as the most natural of human associations, which
breaks the oppressive bonds of empire and reaches its fullest flowering with sovereignty
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and independence. Primary loyalties of the Kazakh remain with the individual, family
and then only with a larger Gemeinschafi. Consequently, it is the Kazakhs' self-
definition that is the primary obstacle to the building of an ethnocratic state, rather than
the republic's many minorities, which is the impediment most emphasized by current
literature. In Walter Connor's typology, the ethnie, defined, has not yet become a
nation, which is self-defined. Brass may ultimately be correct in his assertion "that the
pre-existing cultures or religious practices of ethnic groups are infinitely malleable by
elites."74
The President has been aware of his country's ethnic time-bomb: "God grant
that nobody will stir up Kazakhstan on ethnic grounds. That would be far worse even
than Yugoslavia." 75 Whether there was instead an overall long-term policy of ridding
the Republic slowly of its non-Kazakh minorities is open to question. Masanov
contends that the elite always privately hoped that Russians would leave to free housing
and jobs; and that, finally, the Kazakhs' time had come. 76 However, to judge by the
Kazakhs' ancestors, whose lifestyle was at the mercy of the climate and reliant upon the
yurt's inherent strength - the trellis, the roof struts and the wheel of the smoke-hole
determined whether there was to be harmony or chaos77, the Kazakh is a short-term
thinker with short-term policies. Short-term politics instead of long-term strategy has
allowed a predominantly ethnic Kazakh elite to become rich now at the expense of
potential chaos in the future. For the moment, the elite, witnessing a substantial foreign
interest in its Republic, has become less risk-adverse and more confident, secure in the
knowledge that the international community has rarely placed democracy before the
interests of oil or geopolitics.
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111.2 BUILDING AN ECONOMY:
THE POLITICAL ELITE AND ECONOMIC POWER
The preceding chapter demonstrated the dual conundrum of nation-building in
Kazakhstan. At the multiethnic level, a civic, Kazakhstani identity remains elusive for a
majority of the population. At the ethnic Kazakh level, Kazakh identity is devoid of
cultural content and fragmented along sub-ethnic lines. National solidarity as a basis of
political community remains elusive, and the well-tested Soviet methods of nation-
building in the early years carried little effect. By 1995, it appeared, the ruling elite had
opted for a more objective, universal approach to achieve solidarity: economic growth.
The only way in which the average Kazakhstani was going to believe in his state was
through tangible, material gain. The vision of society changed. This was embodied in
Strategy 2030, Nazarbaev's equivalent of a state-of-the-nation address.' Delivered in
1997, it emphasised technocratic and managerial reform while diminishing reference to
the consociationalism that had marked his earlier statements.
In this light, the chapter will assess the relationship between the political elite
and economic reform. It analyses the ways in which the political elite affects, and is
affected by, economic reform. A word of caution - effects and influence can only be
hypothesised, not proven, although correlations are possible. Nor does the argument
assume that other factors - such as national resources, political culture, financial
resources, geopolitics or social structure - do not play just as an important factor, or
often an even greater role, than political elites in the economic development process.
This is not a chapter detailing economic reform. While the chapter offers a brief
consideration of newly-independent Kazakhstan's economic condition, it resumes a
focus on the composition and structure of the elite. The importance of political actors in
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economic reform is heightened by an observation made by Tom Bottomore, namely that
the "whole process of economic development has become more deliberate and self-
conscious than it was in the first industrial revolution".2
The relationship between the political elite and economic reform will be
assessed along five criteria: elite composition, integration, structure, capacity and
legitimacy. Marx argued that the composition of the political elite is a direct
consequence of patterns of socio-economic power. To what extent has economic reform
shaped the composition of the elite and vice versa? Second, how institutionally
integrated is the political elite involved in economic policy-making? This will give an
indication of the degree to which political centralisation remains a possibility in the
wake of increased economic decentralisation. The composition and integration of the
elite involved in economic policy provides the backdrop to our third point of enquiry:
elite structure. To what extent has socio-economic modernisation fragmented the elite?
Do we see a type of bifurcation witnessed at the national level in Russia, where the
political elite became separated into a political and an economic elite? Finally, all three
of these factors have serious implications both for elite capacity (determined both by
state autonomy and state resources) and elite legitimacy, shaped by the nature of mass-
elite linkages. In the absence of democratisation, economic performance offers some
substitute for public opinion otherwise expressed through elections.
Kazakhstan's independent economic policy has been driven by the triad of
economic necessity, political priorities and geopolitical constraints. Its economic
challenges were faced by many transition states. 3 But geopolitics (see introduction) and
Soviet legacies (see 1.1) added to Kazakhstan's own economic challenges. 4
 As the
USSR began to unravel in late 1991, the product cycle linkages among raw material
suppliers, intermediate product and equipment suppliers, and tertiary producers were
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disrupted. Enterprises sought to continue functioning despite the breakdown in
deliveries from suppliers and loss of orders from consumers. Heavy industry was
particularly hard hit. The metallurgical industry of Kazakhstan had come into existence
relying to a large extent on the vast demands of the Soviet military industrial complex.5
This entity was centred in Moscow and Kazakhstan's post-independence ability to
continue exports was dependent on the economic and political situation in the Russian
Federation. As the Soviet Union reorganised into fifteen independent states, the
consumers of heavy industrial goods in Russia ceased issuing requisitions and orders for
inputs from factories located outside the Russian Federation dwindled. 1992 was a year
of wrenching economic adjustment for Kazakhstan's heavy industry.
Without cash to pay for production inputs—raw materials, and processed
materials delivered from other plants—enterprises could continue operating only by
passing the debt on to other firms through accepting promissory notes for accounts
receivable and, in turn, passing promissory notes to their suppliers for inputs. This form
of inter-enterprise debt continued to accumulate throughout 1993 and 1994, capturing
enterprises in a scissors crisis.
Kazakhstan's reluctance to declare independence was principally determined
by the Republic's extensive integration into the Russian economy. 6 Not only had it
been one of the highest recipients of Soviet subsidies and trade with Russia, 7
 but its
energy and pipeline system also remained integrated with that of its northern
neighbour.8 These geopolitical constraints shaped the ruling elite's 'multi-vector'
economic foreign policy. 9 While it would remain in close alliance with Russia - a
relationship further dictated by its demographic balance– it would nurture new
trading partners and seek aid and alternative oil pipelines from elsewhere.
Kazakhstan adopted the most ambitious economic liberalisation programme in
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Central Asia, "assuming a 'Kazakhstan means business' attitude".'° The Nazarbaev
government was among the first in the former USSR to commit itself to a course of
thoroughgoing economic reform and the transition to a market based economy.
Shortly after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan thus set out to
liberalise its economy and integrate into the world market. Kazakhstan developed a
programme for the divestiture of state-owned enterprises and began to develop the
legal and institutional infrastructure to facilitate the transition to a system of trade
and commerce in accordance with internationally accepted standards. Within a year
Alma-Ata, a sleepy vacation town for Soviet officials, was transformed into a
commercial capital, becoming a nexus for some international flights, foreign
investors, and diplomats.
These aims fed into three key economic policies between 1991 and 1998:
macroeconomic stabilisation with the help of an IMF-backed stabilisation programme;
diversification of trade and pipeline routes; and, privatisation. By 1998 Kazakhstan was
generally considered a macroeconomic success story."
Macroeconomically, Kazakhstan has undoubtedly made great strides in
transforming its economy since the introduction of its own currency, the lenge, in
November 1993. "The stability of the tenge came at a price: we worked to eleven every
evening for years to develop the National Bank into a respectable institution able to
control its own currency", said Daulet Sembaev.' 2
 In June 1994, Tereshchenko
negotiated a $1.4 billion IMF stabilisation package which was implemented by his
successor Kazhegeldin. Even if real output and wages were higher in 1991, the two
indices meant little, since output was not demand-driven. By 1996, prices for almost all
goods had been freed, and a reformed National Bank of Kazakhstan had successfully
asserted control of monetary policy, interest rates, and inflation. Annual inflation at the
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close of 1997 had settled at the lower than expected rate of 12 percent, while the
average monthly wage had risen 27 percent to $120.' In his 1998 New Year's address
at Kazakhstan State University, Nazarbaev announced that GDP had grown by 2.5
percent in 1997 over the year before. This, he said, gave Kazakhstanis the highest per
capita GDP rating ($1,500) of any country in the CIS.' 4
 The IMF's involvement in
Kazakhstan's economy also began the Republic's dependence on Western, specifically,
US capital and policy recommendations.
Foreign investment, trade and pipeline routes had mixed records of
diversification by 1998. Russia remained Kazakhstan's principal trading partner in 1998
and the principal pipeline route for the export of oil. But China and several Western
countries had been added to the country's list of trading partners. Kazakhstan's
principal exports to these countries were raw materials, and its principal imports
consumer goods. Coupled with this, the government drew up six alternative pipeline
routes; although by the end of 1998 no capital for any alternative pipeline route was
forthcoming, there were plenty of competitors interested in these alternatives.' 5 The oil
and gas agreements on the Caspian Sea and Karachaganak gas condensate fields signed
in November 1997 in Washington, which Nazarbaev called "the deal of the century",
had now intimately bound the West's leading oil and gas companies to the fate of the
Ka.zakhstani economy. The biggest achievement in the period has been Kazakhstan's
record at attracting foreign investment. The State Investment Committee reported in
1998 that foreign direct investment in 1997 totalled a healthy $1.7 billion - the highest
of all CIS countries for the second consecutive year. And this figure did not represent
the flit! potential of investment, since the oil and gas sector was outranked by the
metallurgical. L6
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Foreign investment and privatisation were mutually reinforcing. Already in 1990
Kazakhstan had already begun formulating an ambitious privatisation programme, the
first Soviet republic to do so, but was subsequently slow to implement it. The
independent state began piecemeal with small privatisation in 1992 but the full process
was launched in earnest only in 1994.17 As then Agricultural Minister Karibjanov
stated, small privatisation of the trade and service sector was the easiest to achieve but
added little to state coffers.' 8
 For a while, the scheme was opened to the public through
so-called 'mass privatisation' based on the Czech voucher model but with the important
difference that all privatisation had to undergo several stages: first, through investment
funds, then enterprises, through a voucher scheme and investment funds, followed by
mass and finally, "case-by-case". "Case-by-case" comprised two stages. First, as we
shall see, key enterprises were either sold to or placed under management contracts with
strategic investors. These included giants such as Karaganda Metall Kombinat, the
Sokolov—Sabaisko mining concern, the Pavlodar aluminium company, the Ermakovsk
Iron Plant, and the oil companies of Tengizneft and Embaneft. The second phase moved
to portfolio investment and involved the planned stock-market flotation of thirty-two of
Kazakhstan's largest enterprises. This also constituted the second stage in Ka.zakhstan's
case-by-case privatisation program. The flotation, scheduled for October 1997, was put
on temporary hold with the appointment of Kazakhstan's third Prime Minister
Balgimbaev.
What is striking is the overwhelming consensus on the overall direction of
economic policy. Crucially, even the bellicose 13th Parliament which Nazarbaev
conveniently dissolved in 1995, expressed serious misgivings on timing and
sequencing, but did not disagree with the end-goal of marketisation. The policies briefly
reviewed, what was their relationship to the five criteria?
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ELITE COMPOSITION
First, the composition of the Kazakhstani elite (character, social origins and values)
does appear to reflect the nature of economic change. On the one hand, the nature of the
elite appears to have had some bearing on policy content. On the other hand, economic
change, in line with Marx and the classical elite theorists, has affected the composition
of the political elite. The three governments of independent Kazakhstan serve as
illustration of this symbiosis.
Economic reality in the early years of independence dictated policy continuity.
This continuity was served by Nazarbaev's appointment of Sergei Tereshchenko, an old
Soviet apparatchik. Many members of the elite favoured continued relations with
Russia. As seen in 11.2, many of the elites in this period were hand-picked for their
Soviet-era connections.
Nevertheless, Nazarbaev was a reformer and his key task at an early stage was to
attract foreign investment. To do this he added two categories to his elite. First, he
attracted a foreign cadre of experienced economic advisers and consultants, many from
South-East Asia. Their state-led approach to economic reform may have had a marked
effect on the largely top-down policies enacted in this period. Second, the president
added to his policy circle a group of the leading young Kazakh intellectuals who were
also forward-looking. Many members of Kazakhstan's intellectual elite, formerly
associated with the universities and research institutes, were drawn into advisory and
consultant relationships, and they supported Nazarbaev's course of this period which
promulgated liberalisation and democracy. Their advice, modelled on Western
principles of reform, thus differed to that of many of the foreign advisers. The upshot
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was an often contradictoiy policy mix, with proposals ranging from rapid liberalisation
to cautious conservatism. It was in this period that accusations also began against
Nazarbaev that, because he was not an economist like Karimov, he did not know the
direction in which the reforms were leading the country. Kazakh officials at this stage
were unwilling to commit to what was widely regarded as "shock therapy". For
example, the Tereshchenko government objected to a rapid liberalisation of energy
prices on the grounds that this would hobble light industry. From the government's
point of view during this time, the situation of growing inter-enterprise indebtedness
was preferable to a complete collapse in production. The government was thus willing
to tolerate the situation temporarily while it sought new financial mechanisms for
clearing the indebtedness. Enterprises themselves, however, found that some creditors
were less flexible than the government. The enterprise debt involved payments to other
enterprises, but also included payments for energy, payroll and, sometimes, foreign
suppliers. Energy producers began demanding payment. Foreign suppliers called for
payment or at least equity shares in debtor enterprises. Workers started refusing to work
without payment of overdue wages. By mid 1994, many enterprises were demanding
government credits to pay for energy supplies and resorting to chits, payment in kind, or
other creative techniques to meet their payrolls.
Meanwhile, the Kazakhstani government was preparing the groundwork for the
privatisation of state-owned and state-managed enterprises. But until privatisation could
be carried out in the far-flung regions of Kazakhstan, with their poor transportation and
communications infrastructure, enterprises were at least temporarily being operated by
their Soviet-era managers. To the north, in Russia, rapid privatisation was already
handing managerial control over to newly appointed managers representing the recently
formed joint stock companies. In many cases the new management in Russia had little
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need for the Soviet-trained managerial cadres. Kazakhstan was perhaps two years
behind the Russian experience. But as Kazakhstani enterprise managers observed
developments in Russia and saw impending privatisation in their own future, many
naturally began to think in terms of short-term self-interest. The danger of asset
stripping, looting and embezzlement in idle enterprises became a serious problem for
the government.' 9
 Oblast administration officials began to worry that by the time
privatisation of the enterprises was complete everything of value would have been sold.
Nazarbaev decided to dismiss Tereshchenko in 1994. His replacement,
Kazhegeldin, ushered in a qualitatively new phase in economic policy and government
composition. Kazhegeldin represented the triumph of technocracy, the search for
managerial answers in the place of political solutions. Ka.zhegeldin immediately took
bold and decisive steps to transform the economy, even to the extent of taking some
politically unpopular and experimental measures. For instance, Kazhegeldin liberalised
the grain market, eliminating one of Soviet communism's first and most symbolic
subsidies, the price of bread. The price of bread was freed on 13 October 1994, and a
short time later the Kazakhstan government eliminated the state grain monopoly.
Kazhegeldin began to implement legislation to liberalise other industry, including the
oil and gas industries. Kazakhstan began to look for new instruments to encourage
economic development in primary commodities, introducing new leasing and
concession agreements. In this early phase of the Kazhegeldin administration, the
concept of management contracts was introduced.
Kazhegeldin surrounded himself with a like-minded team, including individuals
introduced in 1.2 but worth a new mention in the context of economic reform. Chief
among it was the thirty-two year old, Moscow-educated economist Oraz Dhandosov
who succeeded Sembaev as head of Natsbank, making him the youngest National Bank
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Chairman. He was aided by Western-trained Grigory Marchenko. Others included the
Deputy Minister of Economics Zhanna Ertlesova, who also collaborated closely with
the IMF. Kazhegeldin also developed close ties with Kazakhstan's leading commercial
bank, Kazkommertsbank, headed by another Moscow-educated economist, Nurlan
Sukhanberdin. The upshot was a dedicated team of technocrats committed to Western
marketisation and keen to implement the IMF stabilisation programme. The style of
government was also very different and appealed to the West; whilst Tereshchenko
rarely met with foreign elites, Kazhegeldin enjoyed substantial freedom in his travels
abroad. So keen was the team to please its donors that the IMF actually advised
Kazakhstan to not worry excessively about implementing its advice to the letter. 2° And
unlike conventional bureaucrats, whose managerial skills are capable of being
duplicated, the relative scarcity of technocrats means that they cannot be purged or
replaced easily.
The dismissal of Kazhegeldin and his replacement by Balgimbaev in October
1997 ushered in a third and final phase of economic policy-making in the period under
consideration. Balgimbaev was Nazarbaev's third choice. Although Western-educated
and trained, Balgimbaev was not an economist; even more importantly, he was widely
known to have opposed Kazhegeldin's rapid privatisation programme. His government
and the heads of key economic agencies reflected again a mix of old and new,
combining politics again with technocracy.
Under all three governments, economic interests, factions and performance
appear to have influenced recruitment. Poor economic performance provided Nazarbaev
with a useful excuse to dismiss officials. Of all the ministers, the Economics Minister
was most frequently replaced. After six Ministers the Ministry was ultimately abolished.
Kazhegeldin introduced a league table of regional heads related to their performance;
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performance was judged according to the economic performance of the regional
economies. In the end, this was never implemented, as the central administration
reportedly feared that highlighting regional differences of economic performance
through this system would only exacerbate regional differences and possibly accelerate
disintegration.2'
Significantly, economic agencies appear to have assured an individual's
permanent place among the elite. Said Eduard Utepov, Deputy Head of the State
Property Committee in 1996: "Before I came to this job, my chances within the system
had been poor. I have been very privileged to work alongside Sarybai Kalmurzaev".22
Key individuals associated with the economy - such as members of NAFI, the State
Investment Committee or the State Property Committee, appear to have gained
permanent access to the elite. Even if these posts were ripe conduits for corruption, and
thus possible removal, these individuals invariably returned. The circulation of elites -
Zhabagin, Urkumbaev, Tereshchenko and Kazhegeldin - suggest that in this time of
flux, economic interests quickly become entrenched and political officials are not easily
sidelined. Their alienation becomes a threat to the centralisation of policy-making.
ELITE INTEGRATION AND EFFECTIVENESS
Centralisation of power has been another attempt by the elite to shape the direction of
economic reform and to ensure the integration - both horizontal and vertical - of its
elite membership. The degree of elite integration - the extent to which institutions are
coordinated and members of the elite share the same policy goals - can be shown to
have a direct effect on the nature and effectiveness of economic policy. Briefly, the
three phases have been an initial attempt at centralisation; a period of laissez faire under
Kazhegeldin; and ineffective centralisation since 1997.
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Under the first government of Tereshchenko until 1994, the administrations of
president and government remained fused. In reality, however, the presidential
administration took charge of economic policy whilst the Prime Minister and his
government awkwardly waited to receive orders and then anxiously checked that they
had fulfilled those orders. Nazarbaev became increasingly frustrated in these early
years with what seemed like non-fulfilment of his commands. He would frequently
bypass the government, calling meetings of regional heads, banging his fist on the table
in the style of the former apparatchik, and threatening dismissal for non-fulfilment.
Horizontal integration seemed to have little effect. The lack of horizontal integration at
the level of government can fl.irther explain the lack of policy coherence at this stage of
reform.
Vertical integration, by contrast, seems to have been more effective in these
initial years of the Republic. The appointment of akims was little contested because
economic interests had not yet increased their economic powers to the point where they
could start asking for greater regional autonomy. The relatively little pnvatisation of
this period made for easier governance. Recruitment decisions of akims were driven by
loyalty to this vertical hierarchy rather than by skills or technocracy.
Horizontal integration increased with the appointment of Kazhegeldin in
October 1994. But this integration was within institutions, not across them. As a sign of
the president's desire to distance himself from economic policy-making - its failures
could expose Nazarbaev to the 'politics of blame' - Nazarbaev separated his
administration from that of the government in March 1994. In these years Kazhegeldin
encouraged regional heads to take increased charge of their own economic policies, and,
as seen, even produced a table of performance for regional heads dependent on the
success of their regional economies. Furthermore, between 1994-1997, the State
245
Investment Committee (between, and independent of the government and the President;
akin to the Treuhandanstalt of East Germany) became the powerflul agency in charge of
privatisation. This period in economic policy-making, although marked by a degree of
internal institutional divisions, appears to have been more effective at devising a
coherent policy than when the elite was totally integrated. It suggests that institutional
context was less important for good economic policy than a good degree of solidarity
amongst the key economic policy-makers of the time. The fellowship among the
members was relatively good, akin to "the psychological affinities.. . that make it
possible for them to say of one another: He is, of course, one of us...
By elevating Balgimbaev to the Premiership, Nazarbaev was to recentralise the
direction of economic policy, an area that Nazarbaev indicated could not be trust ed to
Balgimbaev. With the move to Astana, Nazarbaev also brought all economic think-
tanks, agencies and committees under his direct scrutiny. These were: the State
Investment Committee, the National Statistics Agency, the Committee for the
Regulation of Monopolies and Competition Policy, and Utembaev's outfit, the Agency
for Strategic Planning and Reform. 24
 Some of the earlier integration had been lost due to
the departure of its key planner, Akezhan Kazhegeldin. What Raif Dahrendorf wrote of
West Germany's elite of the 1960s might well apply to the Kazakhstani elite in this final
phase under consideration: "The elites lack the confidence needed for leadership or for
conflict. If we ask why this is so, the answer must be... [t]hey do not in fact form a
group, but remain a mere category".25
STRUCTURE
Elite composition, degree of consensus and style of integration feed into elite structure
and further linked to economic reform. The nature of policy, and the degree of
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integration surrounding its actual formation, have had important implications for the
relationship between the political elite, domestic entrepreneurs and foreign investors.
Crucially, the structure of the political elite has passed through three phases, roughly
concurrent with the three periods of policy formation. In the first phase, the political
elite was synonymous with the economic elite (1992-1994); second, the political elite
became interlocked with the foreign elite, which in the regions was often in alliance
with the indigenous business elite (1994-1997); and, third the political elite co-opted the
business elite (1997 onwards). By this third stage, the political elite had become less of
a structural power elite than it had been in 1991. Nevertheless, by 1998 the political
elite still held both the top political and the top economic posts. At this time, the
business elite was still to a large degree dependent on the political elite which, in
contrast to Russia, still makes it impossible to speak of a business elite in its own right.
One significant new factor, however, had been the influence of foreign investment by
1998: in the regions this was increasingly depriving the regional political elite of its
power of recruitment.
The first phase of economic and political structural congruity can be explained
by the privileged position held by the former nomenklatura in 1991. Even if ethnic
Kazakhs were rarely former "red" directors, the new Kazakh political elite was able to
appoint the new, now ethnic Kazakh directors. By being ethnically, rather than
ideologically correct, this new group became the effective owners of the large industries
that were the remains of Soviet industrialisation. In any case, many of the ethnic
Russian "red" directors emigrated of their own accord in these early years, leaving
managerial vacancies behind.
In the transition from the communist era to independence, the Kazakhstani elite,
like its Russian counterpart, managed to maintain its monopoly in the economic
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domain. It did this through much the same ways aptly described by Olga
Khrystanovskaya and Stephen White for the Russian elite: the establishment of joint
enterprises; the conversion of assets into cash; advantageous credits; property dealings;
privileges in import-export operations; and 'pnvatisation of the state by the state' or so-
called 'nomenklatura privatisation' 26 The first two methods were less available to the
Kazakhstani elite; Moscow was still in charge of printing roubles, and only a handful of
top Soviet-era Kazakhstani officials, such as Nazarbaev, Asanbaev, Abyshev,
Abdullaev, Isingarin and Suleimenov had enjoyed travel to the West in the pre-
independence era. But in the four other domains, the Kazakhstani elite proved as adept
as its Northern counterpart in ensuring that the economy in this first stage of transition
remained in its hands.
To receive credit at low rates of interest (or sometimes without interest payment
at all) it was necessary to belong to the nomenklatura or to have close links with highly
placed officials. It is not surprising, then, that the majority of young entrepreneurs who
emerged between 1992 and 1994 were ethnic Kazakhs. Most of their large trading
conglomerates, which traded in anything from Snickers bars to Italian designer clothes
and Mercedes cars, were started up on these credits. Key examples of Kazakh
entrepreneurs and their trading companies were: Kazhegeldin's Semei company before
he assumed the premiership; Bulat Abilov's Butya company
(Abilov is a nephew of the president's wife, Sara Nazarbaeva); Raimbek; Esenberlin of
"Aziya-Leasing"; Nurlan Smagulov of Astana-Motors; Nurlan Kapparov of Accept,
which traded mainly in petroleum products; Nurlan Subkhanberdin of what was to
become Kazakhstan's biggest 'commercial' bank, Kazkommertsbank; and, Mukhtar
Ablyazov of Astana Holdings. Rakhat industries became a particularly powerful group;
owned by Nazarbaev's son-in-law, Rakhat Aliev: by 1996 it controlled 60% of
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Kazakhstan's sugar company, Sakhamyi Tsentr and owned the most popular foreign-
frequented Almaty hotel Rakhat Palace Hyatt Regency27, a sweets factory and
associated industries.
As in Russia, the political elite was well placed to capitalise on property
dealings. The best properties were in the former Soviet resort of then Alma-Ata and
included the key party hotel Dostyk (Friendship) and the former CPSU sanatorium,
Hotel Alatau. Alatau's elaborate grounds were bought in 1995 by a Japanese consortium
and converted into Kazakhstan's first golf course. The most recent opportunity for
property deals has emerged from the capital's move to Astana, where company affiliates
have vied for plots of land close to the Potemkin village that has become the capital's
emerging political centre.
Just as members of the former nomenklatura were able to benefit from
favourable credit lines, so too were they able to retain their monopoly hold on trading.
The former Vneshekonombank, the Soviet-era trading intermediary, became Alembank
in 1991. Its manager, Berlin Irishev, became a key contact for foreign companies.
Alembank, responsible for negotiating foreign credit lines, appeared to compete with
the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations (1992-1994). Its only Minister, Syzdyk
Abishev and former Soviet Trade Minister, was a close friend of Nazarbaev and has
survived as an important, if subsequently low-profile, member of the elite. These
institutions were able to impose strict quotas and licences on the various trading
organisations, and enabled the elite to keep control until trade liberalisation occurred in
1994. The elite enjoyed unrivalled access to the republic's vast wealth of raw materials.
Gaziz Aldamzharov, head of the thirteenth parliament's control chamber, became an
outspoken critic of this period:
In those years, oil, copper, iron and others were sold from Kazakhstan at prices
half or a third of the world market price. I know people who made themselves
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millionaires on the strength of one or two deals and then left Kazakhstan. These
deals were made on the basis of two contracts - the first on the basis of low
prices, then a second, hidden contract at much higher prices. Kazakhstani
authorities were only privy to the first. The rest went to offshore bank
accounts.28
Aldamzharov claims that, at a minimum, $5 billion had been lost in this way already by
mid-1993. Imports were also carefully controlled, and the new commercial importers
were in a position to set handsome margins between state and retail prices.
Finally, and as the epitome of the blurring of public and private property; the
state privatised itself. Notably factories were now owned by the state, and Ministers
often became owners of majority shareholdings in privatised companies. Many
Kazakhstani officials have their own enterprises; in the words of a presidential advisor
on political affairs, Ermuhamet Ertysbaev:
Almost every Kazakhstani official has received an additional source of profit to
supplement their salaries. These are not any longer bribes which can be easily
detected. Today's state officials are more inventive. They all have their own
enterprises and they ensure that it is these enterprises that, for example, carry out
repair jobs or are protected by these officials from state audits.29
This protection is known locally as krisha or supplying a roof to the company. This
involves ministers, oblast akims, the Ministry of Interior or Procuracy. Successful
entrepreneurs are almost always part of state officialdom. Concluded Azamat leader
Petr Svoik: "The present model of Kazakhstani capitalism harps back to feudalism
because its power, management and property are fused."3°
Kazkommertsbank became the closest Kazakhstani equivalent to the Russian
financial-industrial group by having as its top patron Prime Minister Kazhegeldin. The
two served each other. Kazkommertsbank began to handle state finances by buying
shares of Shymkent oil refinery on Kazhegeldin's behalf. In turn, Kazkommertsbank
acquired a considerable degree of independence. For example, it became the only
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example of a private company which repurchased shares originally sold to a foreign
company. The shares in question amounted to forty percent of the state
telecommunications company Kazakhtelecom and were resold directly to
Kazkommertsbank by the South Korean conglomerate Daewoo. Daewoo had changed
its mind when the Kazakh government began to insist on the former's purchase being
accompanied by $lbillion of investment into the country's communications
infrastructure. Kazkommertsbank purchased the state shares without any intervention by
the government and with no assurances that it would deliver on the investment front.
Thus, in contrast to Russia, the Kazakhstani political elite had managed to retain
its monopoly over the economy to the end of 1994. The young managers of the
investment funds were not trusted in government as their advocacy for the right of
Private Investment Funds to hold shares in Kazakhstan's strategic enterprises
represented a step tantamount to economic decentralisation. 3 ' The government refused
to bail out the trading conglomerates when many had become insolvent by 1993. One of
their managers, Butya's Abilov (Sara Nazarbaeva's nephew), received a further snub
when he made a bid for the former USSR's leading metals plant, the Karaganda steel
mills, or Karmetkombinat (where Nazarbaev had made his early career and Oleg
Soskovets was to follow). Abilov, in alliance with Austrian company Voest-Alpine,
won the tender and took over the plant in Spring 1995. This happy alliance lasted for
nine days; meanwhile the Kazakh government, notably then Deputy Prime Minister
Vitalii Mette, had found more profitable and promising buyers in the Indian-owned,
London-based steel company Ispat International. Butya. Voest-Alpine protested, but in
vein.
Frustrated, these domestic entrepreneurs turned to politics. They formed a
movement called Novoe Pokolenie (New Generation), hoping that they would be able to
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arouse similar indignation amongst the population. In their newspaper of the same
name, they portrayed themselves as the kernel of the new Kazakhstani economy and one
which had been abandoned by the government. The group made little impact either on
the government or the population, who derided them as "children of asphalt". 32 Unlike
Yeltsin, Nazarbaev did not need business support for election campaigns; by 1995
Nazarbaev had opted instead for the far cheaper and safer referendum on his continued
presidency. When, in October 1998, Nazarbaev called for premature elections to be held
in January 1999, he argued that the short campaign time would enable money saved on
electoral posters to go toward back-payment of wages.
But there is also a more subtle reason why President Nazarbaev may have been
unwilling to allow the uncontrolled, state-free development of a national bourgeoisie.
This was the fear alluded to at the outset of this chapter, namely that the struggle over
resources, if uncontrolled, would be particularly bitter in the Kazakhstani context. The
struggle, he may well have feared, would become entrenched along sub-ethnic, ethnic
and regional lines, all sources of potential state disintegration. This reason may also
partly explain the government's hesitation over the pnvatisation of land which has still
to occur. The government (probably justifiably) feared that in the early years of reform
the best land - in the north of the republic - would have been bought by ethnic Russians
and not ethnic Kazakhs.
The structure of the domestic business and political elite was transformed under
Kazhegeldin. The transformation came with accelerated privatisation, foreign
investment and particularly, the 'management contract'. Speaking at the "International
Conference on Investment Opportunities in Ka.zakhstan" in London in July 1996,
Kazhegeldin noted that Kazakhstan was the "first country in the CIS to begin using a
new form of economic management, management contracts with foreign firms for the
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management of government property." Kazhegeldin added that these contracts were
designed to lead the enterprises directly to privatisation.33
The Kazakhstan Committee on the Management of State Property issued
approximately 60 management contracts between December 1994 and August 1996 to
private firms to manage publicly owned enterprises in Kazakhstan. As the use of
management contracts was expanded in 1995, the government sought to provide a
reasoned rationale for the practice. The most authoritative statement of the rationale
appeared in an article published by the Chairman of the State Property Committee in
1996. Contracts were issued in the service sector, in food processing, and in the
mineral extraction and metals processing sector. Some of Kazakhstan's most valuable
enterprises were placed under management contracts. The large Karaganda Steel
Factory (Karmet), the Pavlodar Aluminium Plant, the Sokolovo-Sarbai Mining
Combine, the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium Factory, the Zhezkazgan Non-ferrous Metals
Plant, and a number of other Kazakhstani flagship enterprises were transferred from
direct state management to management under contract to private firms. A management
contract is typically an agreement whereby the owner of a facility contracts with a firm
possessing technical, financial, or managerial expertise to operate the facility under
specified conditions for a given period of time for an agreed upon remuneration.
Common in the developing world, management contracts usually require the owner to
pay the contracting firm; at the conclusion of the period, the responsibility for managing
the property returns to the owner.
The Kazakhstan property committee designed a novel contracting instrument by
concluding management contracts in such a way that the managing firms paid the
government to take over the responsibility of running factories. 35 It is unusual that a
firm would pay the owner for the privilege of providing the service of managing an
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enterprise. Because the remuneration in these cases appears to be going in a direction
opposite to that normally expected, donor agencies and international organisations
providing technical assistance to the Kazakhstan government privatisation program
raised questions asking whether the terms of these confidential management
contracts may have offered managing firms extraordinary concessions. 36 These
contracts typically offered the managing firms "exclusive and unconditional" rights
to purchase outstanding shares in the enterprise. In other words, the management
firms contracted to manage the enterprises and to obtain the right to purchase the
enterprise. Without violating any Kazakhstan privatisation legislation, ownership of
some of Kazakhstan's most valuable enterprises appeared at times to have passed
from the state to private hands in a less than fl.illy transparent and competitive
manner.37
 The Kazakhstani management contract thus served a dual purpose: it
satisfied those who believed that direct foreign investment may imply an unwanted
degree of external political and economic influence but in reality financially satisfied
the majority of the political elite. In some cases, it should be noted, real benefits in
back-payment of wages and clearance of debts were achieved.
Of the total of 42 management contracts, twelve were reportedly abrogated,
leaving a total of 30 contracts in force. Of the 16 contracts held by firms registered in
Kazakhstan, three were joint-ventures. The Kazakhstan firms were among the most
visible in Kazakhstan. They include the principally trading conglomerates of Aleksei
Postopalov and Co., Aksept, Kazkomertsbank, Tagam, Altynalmas, Raimbek, and
AvtOVAZ . 3S
 It is worth noting that many of these local firms are those we met first as
being under Tereshchenko in the Novoe Pokolenie group.
Enterprises under contract, while relatively few in number, had a
commanding position in the economy. These enterprises were responsible for over
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90% of production in metallurgy. The contracts concluded for the Sokolo-Sarbai
Mining Operations, the Donsk Mining Combine, and the Ermakovskii and Aqtobe
Metal Works are in force. 39
 According to the State Property Committee, all of the
contracts on the state list included a provision of confidentiality to protect the
commercial interests of both parties, the owner (the state, which in most cases also
becomes the seller) and the managing firm. Neither of the principal parties was
permitted to disclose the conditions of transfer or sale to third parties without the
consent of the other principal party.
In some cases, the contract provisions reportedly were not met, yet the
contracts continued in force. Samsung and Yutek-Lukoil (acting as an affiliate held
by IBE Trading) did not satisfy their contract requirements for investment and
operating expenses. Ivedon, White Swan, and Nova Resources did not provide GPM
with their business plans and their investment programs in the time frame required by
their contracts. As parties differed on the contractual obligations, the happy alliance
between national capital, the political elite and the foreign interests broke. This
underlined a final important point in this history of management contracts, namely
that foreign owners were rarely foreign. Japan Chrome, White Swan and Ivedon
were all offshore companies established exclusively for their operations in
Kazakhstan and all managed by a former member of the Soviet shadow economy,
Aleksandr Mashkevich. This age- and nationality-inclusive ex-Soviet business group
clouded ownership and led to the absurd and sometimes embarrassing situation
where Kazakhstani officials did not know who owned their flagship companies.
By 1997, 90 percent of the metallurgical industry had been privatised in this
way and Kazhegeldin made known his intention of starting a similar process in the
oil and gas sector.4° This intention provoked many members of the ruling elite -
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amongst them Balgimbaev - to call for Kazhegeldin's resignation. 4 ' When
Balgimbaev was appointed, the political elite entered a new phase of consolidation.
First, the source of the foreign economic power structure of the political elite
had shifted. It had divided the economic pie among itself, a national rent-seeking class
and foreign capital. It had made Western investors express some discomfort at investing
in a country which either adds new conditions to signed contracts or abrogates them
altogether. Some better known, established Western companies had also been in
dispute, such as Belgium's Tractebel and Canada's World Wide Minerals. 42
 On the
other hand, the elite emerged more confident in 1997 vis-à-vis its relations with Russia.
Although the pipeline question had still not been resolved, the sale of many of its assets
to non-Russians - and certainly to non-members of the Russian elite in Moscow -
meant a slow decoupling of structural interests from Russia. 1992— 1994 had been
dominated by a close alliance between Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin,
who had brokered the deal with Chevron, and Oleg Soskovets who left Kazakhstan in
1992 to join the Russian government. By contrast, China appeared to have gained the
upper hand since 1994. The most dramatic economic concession to the Chinese came in
1997, when Kazakhstani authorities granted the Chinese National Petroleum
Corporation the sale rights to Aqtubinsk power plant - after a number of considerably
better offers from US firms were ignored.43
Second, the newly empowered ethnic Kazakh entrepreneurs were co-opted after
1997. The appointment of 28 year old Nurlan Kapparov - a former member of Novoe
Pokolenie - to head Kazakhstan's state oil company Kazakhoil represented a
qualitatively new stage in government and marked the beginning of a process the
government had hitherto resisted. This was an invitation to members of the business
elite to join the ranks of government. Other members of Novoe Pokolenie were invited
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to join. The president appointed Ablyazov Trade and Industry Minister and Kakimjanov
Head of the State Revenues Mini stry.
By 1997 the result was a fragmented political elite. Kryshtanovskaya and White
concluded that the Russian political elite is distinct from the economic elite in terms of
its occupational background. 45
 James Hughes, on the contrary, contended that the sub-
national political elite was not rigidly demarcated from the economic elite as regards
occupational origins but is intrinsically interlocked with it. It appears that in the case
of Kazakhstan the situation is the opposite: in 1997 the national political elite had
become, albeit to a lesser degree than in Russia, bifurcated between a political and an
economic elite - between senior administrative officials and senior managers of
business enterprises. The regional political elite, by contrast, retained a considerable
degree of occupational homogeneity. Privatisation had ceased the ability of the local
political elite to control appointments in areas strategic to the regional economy and
ownership had placed control of local enterprises outside the region or even the country.
Further, the growing role of private capital meant that the political elite had increasingly
become dependent on private financial institutions for investment in the regions.
Privatisation deprived the local political elite of an important resource. Prior to
privatisation of these enterprises, the local political elite used the profits generated by
sales of oil and metals to prop up failing enterprises within the oblast. The loss of
control over the strategic enterprises, therefore, had a critical impact on the relationship
between the economic and the political elite. To restore some of its control over the
regional business elite, the regional political elite developed a series of consultative
forums with the economic and financial elite. A range of informal and ad hoc meetings
have also often been used for other groups in the oblast. 47 Membership of the meetings
confirmed membership of the core elite. Similar consultations were observed at the
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national level; in 1997, Nazarbaev began to call several meetings with heads of
companies, both national and foreign.
CONCLUSIONS: ELiTE CAPACITY, AUTONOMY AM) LEGITIMACY
In conclusion, what can we say about (a) the relationship between political and
economic power at the national and regional level; (b) the relationship of the centre to
the periphery with regard to the economy; and, (c) elite-society relations as a result of
economic reform?
At the national level it remains impossible to speak about a significant business
elite that operates separately from the political elite. The main financial-industrial
groups and trading conglomerates were either part-owned or part-sponsored by the
political elite. By coopting leading representatives of these groups into government
from 1997, Nazarbaev attempted to tighten further these links.
At the regional level, it is not possible to generalise about political and economic
elite alignments. Each region displayed a different configuration dependent on the
degree of foreign investment and the nature of the resources. In Mangistau and Atyrau,
the two major oil producing areas of the West, the regional akim remained in charge of
its key economic resources, and the configuration was rather similar to the national
level. A similar configuration was noticeable in Southern Kazakhstan, where the sale of
cotton had required effective contacts with the regional administration. In regions with a
high metallurgical base - the single greatest source of foreign direct investment - the
nature of foreign direct investment had made the most substantial difference. Here, as
seen, investment has often been difficult to control. This reduced the capacity of the
regional political elite to control the business elite. In yet a third group, where there has
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been little foreign investment, the political and economic elite existed in mutual
dependence.
Despite these different internal economic alignments at the regional level, the
approach of the centre to the periphery has remained uniform across the whole country.
1.2 stressed the unwillingness of the president to introduce any form of decentralisation
to the regions, and has ruled out the election of akims.' It also described the process of
re-centralisation the President has enacted especially since the move to Astana. This
began with the move of the capital and thus the transfer of political power to the north,
and has continued, as we saw, with the reduction of regions from 20 to 14. The creation
of a national elite that stretches into the regions, rather on the lines of Uzbekistan, may
be the next major step in the development of a strong unitary state model. 11.2 indicated
that recent appointments at the regional level have, for the first time, included a
significant number of individuals who have been parachuted in from the central political
structures. However, it is unlikely that the President will find central control as easy as
his southern counterpart, especially in regions where economic interests have become
entrenched with regional political interests such as in the West. This was partly why the
president ruled out the fusion of the western regions. The case of the reinstatement of
Mangistau's akim Levitin, unpopular with central authorities but supported by powerful
local networks, suggests that Nazarbaev was not always able to appoint as he wished.
Nevertheless, this is still the exception, even if an important one.
What then, finally, does the population think about economic reform and the
elite's relationship thereto? What effects is socio-economic change exerting on the
population? First, whilst the core elite has narrowed and grown richer, the masses have
grown poorer. Nazarbaev's glowing 1998 New Year account differed markedly in tone
from a report published at around the same time by the Almaty-based Institute of
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Development of Kazakhstan. The Institute calculated that GDP and wages in 1997,
while indeed over the 1996 figures, were still some 35 percent lower than in 199l.
Officially, unemployment was relatively low at 5.6 percent, but the authors of the report
claimed that the real unemployment rate was closer to 20 percent, and that 40 percent of
those unemployed are rural youths aged between 16 and 29. Due to poor health and
environmental factors, male and female life expectancy had fallen by nearly five years
since 1991. With the added emigration of non-Kazakhs, the Republic's population
dropped from a high of 16.9 million in 1994 to 15.8 million in 1997, making it the only
Central Asian state reporting an absolute decline in the size of its population since
independence. Journalists have warned that, unless the government takes urgent
measures to improve living standards and create employment, the country could face
even more serious problems in the next century. 5° According to the International
Federation of the Red Cross, 73 percent of Kazakhstanis were living below the
government-defined monthly individual poverty line of $50 per month in 1997 and
electricity cuts and wage arrears continue to plague the average citizen.51
These socio-economic pressures sparked a growing delegitimisation of the elite
in the view of the population. Whilst the elite seemed convinced of the benefits of a
market economy, a poii by the U.S. Information Agency in December 1997 indicated
that three quarters of the population supported state control of agriculture and health
care; only one quarter of those aged between 18 and 29 supported elements of the free
market system; and, three quarters believed that the economy was in poor condition and
would deteriorate. 52 Few individuals demonstrated any belief in the rule of law or
institutional longevity. Nor did they believe that corruption amongst the political elite
would in any way diminish with the introduction of an anti-corruption law. Igor Rogov,
the president's legal advisor, devised the decree "On Fighting Corruption". The law was
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designed to increase the legitimacy of the current regime. 53
 In one sense corruption can
be easily understood. Until March 1997, the average monthly wage of a state employee
was around $80 to $100. In March 1997, Head of the State Anti-Monopoly Committee
Nikolai Radotovetz, one of the few ethnic Russians who remained in government,
stated: "My wife earns more than I even though she is only a clerk in a private
company". The population has little acceptance when it sees the elite building luxury
houses and learns of its children being educated abroad. In the words of Gaziz
Aldarnzharov, former chairman of the Control Chamber of the thirteenth parliament:
Many ministers assist in the acquisition of this or that product, or receive
substantial bonuses from public companies. No official will do something for a
company for free. There is always somebody behind the project who controls the
specific terms the company wishes to receive. The cost of the service depends on
the individual's access to the president. If the official is just an assistant but
works with the president, then his services cost much more than those of a
minister. The president can do everything; the minister only a little.55
1996 and 1997 did see the first signs of social protest, almost exclusively in the
south of the country. The Janatas strikers set a precedent by declaring hunger strikes
involving whole families, some of whom attracted added attention by camping out in
sub-zero temperatures. The strike, which began in mid-December 1997, originally
involved 200 workers at a phosphorus plant in Janatas in southern Kazakhstan's
Zhambyl Region. By mid-January 1998, 30,000 workers had set off on a march to the
capital to call on President Nursultan Nazarbaev to order an independent audit of the
state-owned "Phosphorite" enterprise. The strikers said they were owed a total of $6
million in unpaid wages, and blamed both the central and the regional governments for
their plight. The protesters were turned back by the militia, while 20 hunger-strikers
were said to have been hospitalised. 56
 Eventually, the government conceded and bailed
out Phosphorite. Phosphorite was only one of four subsidiaries of the "Kazaphosphor"
company whose workers were suffering wage arrears. However, weak trade unions
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ensured that most strikes remained marginal. The growing socio-economic based
discontent within Kazakhstan may, however, force the central elite to rely upon the
support of regional authorities to control opposition movements and lead to a new
compact for coercion between centre and region.
The first eight years of independence give a sense that the elite will continue to
matter more than society as a motor for socioeconomic change. Social forces are too
weakly organised and lack a powerful counter-elite to organise revolution; the military
has long been abandoned by the Kazakhstani elite. The construction of a political
community through economic modernisation is unlikely to occur. Social forces will not
'confront each other nakedly' as they would in Huntington's praetorian politics
scenario. Nevertheless, Huntington might well be right on another account, namely that
politically centralised institutions are unlikely to be able bring out rapid economic
reform in a country this size developing at different economic speeds. Economic
modernisation has already weakened established institutions and increased the
complexity of political demands.
Ultimately, mistrust and conflict among the Kazakh political elite have been
aggravated by economic decline and the dismantling of the enormous state-run
economy. The elite has scrambled to benefit from the opportunities that privatisation
has created. The result is an aggregate of competing groups whose members see politics
as a zero-sum contest. Group leaders continue to accumulate power through patronage
and by expanding the administrative hierarchies over which they preside. Junior or
aspiring members of the elite continue to be rewarded for their support. It is unlikely
that fragmentation at the top of the regime will cease once revenues from the Caspian's
"black gold" begin to flow. The stakes of the political game will be raised.
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CONCLUSION
Other empirical analyses of political elites have used social-background information
both to illustrate theoretical concepts and to establish relationships among social,
economic and political variables. What preliminary conclusions can we draw from the
empirical evidence of Kazakhstan? To reiterate, since this thesis covers the first seven
years of independence conclusions can only be of a tentative nature, and where
conclusions are not possible this will be stated.
The thesis has encouraged us to question the unqualified application of social
science methodologies to area studies. This caution applies particularly to the
methodology of locating the elite. The four methods of locational, reputational,
decisional and press analysis, as described in the Appendix, proved inadequate in fully
determining the political elite in a society where power remains informal and where
institutions remain poorly developed. Instead, a more flexible approach was required
which combined all four methods. This approach identified individuals who exerted
informal power and excluded individuals who did not exert power even if they were
employed in institutions of formal power. The appendix explains how different results
from the four methods used to locate the elite were reconciled. For example, as
demonstrated in the thesis, only a tenth of the members of Kazakhstan's Parliament,
even at its strongest in 1994-5, exerted influence on decisions of major strategic
importance. These findings would confirm the conclusions made by others that methods
of data collection must differ markedly between developed and developing countries. 1 I
would go further and argue that even such compartmentalisation is misleading, and
research methods need to be adapted to the particular culture and society in question.
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The upshot is an empirically grounded definition of the political elite. This
definition of the elite has established a hierarchy of factors which explain the
contemporary constellation of the political elite. In increasing order of importance these
are: history, nationality, wealth, education (in particular in Moscow), and loyalty to the
principal gatekeeper, President Nazarbaev. These factors will be mentioned at various
points in the conclusion, and the importance, or otherwise, of horde membership will
also be discussed.
The thesis has assessed the importance of historical factors in the make-up of the
contemporary elite. Some elements of the political culture of the traditional steppe
appear to have survived - even if such apparent cultural legacies cannot be proven or
isolated from more immediate causes. Power was shared in the traditional nomadic
steppe, shared between various individuals both within the black and the white bone.
For example, in cases of dispute nomads would seek redress in the social figure of the
local elder rather than in the political office of the khan. The contemporary political link
between rulers and ruled in contemporary Kazakhstan is also weak, but for different
reasons. The main reason for the absence of a political and social contract between the
political elite and society stems from the economic chaos that has resulted from
economic transition. The vast majority of the population has not yet benefitted
materially from independence and thus is not reassured that an independent Kazakhstan
can deliver better than, or even as well as, the former Soviet republic.
As regards antecedents, it is above all those from the Soviet period which
explain the formation and make-up of the contemporary political elite. Kunaev fostered
an educated and indigenous elite already in the 1970s and 1980s. He was able to do this
because of the freedom granted him in recruitment by his patron, Leonid Brezhnev. This
indigenousness of authority ensured a smooth transfer of power for ethnic Kazakhs into
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the post-independence period. Moreover, Kunaev primarily favoured individuals from
his own Southern Horde. This further explains why upon independence it is the
Southern Horde which initially occupied major government posts. In comparison to
other post-colonial states the native majority (and in the case of the Kazakhs upon
independence a titular minority) engaged in far less of a struggle to replace alien elites
in the economy (whether these aliens were from the former colonial people or from
ethnic minorities who had flourished under colonial rule). Put differently, Kazakhisation
of the elite, which has been reinforced in the post-independence period, can be seen as a
reaffirmation of political power, rather than as a co-ordinated plan to nationalise the
regime. This continuity and the lack of an independence struggle helps to explain the
relative weakness of Kazakh nationalism, which is flirther explained by the weak
national identity of ethnic Kazakhs.
The absence of a strong national identity enabled us to appreciate the wider
dynamics behind the composition and constellations of the contemporary political elite.
Part of this weak national identity stems from the republic's multiethnicity, with the
Kazakhs emerging a titular minority upon independence. The numerical inferiority of
the Kazakhs explains the initial anxiety of the political elite to staff its top offices with
ethnic Kazakhs. Thus, particularly in the heavily-Slav populated northern regions, the
staffing of regional administrations by ethnic Kazakhs was deemed an indispensable
step towards state survival. Simultaneously, the ethnic make- up of the political elite
became self-regulating as substantial numbers of the three largest non-Kazakh ethnic
minorities of Russians, Ukrainians and Germans emigrated. Furthermore, the weak
national identity explains the sense of a weak cohesion among members of the political
elite. This weak sense of solidarity is further explained by the frequency of reshuffles
and the possibility of sudden unemployment, which has encouraged the accumulation of
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public money for private gain, or corruption. Corruption is further exacerbated by a
weak sense of national identity and a lack of responsibility to any electorate or legal
order. The resultant insecurity of tenure means that this is a high-risk political system
for the individual members of the political elite. Michels traced the roots of oligarchy in
working-class movements in part to the very sharp drop in status and income that
awaited ex-leaders, and a similar theory may fit some developing countries today.2
When interviewed, few members of the political elite defined themselves in
terms of what it meant to be an ethnic Kazakh; instead they usually invoked the term
Kazakhstani but expended great efforts to provide a cultural content to this term.
Important generational differences should nevertheless be recognised in the political
elite's self-definition. Western values of anarchic individualism and materialism
expressed by many members of the younger, second generation political elite, have
already strengthened during the short period since 1991. This second generation
political elite is ensuring that its children, who will possibly be the third generation
political elite, will absorb these Western values through study and training in
predominantly Western institutions. Daulet Sembaev aptly underscored this
generational change:
To put it in simple terms, my family is a professional family. My parents, on the
other hand, came from a very simple background; my grandfather was a nomad
all his life in the great expanses of Central Kazakhstan. For the third generation
this will be different again; their education will begin with Cambridge.3
The weakness of a national identity carried a further implication. Once in power,
the ethnic Kazakh elite needed to foster a sense of consciousness and cohesion among
its members. The most readily available tool to foster a sense of solidarity in a post-
independence setting is nationalism. In the absence of a readily-available sense of
nationhood, the Kazakhstani political elite fostered a national-cultural revival. This
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revival appears to have backfired. It has instead provoked a rediscovery of sub-ethnic
identity among the political elite. The thesis has argued that this rediscovery is the result
of actual policies rather than of deeply held affiliations to sub-national groupings. III.!
demonstrated how the political elite, devoid of unifying cultural markers, was forced to
revert to symbols which it already possessed, albeit quietly. These were most clearly
associated with the traditional horde structure. Thus, for example, celebrations of
national heroes usually turned out to be devoted to locally revered figures, often
associated with particular horde structures. Paradoxically, then, this state-sponsored
national revival has led to a sub-national revival of traditional allegiances, reinforced by
the size of Kazakhstan and the increasing diversity of the regions, a condition enhanced
by foreign investment and natural resources.
In addition to these first three general points on the overall nature of the political
elite and its relation to society, this thesis has empirically demonstrated the make-up of
the contemporary political elite. Certain social groups dominated the political elite in
the snapshot (but representative) year of 1995. The typical profile of the political elite
constituted: former membership of the Soviet elite; a blue-collar background; aged
between 36 and 55; male, and ethnic Kazakh. But there were also important features
which appeared to fragment the political elite: their birthplace, juz membership and
education being among the most important.
Some of the post-independence members of the political elite are self-made and
have gained their political standing by accruing wealth. But larger numbers of the post-
independence political elite consist of offspring from the post-Stalin generation. Some
of these members were sons and daughters who were educated in Moscow in the
Gorbachev period and formed a close-knit group once Nazarbaev came to power.
Reproduction of this political elite is expected because of the concentration of wealth in
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its hands, the educational patterns of offspring, and a narrowing of the elite. The
narrowing of the elite renders reproduction easier. This make-up of the political elite
suggests - again, conclusions can only be tentative - that the agglutination model
applies, in which the political elite reproduces itself and becomes closed. The thesis has
also demonstrated how this closed model contrasts starkly with the considerable upward
social mobility of the Soviet political elite of the Kazakh SSR. Much of this continuity
depends, of course, on the survival of President Nazarbaev, who has dominated the
recruitment process.
In addition to these 'push' factors, the thesis has highlighted the 'pull' factors in
recruitment. Given the authoritarian nature of the regime, these top-down recruitment
decisions are often more important than factors of ambition or social forces which might
propel individuals into office. 11.2 demonstrated how throughout the period it is the
President who has dominated this recruitment procedure and it is the President who has
made the principal recruitment decisions as regards membership of the political elite.
The thesis has discussed various factors which influence the President in his recruitment
decisions.
The principal criterion of recruitment has been loyalty to the President. The
factor of loyalty explains why members of his own family, close relatives and friends
have come to comprise the core elite. It also partly explains the decision since 1994/5 to
employ a number of technocrats, who, by definition, are apolitical and do not harbour
political ambitions. All other factors that are considered by the President are subordinate
to this.
The thesis has assessed other factors in recruitment, notably horde membership,
the importance of Moscow networks and the role of bribery and corruption. In reverse
order, although detail could not be provided on the last (both because of a lack of firm
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evidence and because a too persistent enquiry would have rendered research on the elite
dangerous and essentially nonviable), the purchase of office did probably occur in the
case of some individuals. It appears that these individuals ultimately enjoyed less
security of tenure. Again, documentation of this evidence is impossible to obtain, but
some members of my panel of experts intimated that the regional head of Southern
Kazakhstan, Turisbekov, was an example of an individual who had purchased his office.
Such a practice negates any principle of merit in appointments. Bribery and corruption
have also had an impact on dismissals. Individuals observed to be incompetent or
politically suspect to Nazarbaev have often been conveniently removed through
corruption scandals. Examples were Mars Urkumbaev, Asygybat Zhabagin and
Nazarbaev's first two prime ministers. But the thesis also highlighted how these
individuals often reappeared, and frequently in better posts (especially if these
individuals in exile managed to accrue wealth). Such circulation also appears to apply at
the regional level of elite formation. Nevertheless, it does appear that elite reshuffling
has been less frequent at the regional than national level, which suggests that the
regional political elite has become more entrenched and is more reliant on existing
networks for policy implementation than is the national elite. This in turn implies that
Nazarbaev's control over regional elites is less complete than his domination of the
central cadres.
With regard to another network, that of Soviet-era Moscow connections, the
thesis highlighted how individuals who belonged to this network have formed a close-
knit sub-group of the political elite. This was already highlighted above. Predominantly
in their early thirties, they trained primarily as economists in Moscow in the 1980s and
were recruited by Prime Minister Kazhegeldin in 1994/5 to manage the IMF
macroeconomic reform programme. It will be some time before the republic can
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generate its own indigenously trained economists; indeed, it may be that Kazakhstan,
like many countries of the developing world, will send its elite for training abroad
indefinitely.
Does the 'horde factor', then, explain recruitment? The thesis has argued that
explaining decisions in terms of the juz affiliation is an oversimplification and thus
distortion of reality. In the first years of independence there did exist signs that the
President opted to follow in Kunaev's path and recruit primarily from the Southern
Horde, from which Nazarbaev also hails. However, these individuals were often either
close relatives or friends of the President and it has been argued that these factors of
loyalty predominated. Masanov's thesis, as explained in 11.2, that the President engaged
in a careflul balancing act between different juz has been highlighted, but on closer
inspection it was concluded that this was a symbolic gesture on the part of the president
to honour a revived sub-national identity. Moreover, that sub-national identity, in any
case, was fluid. The juz identity had little cultural content and thus little significance in
and of itself Horde membership has principally become crucial when allied with
significant economic interests. In the case of the political elite of the Western region, for
example, economic and horde interests were most starldy intertwined, and it is here that
the central authorities have encountered the most difficulty in parachuting in their own
clients. Thus, we saw that the majority of the key posts of the Oil and Gas Industry was
occupied by members of the Small Horde. Put differently, kinship was not in itself a
crucial element in the allocation of patronage but rather it was part of a wider set of
relations. This, as noted, would support the contention that kinship has to be expressed
in other relationships to be given content.
In the final analysis, I found the patron-client approach the most useful one in an
attempt to understand the recruitment process. Recruitment, in a weak state where
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officials are beholden to the selectorate and not the population, has become a
considerable source of power. Just as in the Soviet period, patronage is structured and
organised because the power to appoint is a vital resource in politics. Patronage is a
sought-after-resource, despite its limitations, and more available to some than others.
By the same token, its misuse bespeaks considerable instability. The selectorate in post-
independent Kazakhstan has become a broker of competing identities, networks and
interests (with Nazarbaev as the constant factor). Much of what Waterbury writes on
Morocco could be applied to Kazakhstan. According to Waterbury, the Moroccan
political fabric is composed of a multitude of clienteles each seeking to "create or corner
a patrimony and then defend it". The King stands at the summit of this pyramid: "the
monarchy is the major distributor of spoils and patronage in Morocco, and it considers
the entire elite as its clientele group. To maintain its following.., the palace manipulates
its systems of rewards. . to great advantage". In this sense, Nazarbaev has been
extraordinarily adept at using the tool of patronage as a factor of elite stability. That
said, there is an important sense in which Nazarbaev differs: he does not have the
traditional legitimacy or the security of succession of a monarch.
In sum, where power is effectively centralised in an authoritarian bureaucracy,
or on the other hand well-diffused, patronage is correspondingly less common. When
power is neither effectively centralised, nor well-diffused - somewhere in the middle as
in the case of a fragmented centralised political elite as is Kazakhstan's - patronage
assumes added importance.
Elite fragmentation can partly explain the authoritarian nature of the regime.
Authoritarianism can act as a partial antidote to a fragmented elite. The study of
Kazakhstan's political elite can perhaps improve our understanding of the republic's
political system. Its approach provides an alternative explanation for centralised
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presidential power, and supplements other reasons in the literature on presidentialism
explaining Central Asia's failure to democratise. 4 Higley et a!. provide a schema of how
elite types correspond to particular political systems, and they show how a fragmented
elite is generally associated with authoritarian systems. 5
 Kazakhstan would appear to fit
with this correlation.
What has been the effect of this fragmentation on the degree of elite integration?
The picture is not clear-cut. Let us take the parameters we specified in the Introduction:
social homogeneity, recruitment patterns, and value consensus. That the post-
independence contemporary political elite has its origins primarily in the Soviet elite
provides some social homogeneity in terms of education and origins. The core elite
itself has become increasingly unified in terms of one of two social origins - it is
composed of either the extended family of the President or loyal technocrats. They are
united by their loyalty to the president. The political class is occupationally
homogeneous and still mainly southern in origin.
In terms of recruitment, the agglutination model does appear to apply. The
political elite has become increasingly closed. There is a strong degree of elite
circulation, where the same members of the political elite have survived during these
seven years.
In terms of the degree of value consensus, no definitive conclusions can be
made. Values are subjective at the best of times, but this is a closed elite which is
unwilling to talk about its values and opinions and above all about its views on political
decisions. 6 What can be tentatively gleaned, however, is a tacit agreement among the
political elite about the rules of the game, which would fit with Meisel's argument that
for a political elite to exist and operate it has to be a conspiracy. The political elite
appeared united by a consensus about the process of government, which principally
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dictated that conflict is camouflaged and opposition or rapid change is undesirable. This
harmony is contradicted, however, by a culture of conspiracy, mutual suspicion and
cynicism in a period of political and economic transition strongly marked by the
absence of law and the lure of economic gain.
It appears, indeed, that socio-economic change has begun to transform the
alignments, composition and outlook of the political elite. Brzezinski and Huntington,
in their study of United States and Soviet Union elite turnover, state that such change
"does not guarantee new policies, but it makes them possible." 7 Marketisation has
assisted the emergence of some new business entrepreneurs. The majority of the
political elite studied here consists, however, of members of the former Soviet political
elite. This continuity suggests that structure is less important than agency in this early
transitional stage, that the same leaders can (and sometimes must for the lack of any
alternatives) remain in power despite the collapse of the structure of the command
economy. Is the importance of agency then reflected in differing outputs? We were to
some degree able to measure this correlation with regard to economic reform since the
economic sector has seen the greatest number of new recruits at the policy-level.
Chapter 111.2 on economic policy suggests that composition has made a difference to
output. Nevertheless, we also inferred a surprising degree of congruence, for example
on attitudes to marketisation from both former apparatchild and present entrepreneurs.
Kazakhstan has thus provided a further example that the link between opinion and
behaviour is never simple,8 and would confirm C. Wright Mills' statement that: "We
cannot infer the direction of policy merely from the social origins and careers of the
policy makers".9
Overall, and crucially, the structure of the elite has narrowed in Ka.zakhstan. The
background of the top power holders was increasingly differentiated from the political
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elite at lower echelons of power. This narrowed political elite has been remarkably
adept at monopolising the cultural, political and economic policies of independent
Kazakhstan. It has so far prevented an effective nationalist counterelite from
developing, it has centralised power and it has co-opted the political counterelite
through various institutional mechanisms and recruitment policies. Economically, the
political elite has managed to keep its hold over the business elite either by continuing
to control the principal resources or by co-opting the business elite into the ranks of the
political elite.
Thus, neither the power nor pluralist paradigm appears an apt illustration of the
elite. The "power elite" suggests a number of interlocking, but separate elites - in
C.Wright Mills' case of the United States, the interlocking of the military, business and
political. This does not (yet) apply in Kazakhstan. In the absence of genuinely
competitive elections nor is it a pluralist political elite. "Fused political elite" might be
the best term: there is no distinct political elite because, for the above reasons, it is
inseparable from the business or cultural elite.
Finally, we look at the implications of elite composition, structure and policies
for the political stability of the Republic. We do not here assess other, potentially more
important, factors contributing to political stability, such as economic growth,
democratisation or interethnic relations. Some brief, tentative points on the likely effects
of oil revenue on political stability will however be made at the close.
The thesis has attempted to demonstrate that the relationship between the
contemporary political elite and political stability is still unclear. This inability to draw
any definitive conclusion can be illustrated by looking at three aspects of the political
elite: its relations with society; its configuration at the national level; and, the relations
between the national and regional elite.
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The Republic is likely to remain most stable at the level of elite-society
relations. Regimes with a narrow elite, a fragmented, disenfranchised population and a
weak civil society, such as in the Middle East, have proven remarkably durable. This is
partly because the population does not expect power to be "legitimate": despite clear
anti-democratic measures of the Nazarbaev regime, there have been few popular
protests. That also partly stems from economic chaos when politics becomes a luxury.
Intra-elite stability, in turn, can work both ways. On the one hand, the frequent
reshuffles at the top are likely to continue. These personnel changes are due to the
dominance of the recruitment process by a single individual, President Nazarbaev.
When a member of the political elite displays either disloyalty or ambition he is
sidelined. These reshuffles are a source of instability, as they create considerable
discontinuity in policy-making and relations with foreign actors. By isolating himself in
Astana, Nazarbaev may be increasingly unable to broker these southern networks and
act as patron. Therefore, although the move to Astana was conceived by some as a
means for Nazarbaev to distance himself from the nepotism of the South, it may also
contribute to more frequent reshuffles by the President in his eagerness to keep a hold
on regions through divide-and-rule tactics.
Conversely, there are mitigating factors of stability at the intra-elite level. The
political elite consists largely of the same individuals as it did eight years ago.
Individuals have 'circulated' rather than disappeared. This deliberate policy of
'circulation' on the part of Nazarbaev has maintained the loyalty of a good part of the
political elite. In the absence of a united national army with real political influence, a
military coup is highly unlikely. The issue of succession is not yet on the agenda and its
precise form is difficult to predict. It is likely to be marked by fierce internal battles of
the incumbent elite, given its fragmented nature. But under present circumstances - the
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absence of a weak national army and the marginalisation of the opposition - succession
is likely to be relatively smooth. The successor to Nazarbaev is thus likely to come from
within the ranks of the incumbent elite. In the meanwhile Nazarbaev has already
declared his intention to stand for re-election in 2006.
It is probably fair to posit that the principal strains on the political system will
emerge from relations between the centre and the periphery. The thesis has been
concerned with the national political elite between 1991 and 1998 and thus only
generalisations can be made here about the regional elite. The thesis has hinted at a
growing regional divergence. The key post-Soviet variable to cause this diversification
has been foreign investment. While the Western oil-producing and Northern metals-
trading areas have become key beneficiaries of foreign capital, the Southern, mainly
agricultural, areas have been largely neglected. In the resource-endowed areas foreign
investors have struck strategic alliances with the regional administrations. These
alliances, largely dependent on the goodwill of the akim, have become entrenched.
Entrenchment has in some cases divested Nazarbaev of effective appointment powers.
In Mangistau, for example, we saw how the President has twice removed but twice
reinstated the regional akim. This may result in a figurehead national elite with little
meaningful power in some key regions. Some tribute or family-linked remittances may
come back to Astana but this may not necessarily be the case and it is again too early to
predict. The optimal means of countering a growing resentment of central interference
by these richer regions may be to allow the election of the local akim and to grant
meaningful powers to local legislative bodies.
Despite these centrifugal forces, secession by the regions or disintegration of the
unitary state is unlikely. The move to Astana will tend to strengthen the centre's grip
over the northern regions, as will the reduction of the number of regions from 20 to 14.
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To date akims have limited their demands to a fairer redistribution of taxes to avoid
unfair penalisation of the richer regions; none have harboured serious secessionist
claims. Instead, the national elite may close itself off, making its composition less
important because in some regions it will become largely ineffective.
Ultimately, in these early years Nazarbaev has proven extraordinarily adept at
managing his political elite. He has maintained the loyalty of the senior members of
various groupings through careful patronage. He has successfully neutralised tensions
by incorporating foreign experts among his cadre of advisors and by stressing policies
that appeal to various constituencies. By introducing external parties with less stake in
the regime the president has thus reduced tensions. This neutralisation appears above all
embodied in his Strategy 2030, with its emphasis on big decisions, broad outlooks and
long-term perspectives. This strategy is also designed to bring the political elite
together, to provide them with a goal and an élan, above all with patriotism. It is a
sensible approach; the challenges of an independent state demand strategic and not just
tactical decisions. As former Presidential aid Sabit Zhusupov concluded: "the emphasis
on the strategic can in many ways explain the specifics of the way the Kazakhstani
political system is functioning, indeed the sovereign state as a whole."° The emphasis
on technocracy is designed to deliver economic growth and exclude potential political
rivals from government. This is very traditional monarchial politics - and all the more
important for a politician without the institutional charisma or legitimacy of a monarch.
The political elite regards oil revenue as the best guarantee of stability. Revenue,
its members say, will finance the budget deficit. They will allow a redistribution of
income to society. They will increase the economic pie and allow more members of the
political elite to benefit. This might increase the cohesion of the political elite. Less
burden will be placed on the richer regions to subsidise the poor. However, while these
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are attractive gains in principle, the reality may well be different. Much will depend on
the actual quantity of oil, the willingness of foreigners to invest, and the ability to
construct alternative pipeline routes. Undeniably, oil will raise the stakes of the political
game. Given the already fragmented nature of the elite, oil will probably serve to
strengthen these divisions, which in turn might evolve into increasingly tense regional
disparities and relations.
All of the above issues are crucial in an attempt to evaluate Kazakhstan's future
stability. They are, however, beyond the scope of this thesis; instead the thesis has
above all attempted to illustrate and explain the contemporary make-up of the national
elite, the importance in this transitional period of agency over structure, of individuals
over institutions and of the relationship, if any, between socioeconomic variables and
elite composition. The other equally important issues of geopolitics, mineral wealth,
economic reform and centre-periphery relations are the subject of another enquiry.
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APPENDIX: APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
This Appendix provides an overview of the methodology that has been employed in this
thesis. It will become apparent as the narrative evolves how crucial was the choice of
methodology and how revealing it is or is not about the structure of society.
I. APPROACH
Primarily concerned with exploratory research, the foremost aim of the methodology
was to establish a means of determining the political elite in post-independent
Kazakhstan, and then applying that mechanism to the realities on ground.
2. AIMS
The aims of the methodology are three-fold:
(a) to identify the political elite (whose parameters are defined in the Introduction);
(b) to locate sources on the political elite; and
(c) to interview the core elite where possible.
(a) Identifying the political elite
Various authors have waxed lyrical about the problems of finding the powerful.'
Broadly speaking, social scientists have used three strategies for identifying elites:
positional analysis, reputational analysis, and decisional analysis. The most important
point about "finding the powerful" was to be systematic in my selection, criteria and
interviewing of the core political elite (see Introduction).
Positional, or locational, analysis, assumes that powerful people are located in
the institutions of government. In other words, people derive power itself from
institutional roles. The key treatise written in this assumption is C. Wright Mills' The
Power Elite: "To be celebrated, to be wealthy, to have power requires access to major
institutions, for the institutional positions men occupy determine in large part their
chances to have and to hold these valued experiences". 2
 Because formal institutions
usually keep good records, positional analysis is the easiest and most common
technique for finding the powerful. There are immediate flaws, however. This type of
analysis assumes that we know which institutions are politically significant, but neglects
the possible existence of individuals who merely rubber-stamp decisions. More
seriously, this method ignores the indirect influence of those figures not located in
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governmental institutions. Where institutional architecture is in its very infancy and
where informal networks are at least as important as formal networks (particularly true
of Kazakhstan), this is a serious shortcoming.
Reputational analysis relies, not on formal organisation charts, but on informal
reputations of power. Usually a "panel of experts", or "informants", deemed to have
observed political machinations from close up is involved. It also relies on opinion polls
taken at various times by the media. This technique is founded on the assumption that
participants in a system will know who is powerful and who is not. It incorporates
powerful figures whose influence is also indirect or implicit. However, reputational
analysis also has grave weaknesses, for a researcher using this method must decide
whom to ask and what to ask. Errors in choosing informants may irreparably bias the
results. The reputational approach is most closely associated with Floyd Hunter's study
of communal power structure.3
The reputational approach is closely related to the third main technique for
identifying the powerful - decisional analysis. This method - sometimes called event
analysis - is based on the assumption that if political power is defined in terms of
influence over government activities, we can detect it by studying how specific
decisions are reached, and, in particular, by noting who successfully initiates or vetoes
proposals. In the best-known application of decisional analysis, Robert A. Dahi studied
decisions in New Haven, Connecticut, on three issues: urban redevelopment, public
education, and nominations for public oflice. 4 Again, there are several significant
limitations. Only a few decisions can be studied in detail, yet patterns of power may
differ from issue to issue. 5 It is also best suited for studying matters that have already
become recognised public issues.6
Because none of these methods for finding the powerful is without limitations,
some sophisticated analysts have merged several different approaches. For example, in
a pair of pioneering studies of Yugoslav and American elites, Allen Barton and his
collaborators combined positional and reputational analysis in the so-called "snowball"
technique. 7 In each country, incumbents of key formal positions constituted the initial
elite, as defined operationally. Respondents from these positions were then asked for the
names of others to whom they looked for advice or who they thought to be generally
influential. People receiving at least five such nominations were themselves added to
the elite sample, and they in turn were asked for further nominations8
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The vigorous debate among social scientists over methods for identifying the
political elite has often proceeded at too abstract a level. At times too little attention has
been paid to whether, when, and how our conclusions might be affected by our
methods. It was with this last point in mind, in particular, that I began my pilot tests of
the first two months of fieldwork. The conclusion I came to was that only a combination
of these three techniques would provide as realistic picture of those who wield
substantial influence.
I adopted the following combinations of methodology. I first adopted the
snowball technique by locating individuals by the locational and reputational methods. I
selected institutions on the basis of the Constitution and media coverage. Reputations
were gleaned from an independent panel of experts that I established consisting of
inside informers, journalists, political scientists, the generally interested and informed,
and the foreign community (mainly chosen for their impartiality and often closer
dealings with the community). This panel of experts is elaborated below. In addition I
scanned the newspapers over two separate periods of one hundred days (in 1992 and in
1995). I also compiled a list of issues that the experts, media and other sources had put
as the top ten facing Kazakhstan in its first five years of independence. This would also
allow me to gauge, up to a degree, which individuals had been involved in the decision-
making process. Nevertheless, decisions are closed and access to signatures and policy
proposals was rare. Most information here was revealed by informers from the inside
who were simply keen to assist and who did not fear too much for their positions.
Such a combination of methodologies had to be treated with caution. Combining
them required a systematic process of elimination of some members of the political
elite. This is because, unsurprisingly, not every methodology resulted in the same list of
names. To avoid confusion, I adopted the following approach. Those members of the
political elite who were common to all four methods comprised my core elite (p. 133).
Then I used Barton el al's tested "snowball technique" of combining institutional and
reputational analysis. This meant that I placed reputational analysis at the heart of my
location of the elite. If members of my institutionally-located elite were not confirmed
by my 'panel of experts' then they were only included in my list (p.127) if they were
associated with posts which were known to be institutionally powerful but about whose
individuals even a panel of experts would know relatively little. This was the case, for
example, with the presidential inspectors, the President's most loyal coterie of advisors
who provided a reliable link between him and the regions, but about whom little was
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known. The decision-making method was generally only helpful in illuminating those
who comprised the core elite since it was only core individuals who were associated
with core decisions; little of the reality of other decision-making processes were
possible to uncover. The analysis of the media also provided a means of rubber-
stamping some of the names of the core elite; individuals who appeared in the media but
who were not endorsed either by the intrinsic power of their institutions or by the panel
of experts were eliminated. In this way, it can be summarised that the panel of experts
was the Iinchpin of the four methods and served to sieve contradictions that might have
arisen from the simultaneous use of four methods. Given the importance of informal
power, however, the combination of methods was a means of reinforcing the list
generated by the panel of experts and acted as a safeguard.
An additional point needs to be made here on the final composition of the
political elite (p.1 27). The ultimate inclusion of only one editor of a major newspaper -
under the heading of 'cultural political elite'- is a useful means of highlighting how
Bottomore's definition became useful. My use of an essentially political definition of
the elite - rather than a cultural one in its own right - means that for any individual in
the cultural sphere to be included in the political elite he/she must "exercise political
power or influence, and [be] directly engaged in struggles for political leadership" (see
my p. 17). As the owner of the only independent printing press in Kazakhstan (and in
Central Asia for that matter) and as the only influential figure in his own right, only
Karavan's Boris Giller is included. He was in a position to exert real influence as an
opinion-maker, not least as his newspaper at the time of analysis enjoyed at least five
times greater circulation than that of its competitors. In other cases, the media is either
state-owned, influenced by the state or essentially a cultural channel.
To sum up, the convergence of formal and informal power had to be taken into
account in the context of Kazakhstan. The relationship between concepts and data is
dialectical, and concepts and definitions needed to be be reassessed and reshaped in the
post-Soviet context of Kazakhstan.
(b) Sources on the political elite
The reliance on reputational analysis required a competent, ideologically diverse
and well-informed 'panel of experts'. The following consists of a summary of my
"panel of experts". It indicates its composition (according to the occupation, status,
background) and why these particular 55 individuals were chosen.
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a. 14 Journalists and Academics
This group included 5 journalists from independent radio and TV stations, 2 from
state-owned newspapers, 3 from independent newspapers, and 4 academics. Here
the main criterion of selection (where possible) was a broad range of ideologies and
subject areas of specialisation. Of the journalists and academics, 8 were ethnic
Russian and 6 were ethnic Kazakh; 10 of the 14 were aged between 25 and 40; the
remaining 4 were over 40. I initially selected journalists and academics whom I had
known from two previous years' experience in the Republic. They suggested fi.irther
specialists in their field.
b. 10 local political office-holders (2 from the presidential administration, 2 from
government ministries, 4 from parliament and 2 from local government). 6 of the
local 'informers' were ethnic Kazakh, 3 Russian and I German. 8 of the 10 were
aged between 25 and 40 and the remaining 2 were over 40 years of age. This list
took longer to compile because it was based on individuals whose trust I gained
between 1992 and 1996.
c. 21 foreign businessmen and diplomats (3 from international organisations (UN
and IMF); 5 from foreign embassies (Britain, the Czech Republic, France, Israel,
Japan and the United Sates); 5 from US company representative offices; 5 from
European company representative offices; and, 3 from non-governmental
organisations). 80% of these foreign representatives were chairmen of local
companies and 65% of these foreign representatives had been resident in
Kazakhstan for over three years. They were chosen on the basis of their reputation
in Kazakhstan, their access to the President, and their representation of a broad
spectrum of economic sectors and interests.
d. 10 local businessmen (2 from state mineral extraction companies, 2 from state
production companies, 2 from private trading companies, and 4 from local
consultancies). They were chosen on the basis of their access to the President, their
degree of inside knowledge and my personal acquaintance with them. 80% of these
local businessmen were between the age of 25 and 40, 20% were over 60. 65% of
local businessmen were ethnic Kazakh, 25% Russian, 5% German and 5% Korean.
Furthermore, I used the following sources on the political elite: my panel of
experts, informal data (a good deal highly speculative and subjective, but this form of
evidence in this sort of setting invariably needs to be used); newspapers; biographical
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data; government directories. The key Russian-language newspapers used were:
Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, Sovety Kazakhslana, De/ovaya Nedelya, Panorama,
Karavan, and Kazakh-language newspapers Egemen Qazaqslan, Ana Till, Jaz A/ash,
and Zaman Qazaqastan. The key sources of biographical data were: A. Z. Asylbekov,
V. N. Voloshin and V.N. Klyoupin, Kb Es! ' Kb VRespublike Kazakhsban (Almaty:
Evraziya-Polis, 1995); D. R. Ashimbaev, Kb Es!' Kb VRespublike Kazakhstan
(Almaty: Karzhy-Karazhat, 1995); individual biographies were also sourced from
Kazakhslanskaya Pravda. The key government directories used were: Spisok Telefonov
Rukovodiielei Oblastei, 1995 and 1996; Spisok Telefonov Rukovodyashchikh
Rabobnikov Organov Gosudarstvennogo Upravleniya, Parliinykh, Obshcheslvennykh I
Dnigikh Organizaisli Kazakhskoi SSR, July 1991 and January 1995; Spisok Te/efonov
Rabotnikov Adminisirabsil Prezidenta Respub/iki Kazakhsban, October 1992 and April
1996; and Spisok Depulabov Verkhovnogo Soveba Respubliki Kazakhsian (12th
Parliament, 1993).
(c) To interview the core elite
Part of my information on the elite was determined from interviews. This formed some
of the fieldwork that was carried out principally over a period of one year. For this
reason, I did not interview individuals throughout the seven-year period. Clearly, this
poses problems in that the composition of the elite has changed and individuals have
changed their opinions. Ideally, one would wish to interview the same individual
throughout the five years to detect any transformations. Time and money did not allow
for this.
I knew prior to my fieldwork that I would not be using questionnaires. The
culture in Kazakhstan is not written, and the likelihood of receiving informatively
completed questionnaires was very slim. I opted instead for unstructured interviewing
(based on techniques acquired at the LSE Methodology Institute 1994-5), which
necessitated the compilation of topic guides. Rather than providing a straightjacket for
the interviews, these provided me with a guide to the topics that I needed to cover in the
interview, ensuring uniformity and systemisation of approach. I compiled the topic
guide in both Russian and English. When appropriate, interviews were recorded.
Approximately 40% of my interview data was useful. I interviewed twenty members of
the core elite, including the Prime Minister.9
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Because the number I interviewed was small I used 'Framework' as the method
of qualitative data analysis. 'Framework' is an analytical process which involves a
number of distinct though highly interconnected stages. Although the process is
presented as following a particular order and is actually systematic and disciplined, it
relies on the creative and conceptual ability of the analyst to determine meaning,
salience and connections. The strength of an approach like "Framework" is that by
following a well-defined procedure, it is possible to reconsider and rework ideas
precisely because the analytical process has been documented and is therefore
accessible. The five stages to qualitative data analysis involved in "framework" are:
(I) Familiarisation (i.e., becoming familiar with the range and diversity of the data);
(2) Identifying a thematic framework (process of abstraction and conceptualisation) (3)
Indexing (where a thematic framework is systematically applied to the data in its textual
form);
(4) Charting (where data is 'lifted' from the original context and rearranged according
to the appropriate thematic reference); and,
(5) Mapping and interpretation. (which involved defining concepts, mapping the range
and nature of phenomena, creating typologies, finding associations, providing
explanations and developing strategies).'°
3. LIMITS TO MY ANALYSIS
There are a number of limits to my analysis. This thesis does not set out to analyse
regional recruitment dynamics, but focuses on the national elite. But since
decentralisation has not occurred and power remains vertically centralised, this
exclusion can be justified. Second, the nature of this thesis means that some sources
either cannot be revealed or are based on anecdotal evidence. Third, since only seven
years of independence have passed, definitive conclusions are premature. Fourth, this
thesis does not purport to claim that the elite factor is the only factor worthy of analysis
in transition, nor can it have the space to analyse other factors essential to Kazakhstan's
successful development. It does, assume, however that the elite factor is crucial.
As a final note, locating the elite was not without its physical and psychological
hazards. In interviewing what I had conceived to be an informant of a popular
newspaper, roles were quickly reversed. An article of that newspaper the following day
described me as a Westerner keen to discover the size of bank accounts of the Kazakh
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elite and that, in the tme spirit of a good, racy detective story, all could not wait for the
last page of my work where the name of the richest of them all could be revealed.
Needless to say, I had great difficulty in gaining any access anywhere in the subsequent
few weeks. The same public attention occurred in Pavlodar, where "a mysterious young
Englishwoman" in "less than a week" had managed to interview "nearly all the
members of the regional administration"." Suspicion always shrouded my activities,
and the Ministry of Interior kept track of my activities. The reaction of the regions to
my arrival was very different. While the regional administration of Pavlodar sent one of
their own employees to accompany me to all the interviews, those of Shymkent left me
unaccompanied. As we shall see as the thesis unfolds, this has much to do with the
increased regional differentiation, a product of both geopolitics and foreign investment.
4. TRANSLITERATION
For Russian transliteration, the Library of Congress system has been used throughout.
In terms of Kazakh transliteration, more familiar forms have been preferred than the use
of a Turkic transcription system. Thus, for example, zh is often used in preference toj
and k is used for q such as in Kazakh, rather than Qazaq (except where usage dictates,
such as in Qazaq Till, the Kazakh language organisation).'2
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